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Titre 
Trois essais sur l’influence des stratégies d’entreprises sur 
la performance des filiales 
 
Résumé 
 
Cette thèse étudie comment et dans quelle mesure les décisions stratégiques des firmes 
multi-divisionnelles affectent la performance de leurs filiales. Elle contribue aux débats 
récurrents liés l’importance de la stratégie d’entreprise, du ressort des sièges sociaux, dont le 
but est d’optimiser la performance de l’ensemble des filiales, comparée aux stratégies des 
filiales (business strategy) dédiées à optimiser leur performance. L’enjeu de ce débat est de 
mieux comprendre les leviers d’action des sièges sociaux et d’éclairer les choix d’allocation 
des ressources en prenant en considérations les interdépendances ou synergies potentielles 
entre les filiales, ce que la littérature a peu étudié jusqu’alors.  
Dans le premier chapitre, nous nous intéressons à la question de l’importance relative 
des décisions stratégiques des sièges sociaux sur la performance de leurs établissements. Cette 
question fait l’objet d’un débat toujours ouvert depuis l’article de Schmalensee (1985) 
montrant que les effets industrie était les plus significatifs dans la détermination de la 
performance des filiales. Un nombre de travaux important ont depuis affiné les outils 
méthodologiques permettant de comparer les effets fixes des sièges sociaux, aux effets 
industries et filiales. Après avoir comparé les différents résultats mis en avant dans la 
littérature, nous montrons l’incapacité des méthodes traditionnelles à rendre compte 
efficacement des effets entreprises. Nous soutenons en effet que les études précédentes sous-
estiment systématiquement les effets des sièges sociaux car elles ne tiennent pas compte des 
effets différenciés des décisions des sièges sociaux sur leurs filiales. En effet, très peu de 
choix stratégiques concernent toutes les filiales de manière homogène. Par exemple, une 
décision de fusion-acquisition affectera (positivement ou négativement) la profitabilité d’une 
filiale selon qu’elle soit ou non concernée par les activités de la nouvelle filiale. Une fusion 
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engendre presque systématiquement une réorganisation et donc un redéploiement de 
ressources. En fonction des caractéristiques de la filiale et des synergies potentielles avec 
l’entreprise acquise, elle se trouvera dans une position plus ou moins avantageuse vis-à-vis 
des autres filiales de l’entreprise et pourra recevoir ou se voir confisquer une quantité plus ou 
moins significative de ressources. Par conséquent, le fait d’étudier, comme le font l’essentiel 
des études s’intéressant à la stratégie des sièges sociaux, toutes les filiales comme s’il 
s’agissait d’un seul groupe sous-estime systématiquement les effets entrepris. Nous proposons 
plutôt de tenir compte de la variance induite par les décisions des sièges sociaux sur la 
performance des filiales et montrons qu’il existe un effet différencié par filiale. Nous appelons 
cette variance induite un « effet variable » pour le distinguer de l’effet traditionnel qui, par 
définition, est « invariant » en ce qu’il rend compte d’un effet homogène sur la performance 
des filiales. Cette approche originale révèle que cet effet variable est aussi important que 
l’effet des sièges sociaux traditionnel. Elle nous permet surtout de montrer que la valeur totale 
des effets sièges sociaux est e même ampleur que les effets filiales et donc beaucoup plus 
élevés que les travaux précédents. 
Dans le deuxième chapitre nous nous sommes intéressés au débat relatif à l’efficacité 
des marchés internes de capitaux. Les choix d’allocation du capital sont reconnus comme une 
des sources essentielles d’hétérogénéité quant à la performance des filiales. Le débat se 
justifie par les résultats des études empiriques récents mettant en évidence des choix 
d’allocation très différents des allocations optimales telles qu’elles sont prescrites par la 
théorie standard. De fait, ces résultats concluent à niveaux de croissance relativement faibles. 
Les écarts observés sont justifiés par des déviances comportementales, qu’elles soient dues à 
des problèmes d’agence (liés à des asymétries d’information importante entre le dirigeant de 
la filiale et les membres du siège social) ou des biais cognitifs. Dans ce chapitres, nous 
proposons de modifier le cadre analytique prenant à la fois en compte le degré d’incertitude 
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auquel la firme est confrontée lorsqu’elle décide d’allouer son capital et du niveau 
d’interdépendance de ses filiales. Ce cadre conceptuel nous permet de distinguer les choix 
inefficaces, au sens de la théorie standard, de choix « déviants » mais que nous montrons 
justifiés une fois considérés les niveaux d’incertitude et d’interdépendance des filiales. Ainsi, 
la logique de winner picking - investir systématiquement dans les filiales positionnées sur les 
marchés les plus porteurs-  peut s’avérer sous- optimale compte-tenu des caractéristiques 
spécifiques de chaque filiale et des interdépendances potentielles entre les filiales. Des choix 
différents peuvent ne pas relever de biais comportementaux mais d’intentions stratégiques 
prenant en considération des spécificités liées à chaque filiale telles que leur taille relative, le 
risque lié au retour sur investissement ou aux synergies potentilles entre filiales. Notre 
approche empirique susceptible d’estimer le rôle de l’incertitude dans la prise de décision 
consiste à prendre en considération la diversité des expertises du PDG de l’entreprise. Notre 
hypothèse consiste à prédire un effet modérateur positif sur la relation entre incertitude et la 
performance de la firme. Un PDG aux expertises diversifiées doit être plus à même 
d’anticiper les effets liés à l’incertitude et prendre de meilleures décisions. Cette relation étant 
confirmée, nous montrons donc un résultat intéressant d’un point de vue managérial. Les 
PDG ayant démontré une capacité à assurer leur fonction dans différents environnements 
industriels sont plus à même de gérer les incertitudes liées aux environnements instables et 
imprévisibles et à prendre les décisions d’allocation des ressources adaptées.  
 Le troisième chapitre approfondit cette problématique en s’intéressant aux 
mécanismes justifiant la nécessité de prendre en considération les caractéristiques des filiales 
lors de décisions d’allocation du capital de l’entreprise. Ce chapitre porte sur les effets 
inégaux des décisions en matière de redéploiement de ressources au sein de la firme. Dans le 
but de mettre en évidence la portée générale de notre analyse, notre première contribution 
consiste à incorporer les ressources financières comme des ressources sujettes à des arbitrages 
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lors des décisions de redéploiement. Le capital financier est, par définition, parfaitement 
fongible et infiniment divisible, donc supposé inconditionnellement redéployable si 
nécessaire. Notre propos consiste à montrer que des irréversibilités de l’investissement réalisé 
impose une prise en compte de contraintes propre au capital physique quelle que soit la nature 
des ressources allouées. Traditionnellement, seules des ressources imparfaitement divisibles 
et ou imparfaitement fongibles sont supposées faire l’objet d’arbitrage lors de décisions 
d’investissements ou de réallocation de ressources. Par définition, elles engendrent une 
irréversibilité et sont susceptibles d’engendrer des coûts d’opportunité. La théorie standard a 
exclu les ressources financières de cette problématique puisque, par définition, elles peuvent 
être librement réallouées vers tout type d’investissement sans contrainte. Nous propos 
consistent toutefois à considérer que lors qu’elles sont allouées à une filiale, ces ressources 
financières sont en réalité investies dans du capital physique, tel que des usines ou des 
ressources technologiques. Dès lors, le choix d’investissement présent doit être réalisé en 
tenant compte des coûts de redéploiement éventuels dans le futur. En d’autres termes, à cet 
investissement est attaché l’achat d’une option de redéploiement de ces ressources dans le 
futur. Par conséquent, la direction des flux de capitaux actuels entre les filiales ne sera pas 
simplement réalisée en fonction des opportunités actuelles de croissance relative du marché, 
mais aussi en fonction des coûts d’ajustements dus aux redéploiements éventuels entre les 
filiales dans les périodes ultérieures. Lors de l’affectation du capital, le siège social doit donc 
tenir compte de la flexibilité de redéploiement potentiel des ressources. Ce résultat nous 
permet de conclure qu’il est légitime d’étendre la théorie du redéploiement des ressources aux 
pratiques d’allocation du capital financier. Cette extension, outre l’intérêt qu’elle représente 
en matière de choix d’investissement, permet d’étendre le champ d’études empiriques de la 
théorie du redéploiement aux domaines liées aux ressources non-financières. En effet, les 
études empiriques dans ces domaines sont rares en raison du défi que représente l'observation 
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et la mesure du redéploiement des ressources non financières. Ainsi, l’intégration du capital 
financier dans les champs d’investigation peut augurer d’études plus fines et plus nombreuses 
nous permettant de mieux comprendre les choix stratégiques réalisés par les grandes 
entreprises multi-divisionnelles. 
 
 
Mots-clés: Stratégie de corporation; sièges sociaux; théorie du redéploiement des ressources; 
marché intérieur du capital 
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Title 
Three Essays on How Firms’ Strategies Affect the 
Performance of Subsidiary Businesses  
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation deals with how multi-business firms’ strategies affect the performance of 
subsidiary businesses and contributes to long standing debates in corporate strategy. Overall, 
each of my 3 dissertation essays are designed to, correspondingly, analyze the debated 
magnitude, efficiency, and mechanism of the effect of a multi-business firms’ strategies on the 
performance of its subsidiaries.  
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I address a root question in corporate level 
strategy; I question traditional methods to estimate corporate effects (the effect of corporate 
headquarters on subsidiary businesses’ performance) and analyze whether and to what extent 
corporate headquarters “really” affect the performance of their subsidiary businesses. I argue 
that previous corporate effect studies fail to account for the uneven impact of corporate 
decisions on subsidiaries. A headquarters makes conscious and deliberate decisions that induce 
performance heterogeneity among its subsidiaries. Depending on the relative characteristics of 
a business unit compared to its sister businesses, it may receive different shares of corporate 
resources. Consequently, considering all subsidiaries as a bundle will systematically 
underestimate the corporate effects. Rather, I argue that it is important to account for the firm’s 
induced variance on the subsidiaries’ performance. We connote this induced variance as 
“business-variant corporate effects”, and show that they are just as important in magnitude as 
the value of the standard corporate effects, namely “business-invariant corporate effects”, found 
in previous studies. 
In the second essay, I focus on corporate capital allocation as a critical dimension of 
corporate strategies that might contribute to, within-firm, subsidiaries’ performance 
heterogeneity. We particularly delve deeper into the internal capital market efficiency debate by 
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extending current theories that aim to justify why headquarters provide more resources, than 
internal capital market theory would suggest, to subsidiaries with seemingly lower growth 
opportunities. Considering both the level of uncertainty a firm faces when making capital 
allocation decisions, and the level of interdependence among its subsidiaries, we disentangle 
between inefficient and not-necessarily-inefficient deviations from standard models’ 
prescription. We explain that deviations from the logic of winner-picking in capital allocation 
decisions (i.e., investing relatively more in subsidiaries with higher growth opportunities) may 
simply reflect different strategic intents rather than allocation inefficiencies. Furthermore, we 
consider the breadth of CEOs’ prior experience in subsidiaries’ domain, as a source of firms’ 
capital allocation competency. We then highlight the role of this breadth of CEOs’ experience 
in attenuating inefficient deviations and enhancing corporate value through better capital 
allocation practices. 
 The third essay focuses on corporate resource redeployments as a source of uneven 
effects of headquarters’ decisions on subsidiary businesses. My first contribution is to 
incorporate financial resources, as a perfectly fungible and divisible resource, within the 
scope of the resource redeployment theory. Indivisibility and imperfect fungibility of 
resources play a critical role in the theory and this is why the standard theory has excluded the 
financial resources from its boundaries. I, however, argue that when allocating financial 
resources, such as capital, to one of its subsidiaries to acquire non-financial assets such as 
plants or technology, a corporate headquarters also purchases the option to redeploy those 
same resources in subsequent periods. Therefore, the direction of current capital flow among 
subsidiary businesses will not merely be a function of their current relative market growth 
opportunities. Rather, this flow of capital also is a function of the adjustment costs of 
potential resource redeployments among the subsidiaries in subsequent periods. In other 
words, headquarters do consider the potential “future” redeployment flexibility of resources 
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when allocating capital. Consequently, we expect to see trace evidence of non-financial 
resource redeployment theory in corporate capital allocation practices. Empirical studies in 
this area have been scarce so far, due to the challenge of observing and measuring the 
redeployment of non-financial resources. Thus, my extension of the resource redeployment 
theory to include intrafirm capital allocations paves the way for further empirical 
investigations of the theory. In turn, studying intrafirm capital allocations through the lens of 
RR theory helps us further develop and offer novel predictions for the theory.   
 
Keywords: Corporate strategy; corporate effect; corporate resource allocation; resource 
redeployment theory; internal capital market 
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INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation is inspired by a twenty-year-long debate on the main source of business-level 
performance heterogeneity (McGahan and Porter, 1997; Misangyi et al., 2006; Rumelt, 1991). 
Whether some scholars argued that business units hold the greatest effect on performance 
heterogeneity, or others advocated for the strong role of industry and firm positioning, the 
peripheral result of the debate was that corporate effect relative to industry and business effects 
is not a very important source of business-level performance heterogeneity. This poses a 
conundrum as to why it is still important to learn about topics of diversification, merger & 
acquisition, corporate resource allocation, etc. when corporate strategy itself is argued to have 
no important effect on performance. As such, my thesis intends to uncover the sources of 
corporate effect (the effect of corporate headquarters on subsidiary businesses’ performance) 
and also suggest a better estimation for it. As this introduction details, my research project – 
originally meant to contribute to long standing debate on the magnitude of corporate effect on 
subsidiaries’ performance – was further deepened to studying and contributing to 
complementary corporate-level debates on the efficiency, and mechanisms underlying the 
corporate effect. 
 The first essay of my thesis analyzes the potential underestimation of corporate effect 
(or corporate strategy in general) by the extant work. As is reported in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, we find that previous corporate effect studies fail to account for the uneven impact 
of corporate decisions on subsidiaries. This failure to do so systematically leads to 
underestimating corporate effect. Aiming to optimize the overall performance, a headquarters 
makes conscious and deliberate decisions that might induce performance heterogeneity among 
its subsidiaries. For example, depending on the relative characteristics of a business unit 
compared to its sister businesses, it may receive different shares of corporate resources, and so 
corporate headquarters’ performance contributions. Consequently, attempting to study 
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corporate effect on the subsidiaries as a bundle will systematically underestimate such effect. 
Rather, for such analysis, it is important to account for the intentionally induced variance of the 
subsidiaries’ performance. We connote this induced variance as “business-variant corporate 
effects”, and show that the magnitude of “business-variant corporate effects” is just as important 
as the previously studied corporate effects, which we connote as “business-invariant corporate 
effects”. 
Interestingly, the two core research streams capable of explaining a headquarters’ 
uneven contributions to its subsidiaries’ performance, have been developed independently and 
separately. On the one hand, the theory of resource redeployment (Anand, 2004; Anand, Kim 
and Lu, 2016; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Lieberman, Lee, and Folta, 2017; Sakhaertov and 
Folta, 2014, 2015) contends that a multi-business firm redeploys its non-financial resources in 
order to achieve intra or inter-temporal economies of scope.1 Optimality of resource allocation, 
according to this theory, is essentially affected by path-dependency and firm-specific measures 
(Sakhartov, 2017). In other words, the theory advocates that the current decisions of a firm may 
influence the optimality of the future decisions. On the other hand, the theory of internal capital 
markets (Stein, 1997; Williamson, 1975) suggests that multi-business firms may create value 
through allocating financial resources - particularly capital - internally more efficiently than 
external capital markets could. This efficiency relies on headquarters’ managers having better 
access to the information of the businesses than external intermediaries do. Therefore, internal 
capital markets are justified (only) to compensate for external markets’ inefficiencies. 
Subsequent empirical work, in internal capital market line of inquiry, extends this thought and 
assumes that, similarly to an external capital market, an internal capital market is efficient only 
if it tilts the capital towards the businesses active in more attractive markets, i.e. picks the 
                                                     
1 Whereas the former economies arise from the simultaneous and synergistic use of resources by different 
subsidiary businesses, the flexibility and the ease, i.e. low adjustment cost, of withdrawing the resource from the 
current endeavor and allocating it to another endeavor results in the latter economies. 
19 
 
winners (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Billett and Mauer, 2003; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Rajan et al., 2000). The optimal capital flow between any two subsidiary businesses of a multi-
business firm is argued to be a function of their relative market opportunities. As a consequence, 
the optimal capital flow between any two subsidiaries is independent of the rest of the firm. 
Unfortunately, these two lines of research both have suffered the above mentioned problem, 
i.e., being developed independently from the other. First, the empirical studies of internal 
capital market suffer validity issues. While reporting significant capital allocation inefficiency 
(i.e., deviation from winner-picking approach), existing work proves unable to link this 
inefficiency to actual corporate value destruction (e.g., Billett and Mauer, 2003). In fact, in 
many instances, corporate headquarters exhibiting the reported inefficiency, demonstrate 
higher market value growth than headquarters aligning with the winner-picking approach. 
Second, due to the inherent complication of tracking redeployment of non-financial resources, 
the resource redeployment theory has been mainly developed through formal models and 
simulations (Lieberman et al., 2017; Sakhartov, 2017; Sakhaertov and Folta, 2014, 2015) and 
has found little empirical confirmation. In the second and third essays of my thesis, I address 
these two concerns. More precisely, in the second essay, we revisit why firms might invest 
extra capital in subsidiaries with seemingly lower growth opportunities. Considering the 
extents of uncertainty firms confront while making capital allocation decisions, and of 
interdependence among their subsidiaries, we disentangle between inefficient and not-
necessarily-inefficient deviations. We explain that deviations from the winning-picking 
strategy may simply reflect different strategic intents. Moreover, we highlight the role of the 
breadth of CEOs’ prior experience in subsidiaries’ domain, as a source of firms’ capital 
allocation competency, in attenuating inefficient deviations and enhancing corporate value 
through better capital allocation practices. The third study of my thesis, on the other hand, 
aims to deepen the understanding of intrafirm allocation and redeployment of both financial 
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and non-financial resources. It extends the boundaries of the theory of resource redeployment 
(RR theory) to encompass financial as well as non-financial resources. More precisely, using 
a simulation model followed by empirical tests of the model’s propositions, we develop and 
test a theory that clarifies how capital allocation decisions provide trace evidence of non-
financial resource redeployments. By this, we set the stage for empirical investigations and 
validation of RR theory which has been mainly developed through formal models and 
simulations. In turn, studying intrafirm capital allocations through the lens of RR theory helps 
us further develop and offer novel predictions for the theory. This study illuminates how prior 
studies, claiming that firms extensively misallocate capital, may have reached their 
conclusion because they did not consider the value derivable from investing in resource 
redeployability. Finally, addressing the internal capital market efficiency debate, both the 
second and third studies of my thesis tackle the validity issues in the link between efficiency 
(inefficiency) of capital allocations and firms’ value creation (destruction). The studies 
contribute to the theory of capital investment by helping to resolve these validity issues.  
 
Chapter 1: “Business-Variant vs. Business-invariant Corporate Effects: A three-stage 
Multilevel Analysis” (Co-authored with Ludovic Dibiaggio2). 
 The design of the first paper is geared towards tackling whether corporate effect on 
business performance, in extant work, has been systematically underestimated. We argue that 
the uneven contribution a headquarters makes to the wealth of its different subsidiaries makes 
standard variance analyses systematically underestimate the corporate effect. It is only possible 
to precisely discover the real importance of the corporate effect if we partition the effects of 
each headquarters’ uneven contributions among its subsidiary businesses. To this end, we draw 
from the literature of diversification, corporate resource redeployment and capital allocation, to 
                                                     
2 University of Cote d’Azur 
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discern the antecedents of a headquarters’ uneven contributions to its subsidiaries’ 
performance.  
Figure 0.1, demonstrates the argument which underlies the first paper. We argue that 
subsidiaries’ relative characteristics and position within the portfolio, the left box in Figure 0.1, 
influence firms’ corporate-level decisions. These corporate-level initiatives may result in a re-
distribution of resources among subsidiaries, the middle box, resulting in ultimate uneven 
corporate effect on the performance of the subsidiaries, the right box. While the uneven 
contribution of headquarters to the performance of subsidiaries is more evident for some 
corporate-level strategies such as capital allocation, headquarters’ uneven contribution might 
happen through any kind of corporate initiative. For example, headquarters’ decision to acquire 
a firm with specific technological expertise might provide one of the existing subsidiaries with 
valuable resources (the knowledge existing in the newly acquired unit) while another subsidiary 
might not benefit from the acquisition (if the newly acquired knowledge is irrelevant to this 
second subsidiary). The first essay focuses on the first and the third box to emphasize the impact 
of business-variant corporate effects on performance of businesses. 
Figure 0.1: The relationship between the factors which affect corporate-level strategies and 
business-variant corporate effects  
 
 
 
 
In this essay, we first explain how corporate strategy may unevenly affect subsidiary 
businesses’ performance. We then explain why standard variance decomposition methods 
(either ANOVA, Components of Variance, or standard hierarchical linear modeling) cannot 
Within-corporate factors 
(The characteristics of a subsidiary 
business relative to the average of the 
corporate portfolio) 
Distribution of the resources 
consequent to Corporate-
level strategies and decisions 
such as capital allocation, 
diversifications, divestments, 
alliances, and M&As. 
 
 
Business-variant 
corporate effects on 
existing subsidiaries 
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capture business-variant corporate effects. Next, we propose an empirical model (a three-stage 
hierarchical model) to estimate the impact of different potential sources of uneven contribution 
from corporate headquarters on subsidiary businesses’ performance. Replicating previous 
works, we use the Compustat database. The majority of prior studies aggregated the data related 
to business-segments’ size and profit at industry level. However, aiming to detect the details of 
the contribution of corporate headquarters to the performance of subsidiaries, we decided not 
to aggregate the business-segments at industry level and, following Hough (2006), we 
preserved the operating segment categorization reported by multi-business firms. The fact that 
the corporations follow the new Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS 131) helps 
us in this regard. Based on SFAS 131, effective since December 1997, firms categorize their 
business units into different business segments based on their management approaches and the 
way the managers organize different segments of their organizations (Hough, 2006). Therefore, 
each corporation in our sample may possess more than one business-segment in a single 
industry. We set apart our proposed “business-variant corporate effects” from the standard 
corporate effects that we connote as “business-invariant corporate effects”. We show that these 
new “business-variant corporate effects” are as important as the standard corporate effects, and 
both together are at least as important as the business effects. We also show that firms induce 
performance variance among their subsidiaries differently, and that they preserve this 
difference across time. 
 
Chapter 2: “Insights Into Internal Capital Market Debate:  Why Headquarters Deviate from a 
Winner-Picking Approach” (Co-authored with Samira Fallah3, and Olivier Bertrand4). 
The theory of internal capital market suggests that corporate capital allocations are 
efficient if firms invest relatively more in subsidiaries with higher growth opportunities (that 
                                                     
3 Louisiana State University 
4 Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (FGV/EBAPE) 
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is, if they pick the winners). However, extant empirical work has demonstrated that 
headquarters do not necessarily tilt capital investments towards their subsidiaries which have 
relatively higher growth opportunities (i.e. deviate from winner picking approach). Curiously, 
so far, existing research has been unable to link this deviation to actual corporate value 
destruction (e.g., Billett and Mauer, 2003). In the second essay, we address this validity issue 
by theoretically claiming, and providing empirical evidence, that this deviation is not 
necessarily equivalent to corporate capital allocation inefficiency. We provide a typology for 
the roots of multi-business firms’ deviations from the winner-picking approach (Stein, 1997). 
We disentangle between deviations that are attributable to the failure of managers to identify 
and shift more capital to units with higher market opportunities; and those deviations that might 
be corresponding to situations in which managers need to follow strategies other than that of 
simply investing more in units with higher prospects. To this aim, we focus on different 
complexities in decision environment that may, theoretically, strengthen the mechanisms 
underlying these two types of deviation from winner-picking capital allocation. We considered 
two types of complexities. First we examine the deviation effects of uncertainty about the 
potential investments’ returns. This complexity may make it harder for a CEO/headquarters to 
find and implement the optimal allocations (cognitive/behavioral reasons) and, in parallel, make 
it easier for self-interested actors to mislead the decision making (agency reasons). Therefore, 
we expect that the deviation from winner-picking which is rooted in this decision-making 
complexity results in the failure of managers to efficiently allocate capital. Second, we look 
into the deviation effect of firms’ interdependence among business units. We expect that a 
headquarters would leverage its subsidiaries interdependence to accrue synergistic rents. 
Therefore, while segments’ interdependence might result in deviations from winner-picking 
logic of capital allocation, it might not be rooted in inefficiencies. Rather, the simple winner-
picking approach could reveal suboptimal to the headquarters. To examine our typology, we 
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hypothesize on the contrasting effect of firms’ capital allocation competency (Arrfelt et al, 
2015) and managerial dynamic capability (Adner and Helfat, 2003) on the two previously 
mentioned types of deviations from winner-picking. We use the breadth of CEO’s prior 
experience in firms’ subsidiaries’ domains as a source of firms’ managerial capability. In turn, 
we expect that this capability would make firms more competent in realizing both real growth 
opportunities in subsidiaries and also synergy potentials among subsidiaries. We find empirical 
evidence that the breadth of CEO’s prior experience attenuates the effect of the uncertainty-
based complexity on deviation from winner-picking approach; also, as expected, we see that 
this breadth of CEO’s experience does not attenuate the relationship between the segments’ 
interdependence and deviations. This second chapter also mainly uses the Compustat data. The 
data on all variables were collected from Compustat except the required data on CEOs’ 
experience that were collected manually from proxy statements, firms’ annual reports and 
websites, BusinessWeek website, and LinkedIn profiles. 
 
 
Chapter 3: “Extending the Theory of Resource Redeployment to Financial Resources: Evidence 
from Corporate Internal Capital Markets” (Co-authored with Timothy B. Folta5). 
The third chapter, of my thesis aims to respond to the second paper’s call for new theoretical 
frameworks that could explain the flow of corporate capital allocations considering the 
interdependencies between subsidiaries; and similar to the second chapter, focusses on the left 
and middle boxes in Figure 0.1. In this chapter, we extend the boundaries of the resource 
redeployment (RR) theory to encompass financial, as well as non-financial resources. We argue 
that when investing capital to acquire/develop non-financial resources such as plants or 
technology in a particular subsidiary, the corporate headquarters also acquires an option to 
redeploy those same resources to other business units in subsequent periods. Therefore a 
                                                     
5 University of Connecticut 
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segment’s overall redeployability of resources plays a substitute role for its overall market 
growth opportunity in corporate capital investment due diligence. We focus on two elements of 
subsidiaries’ resources’ redeployability: resource relatedness to other sister businesses, and 
resource divisibility. We study whether leveraging these two elements of resource 
redeployability (in firms’ capital investment decisions) contributes to firm value. More 
importantly, we explore whether either of these elements becomes the main source of value 
creation under different contingencies such as firms’ market volatility and cash-limitedness. To 
this end, first, we develop a simulation model based on the premises of RR theory and provide 
propositions about firms’ optimal capital allocation. Consequently, we succeed in providing 
preliminary empirical support for the potency of RR theory in explaining corporate capital 
allocation and for our novel propositions. 
We find that leveraging resource redeployability in capital allocation decisions is of 
paramount importance particularly for firms which are active in highly volatile markets. 
Further, we find that cash-rich and cash-limited firms differ in their main source of 
redeployment flexibility. While both reployability elements are important for both types of 
firms, cash-rich firms achieve inter-temporal economies (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004) by 
investing, mainly, in resource relatedness; however, cash-limited firms mainly leverage latent 
resource’s divisibility, in their capital investment decisions, in order to reach resource 
redeployment flexibility and gain inter-temporal economies. This is due to the fact that cash-
limited firms have fewer means to acquire new resources when needs arise in face of external 
opportunities. Therefore overcommitting to indivisible resources results in cash-limited firms’ 
rigidity and is extremely hazardous to them.  
This study contributes to two different literatures. First, it extends the boundaries of RR 
theory to embrace capital allocation. We argue and show that observing internal capital 
allocation allows to empirically test RR theory, which has been developed mainly through 
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simulation models. In turn, studying intrafirm capital allocations through the lens of RR theory 
helps us further develop and offer novel predictions for the theory. Second, the paper 
contributes to internal capital market literature. Relying on the premises of RR theory, we 
complement the theories of capital investment optimality that have been merely accounting 
subsidiaries’ exogenous market opportunities. This resonates with the second chapter of my 
thesis; it illuminates how prior work claiming firms misallocate capital may have reached their 
conclusion because they did not consider firm-specific aspects in the quest for capital allocation 
optimality. Furthermore, the internal capital markets theory advances that intrafirm capital 
allocation may create value because there is less information asymmetry between the 
subsidiaries and headquarters (vs between firms and external markets). Our analysis, however, 
confirms that internal capital markets may create value also because internal capital markets 
consider the firm-specific optimality of capital investment.  
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Business-variant vs. Business-invariant Corporate Effects: 
A Three-stage Multilevel Analysis 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we revisit the analysis of the effect of corporate decisions on the 
performance of business units. We argue that prior studies, relying on standard 
variance decomposition estimations, failed to account for the performance 
variance of businesses born from the uneven influence of a headquarters’ 
corporate decisions across its subsidiaries. Using a three-stage multilevel 
approach, we find that taking into account what we called “business-variant 
corporate effects” increases the estimated influence of corporations on business 
performance variance, with a magnitude as important as that of the standard 
corporate effects, i.e., business-invariant corporate effects. We find the total 
corporate effects to be just as important as the business effects, which have been 
found as the dominant effects in the previous work. We also find that the patterns 
of “business-variant corporate effects” are firm-specific, suggesting persistent 
differences in firms’ resource management processes. 
 
Keywords:  
Corporate-level strategy; business-variant corporate effects, corporate resource allocation; 
hierarchical linear modelling; total corporate effects on business performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of corporate strategy is to make the corporate whole add up to more than the sum 
of its business units if they were independent or owned by another corporation (Chandler, 1991; 
Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1994; Grant, 2016; Porter, 1987). If mainstream strategy and 
major textbooks (e.g., Ansoff, 1965) emphasize the role of corporate strategy as a major 
determinant of firm success, recent studies discussing the relative importance of industry vs. 
business effects on persistent performance differences among businesses (McGahan and Porter, 
1997; Misangyi et al., 2006; Rumelt, 1991) question the relative influence of corporate 
decisions on the profitability of their subsidiary businesses. On the fringes of this debate, the 
minor impact of corporate effects found in models has generated a new discussion stream 
among scholars (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Bowman and Helfat, 2001; Brush and Bromiley, 
1997; McGahan and Porter, 2002, 2005; Guo, 2017; Vanneste, 2017). Although they all 
recognize the significant impact of corporate strategy as a source of performance differences, 
the discussion centers on the magnitude of corporate effects compared to other effects and, in 
particular, compared to business effects. In their literature review, Bowman and Helfat (2001) 
report very different estimates of corporate effects, ranging from negligible (e.g., Rumelt 1991; 
Schmalensee 1985) to relatively high (e.g., Roquebert, Phillips, and Westfall, 1996). Authors 
who contend that corporate effects are underestimated present arguments mainly related to 
methodological problems. The most common explanations lie in sample selection issues (e.g., 
Bowman and Helfat 2001; McGahan and Porter 2002, 2005), problems of collinearity and 
relationships between effects (Guo 2017; Hough 2006; McGahan and Porter 2002, 2005), and 
“exclusion of time-varying corporate effects (Adner and Henfat 2003). In his recent meta-
analysis, Vanneste (2017) concludes that while the measures of estimations, e.g., variance, 
standard deviation, etc. also meaningfully influence the effect size estimations, corporate 
effects turn out to persistently demonstrate half the explanatory power of business effects.  
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However, the objective of this paper is to show that corporate effects are of a higher 
magnitude than those found in prior studies. The reason for systematic underestimation, we 
argue, relies on the particular inability of standard variance decomposition methods to fully 
capture corporate effects using categorical variables. While categorical variables can be 
appropriate for estimating industry and business effects, they may be more problematic for the 
evaluation of corporate effects. A headquarters can have uneven influence on its subsidiaries, 
as decisions can benefit some subsidiaries more than (and sometimes at the expense of) others. 
For instance, a headquarters’ decision to acquire a firm with specific technological expertise 
might provide one of the existing subsidiaries with valuable resources (the knowledge existing 
in the newly acquired unit) while another subsidiary might not benefit from the acquisition (if 
the newly acquired knowledge is irrelevant to this second subsidiary). Therefore, a firm’s 
corporate strategies might induce resource redistributions among subsidiaries and thereby 
generate or increase performance differences across them. We argue that standard variance 
decomposition estimations do not account for the uneven contribution of corporate headquarters 
to their subsidiaries’ performance; this may lead to a systematic underestimation of corporate 
effects, and thereby undermine the importance of corporate strategy.  
To examine whether and to what extent the headquarters’ induced intra-corporation 
variance in business performance accounts for the overall corporate effects we suggest 
disentangling the standard business-invariant corporate effects (the even impact of 
headquarters’ decisions on all subsidiaries’ performance) from business-variant corporate 
effects (the uneven impact on subsidiaries’ performance) to estimate overall corporate effects. 
Drawing on the literature addressing the allocation and the redeployment of non-scale-free 
resources within corporations, we discuss how and according to which criteria corporate 
strategy may unevenly affect subsidiary businesses’ performance. We consider three factors 
that may directly or indirectly determine whether a subsidiary business will receive an above 
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(or below) average level of resources: the level of relatedness between the subsidiary business 
and the main activity of the corporation (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Lieberman, Lee, and 
Folta, 2017; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014), the relative attractiveness of its market (Porter, 1987; 
Sakhartov and Folta, 2015; Wu, 2013), and its relative size in the corporate portfolio (Bardolet, 
Brown, and Lovallo, 2017; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; 
Shin and Stulz, 1998). We review standard variance decomposition methods and explain why 
the use of categorical variables prevents them from capturing business-variant corporate 
effects. We use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) which was recently used in this line of 
inquiry (e.g., Misangyi et al. 2006; Hough 2006) to overcome the problems of collinearity in 
models estimating industry, business and standard corporate effects. However, to be able to 
estimate business-variant corporate effects resulting from corporate resource allocation 
decisions, we develop an extended HLM.  
Our study contributes to the long lasting debate on the main sources of business 
performance heterogeneity. We find that our proposed “business-variant corporate effects” are 
at least as important as the standard corporate effects, i.e., business-invariant corporate effects, 
in explaining the variance of businesses’ performance. We also find that the magnitude of the 
total corporate effects to be as important as that of the business effects, which have been found 
as the dominant effects in previous work (e.g., Hough, 2006; McGahan and Porter, 1997; 
Misangyi et al., 2006). Finally, through some further exploratory investigations, we find that 
patterns of “business-variant corporate effects” are specific to each corporation suggesting 
persistent differences in firms’ resource management processes. 
BUSINESS-INVARIANT AND BUSINESS-VARIANT CORPORATE EFFECTS 
Headquarters may affect businesses’ performance in a number of ways. Some structural 
characteristics, company-wide processes or decisions are supposed to benefit a firm’s all 
businesses similarly, while other strategic decisions such as diversification, mergers and 
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acquisitions or resource allocation are expected to benefit some divisions more than others and 
may increase performance variance between businesses in the firm. However, all the firm’s 
corporate office decisions are susceptible to having both a homogeneous influence and a 
heterogeneous influence on all subsidiary business at the same time. The homogeneous impact 
results in what we call business-invariant corporate effects captured by corporate fixed (or 
random) effects in standard variance decomposition models; whereas the heterogeneous 
impacts generate business-variant corporate effects, that is, an increase in the variance across 
subsidiary businesses’ performance within the firm’s portfolio.  
Grouping together different businesses in a single corporation, per se, provides 
structural characteristics benefitting all divisions. Corporate size, for instance, is supposed to 
increase negotiating power and to give businesses better access to external resources and capital 
markets in particular (Williamson 1975). It also enables cash flow to be pooled at a corporate 
level to support subsidiaries’ investment projects (Penrose 1959; Stein 1997; Williamson 1975) 
and internal capital markets to be organized to compensate for external market inefficiencies 
(Hoskisson 1987; Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Myers and Majluf 1984; Stein 1997; Williamson 
1975). As they benefit from better information to evaluate expected resource productivity in 
each specific application context, the internal mechanisms of corporations are supposed to 
outperform external markets in allocating resources (Williamson 1975). However, corporate 
resource allocation is a critical decision process that may generate significant performance 
differences across corporations (Arrfelt et al., 2015). The literature has emphasized distinctive 
resource management capabilities – i.e., evaluating, selecting, combining and deploying 
resources in the most efficient way (Barney, 1986; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Makadok, 2001; 
Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007) – as an essential source of value creation in multi-business 
firms (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Arrfelt et al., 2015; Barney; 1986; Collis, Young, and Goold, 
2007; Donaldson, 1984; Stein, 1997). Headquarters generally evaluate resources with no price 
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reference, and under uncertainty. Subsequently, they can only infer the value for these resources 
and efficiency of their resource allocations long after the deployments. This delayed value 
appropriation leads to an evaluation disparity of the resources and deployment choices 
(Leiblein, Chen and Posen, 2017; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). In turn, this results in disparate 
headquarters’ contribution to business units’ performance and may create differences among 
the performance of subsidiaries depending on the firm they belong to (Adner and Helfat, 2003; 
Barney, 1991).  
The influence that a single headquarters exerts over its businesses is however 
imbalanced when the corporate office must determine the allocation of non-scale-free resources 
that could potentially be exploited by different activities, but not simultaneously. Firms tend to 
allocate resources to those markets exhibiting potential higher returns to growth relative to other 
projects in the company (Maksimovic and Philips, 2002; Porter, 1987; Stein, 1997; Williamson, 
1975). Resources such as financial resources, technical or management expertise, or machine 
tools that can be used in different related businesses offer redeployment options and can adapt 
to what Penrose (1959) referred to as changing productive opportunities: at any point in time, 
the opportunity cost of the current use of non-scale-free resources can be evaluated to determine 
their best use (Levinthal and Wu, 2010; Wu, 2013), and they can potentially be reallocated until 
marginal returns are equal (Maximovic and Phillips, 2002). As the attractiveness of one 
business diminishes compared to others, the opportunity cost increases as does the likelihood 
of resource redeployment. Consequently, intrafirm allocations and redeployments of non-scale-
free resources may increase performance heterogeneity between businesses enjoying additional 
resources and others that are excluded from or negatively affected by the allocation process.  
A headquarters’ potential uneven contribution to its subsidiaries is not limited to the 
allocation and redeployment of non-scale-free resources. The resource-based view of the firm 
suggests that multi-business firms should favor investments in related businesses to enjoy 
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synergies between markets with similar resource requirements (Markides and Williamson, 
1994; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Palepu, 1985; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000; 
Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1982). However, even apparently scale-free resources 
may not impact all businesses equally. Resources such as brand names or technological 
knowledge may exhibit some properties of rival goods and generate negative externalities for 
some businesses. For instance, using umbrella branding to benefit reputational economies of 
scope may be detrimental if there are high quality differences between products (Cabral, 2009; 
Wernerfelt, 1988). Similarly, a headquarters’ decision to acquire a firm with specific 
technological expertise might provide one of the existing subsidiaries with valuable resources 
(the knowledge existing in the newly acquired unit) while another subsidiary might not benefit 
from the acquisition (if the newly acquired knowledge is irrelevant to this second subsidiary). 
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION BACKGROUND AND CORPORATE EFFECTS  
Early variance decomposition studies discussing the relative importance of industry, corporate 
and business effects on the performance of businesses have primarily used components-of-
variance (COV) and nested ANOVA (OLS hierarchical regression) techniques.6 However, 
these techniques prove unable to clearly disentangle corporate effects from business and 
industry effects. COV models, as used in the seminal work by Schmalensee (1985), assume that 
the effects of different factors are random in nature and therefore uncorrelated. McGahan and 
Porter (1997) show an important and significant negative relationship between industry and 
corporate effects, which limits our ability to distinguish the independent effects of each factor. 
Furthermore, the results obtained with COV models prove highly dependent on the composition 
of the dataset: different tests with the same population can end up with totally different 
                                                     
6 The studies by Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx (1999) and Ruefli and Wiggins (2003) use different methods. 
The former uses a two-stage least squares model (2SLS), while the latter uses a non-parametric, ordinal variable 
approach. Because neither of these approaches was re-used in later studies, we do not discuss their relevance.  
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estimations for the importance of each factor (Brush and Bromiley, 1997)7. Unlike COV, 
hierarchical OLS regressions (or nested ANOVA) do not assume random effects and instead 
calculate the fixed effects of all categorical variables. However, the main source of problems in 
the ANOVA is the sequential introduction of dummy variables in the model, imposing an order 
in the estimation of the effects. Then, the significance of the covariance of factors results in an 
overvaluation of the effects of those factors introduced into the model earlier at the expense of 
others.8 In addition, because businesses are nested within corporations, the inherent collinearity 
between corporation and business categorical variables distorts the estimations. Rumelt (1991) 
recognized this problem and suggested that a substantial part of the effect ascribed to the 
corporate level may instead be associated with the business-level effect. Thus, Rumelt (1991) 
was reluctant to attribute a strong effect (more than 10 percent) to corporate parents9.  
Furthermore, categorical variables impose variance decomposition methods to 
exclusively estimate effects based on estimations of the intra-class variance in businesses’ 
performance. This logic of estimations may lead to a particularly salient problem when 
estimating corporate effects. Variance decomposition estimations rely on the difference 
between within-group and between-group variances: high (low) between-group and low (high) 
within-group variances result in a high value for the considered factor’s effects10. This may not 
be problematic for factors such as business, industry or year effects, but it is more questionable 
for the examination of corporate effects. Suppose that the corporate headquarters intentionally 
                                                     
7 For more information about COV and other parametric variance decomposition approaches, see 
methodological studies such as Searle et al. (2006, p. 391). 
8 The studies that use ANOVA usually report a window of estimations of industry and corporate parent effects 
resulting from different orders of integration of dummies into the model (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997).  
9 This problem cannot be solved by changing the order in which business and corporate dummy variables are 
introduced because importing dummy variables related to the smaller-grid lower-level variable (business 
dummies) before higher-level dummies (corporate dummies) would lead to ascribing all of the variance 
associated with corporates factors to business effects. Studies prior to Rumelt (1991) did not consider this 
problem, as they used market share as a proxy for business effects and did not introduce business segment 
dummies into their models (Kessides, 1990; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Schmalensee, 1985). 
10 For instance, let us assume that we have a dataset with two years of observations comprising a high within-
group (within-year) performance variance in each year and a low performance variance between the two years 
(low between-group variance). Then, the estimations would end up with low year effects. 
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makes a decision, such as rotating a successful top manager from a less strategic business to a 
more strategic one which is already performing relatively better. This decision may benefit the 
latter at the expense of the former, thus increasing within-corporate business performance 
variance. Standard variance decomposition techniques could not take this effect into 
consideration, thus underestimating corporate effects.11 
In recent studies, HLM has been used to address the collinearity problem between 
corporate and industry effects and between corporate and business effects (Hough, 2006; 
Misangyi et al., 2006). HLM recognizes the interdependency of observations and, as its main 
technical difference from standard fixed/random effect models, it integrates residuals in each 
level to be estimated separately (Hofmann, 1997, 1998). To estimate all effects simultaneously, 
this method uses maximum likelihood estimations through an iterative procedure. In addition, 
using HLM techniques eliminates the need to regress business performance against dummy 
variables, thus providing a higher statistical power than nested ANOVA models (see Goldstein, 
2011, p. 922). 
However, the standard HLM proves unable to account for business-variant corporate 
effects, as it cannot evaluate more than one cross-nested effect simultaneously. Prior studies 
could address settings where lower-level categories are cross-nested in two higher-level 
categories, which typically occur when businesses are nested both within corporations and 
within industries simultaneously (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 2006). Simple cross-nesting 
can be sorted out in standard HLM by artificially creating a hierarchy between the two higher-
level categories (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). However, examining business-variant corporate 
                                                     
11 In other words, we argue that the mentioned variance decomposition techniques’ logic captures a portion of 
corporate effect which addresses the extent to which the subsidiaries of a corporation perform similarly different 
from others corporations; we connote this part of corporate effect as business-invariant corporate effect.  
Moreover, we claim for the existence of within corporate variance performance resulted from resource 
redistributions among the subsidiaries consequent to corporate headquarters’ strategic initiatives; which we 
called business-variant corporate effects. Finally, we suggest that since the existence of business-variant 
corporate effects distorts the estimations and systematically leads to underestimations of business-invariant 
corporate effect, one should estimate the both to provide a full account of corporate effects on business 
performance. 
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effects necessitates multiple simultaneous cross-nested categorical variables. First, similar to 
previous studies, we must model business segments as a categorical variable cross-nested in 
corporate parents and industries. In addition, to capture the uneven impact of corporate 
decisions on business performance, we need to consider that yearly business performance is 
cross-nested within both the corporate parent and year categories. We can capture the variance 
related to the business-variant corporate effects only if we introduce the variables that 
potentially affect the corporate resource allocation decisions into the model at a corporate 
parent-year level. Finally, business performance is affected by both stable and transient industry 
effects, which generate another cross-classification problem (Adner and Helfat, 2003; 
McGahan and Porter, 1997). These transient industry effects are critical because, given the time 
length of the observations, not considering the variance between industries’ performance over 
time may undermine the overall industry effects. To account for transient industry effects, one 
would need to introduce a categorical variable (industry-year) that is simultaneously cross-
nested within year and industry categories. Prior studies by Hough (2006) and Misangyi et al., 
(2006) were more focused on accounting for effects’ collinearity and did not address multiple 
cross-nesting settings.  
In other words, all three cross-classifications, i.e., industry-year, industry-corporation, 
and corporation-year, are highly important in our model. This is why we decided to propose a 
model that is a mixture of the nested ANOVA and HLM models to estimate different effects, 
in particular, the newly introduced business-variant corporate effects. 
ADDRESSING BUSINESS-VARIANT CORPORATE EFFECTS 
In order to account for business-variant corporate effects, we need to use both random 
intercepts and random slopes (Short, Ketchen, Bennet & Toit, 2006; Castellaneta and 
Gottschalg, 2014). Mainstream research examining the relative importance of different effects 
on business performance only used random intercept HLM to capture the variance to be 
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explained by each categorical factor (e.g., Hough, 2016; Misyangi et al., 2006)12. Including a 
random intercept for each categorical factor, including year, industry, industry-year, corporate 
parent and business segment, helps us partition that part of the business performance variance 
explained by each factor. However, capturing the portion of within portfolio performance 
variance induced by corporate headquarters relies on the introduction of a random slope for 
each variable of interest, which potentially affects the intrafirm resource allocation, at the 
corporate-year level. This is due to the fact that the uneven contribution of corporations to 
subsidiaries’ performance arises from the redistribution of resources across subsidiaries in each 
single year independently. Therefore, only observations of each similar corporate-year should 
be clustered with each other to estimate the random slopes. Finally, as we explained above, 
standard hierarchical linear models are unable to consider more than one cross-nested 
categorical variable. Therefore, we propose a three-stage hierarchical linear model, where every 
subsequent stage takes the residuals of the previous stage.  
We propose considering the relative market attractiveness of businesses, their level of 
relatedness to their parent firm main activities, and their relative size compared to the size of 
the parent firm, as the potential variables that affect intrafirm resource allocations, to estimate 
business-variant corporate effects. Markets’ attractiveness and the level of opportunities are 
known as one of the main inducements of resource redeployments (Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1987; 
Sakhartov and Folta, 2015; Wu, 2013). On the other hand, by allocating resources to 
subsidiaries having more related resources, a headquarters increases the opportunity of 
                                                     
12 It is worth mentioning that only the studies by Short et al. (2006) and Castellaneta and Gottschalg (2016) have 
addressed the present debate while introducing a random slope for the year variable (only) at the firm level. The 
former study argues that if corporations experience performance increases or decreases differently over time, i.e., 
the year random slope significantly explains the performance variances, this effect should also be added to the 
corporate effects. Put more precisely, firms differ not only if on average they have different returns, but also if 
their returns show different patterns of improvement or decline. To avoid cross-classification problems, they 
limited their sample to single business firms. Therefore, corporate and business effects are not disentangled. In 
addition, they find that only very low amounts of performance variance could be attributed to a uniform 
increase/decrease in the firms’ performance. The latter study hypothesizes about the effect of different factors on 
the growth and shrinkage in the variance of the performance of private equity firms. Private equity firms in that 
paper resemble the corporations in the mainstream research to which we aim to contribute. 
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synergistic use of firms’ resources and realizes what Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) have termed 
“intra-temporal” economies of scope. Allocating resources to these subsidiaries also facilitates 
the future redeployments by facilitating the potential withdrawals and decreasing the 
adjustment costs of a resource redeployment if the allocation proves inefficient in the future 
(Lieberman et al., 2017; Sakhartov, 2017). This provides the firm with “inter-temporal” 
economies of scope (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014, 2015). Finally, 
the literature on internal capital markets has evidenced that smaller businesses are likely to 
receive relatively more resources than their larger sister businesses (Bardolet, Lovallo, and 
Rumelt, 2012; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Shin and Stulz, 1998). First, all 
else being equal, smaller investments have lower opportunity costs. For instance, Shin and 
Stulz’s (1998) study of the internal capital markets of diversified corporations show that smaller 
divisions’ investments are much less sensitive to their own cash flow compared to those of 
larger divisions when opportunities are high. Furthermore, recent studies evidence that when 
smaller divisions have limited access to external markets, they are allocated relatively more 
capital than theory would suggest, even when expected returns are relatively low. This finding 
has been considered to be a consequence of internal political bias (Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfstein 
and Stein 2000) or managers’ cognitive bias (Bardolet et al., 2011, 2012); however, Billett and 
Mauer (2003) find that these supposedly inefficient capital allocation decisions have a positive 
relationship with overall corporate value.13 Thus, we expect that the relative attractiveness, the 
level of relatedness to the overall corporate portfolio and the relative size of business units 
significantly affect their capacity to attract corporate resources and, subsequently, their 
corporate parents’ contribution to their profitability. 
                                                     
13 In a more recent study, Bardolet et al. (2017) find that subsidiaries size play a more complex role in intrafirm 
capital allocations. They suggest that the firms are likely to subsidize the smallest subsidiaries of their portfolios. 
However, for the rest of the subsidiaries, relative size is positively related to their allocated capital. The authors 
explain the positive effect of the relative size, on allocated capital, by higher political power of larger 
subsidiaries.  
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SAMPLE SELECTION 
Replicating previous works, we use Compustat to obtain industry, corporation, and business 
levels data. Our sample set includes the 9-year period from 2001 to 2009, which represents an 
economic cycle in North America: growth in the early 2000s followed by recession in the later 
2000s. Industries are identified based on the 4-digit SIC code. The majority of prior studies 
aggregated the data related to business segments’ size and profit at the industry level. However, 
because we wanted to detect details for the contribution of corporate headquarters to subsidiary 
performance, we decided not to aggregate the business segments at the industry level and, 
following Hough (2006), we preserved the operating segment categorization reported by 
corporations. This was facilitated by the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS 
131), effective since December 1997, which makes corporations categorize their business units 
into different business segments based on their management approaches and on how the 
managers organize different segments of their organizations (Hough 2006). Therefore, each 
corporation in our sample may possess more than one business segment in a single industry.    
We mainly followed McGahan and Porter (1997) in the data screening process. We 
excluded business segments with assets under $10 million, businesses active in depository 
segments (SIC codes starting with 60), and businesses with missing data14. Following Bowman 
and Helfat’s (2001) suggestion, we also excluded single-business corporations. Bowman and 
Helfat (2001) suggest that including single-business corporations in the sample confounds the 
business and corporate parent effects. Moreover, the impact of those criteria affecting corporate 
resource allocation decisions and thereby resulting in business-variant corporate effects can be 
studied only in corporations with more than one subsidiary business. We decided to limit our 
sample to multi-business firms that were active in at least two different industries. This helped 
                                                     
14 For this condition, conservatively, we excluded the observations related to the entire corporation. As we intend 
to study within-corporation dynamics, excluding only the business might lead to biased data, particularly if some 
of the major subsidiaries of corporations are excluded in this way.    
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us to account for the different levels of attractiveness of the industries in which they had active 
subsidiaries and for potential differences in being related/unrelated to the main activity of the 
corporation as potential sources of business-variant corporate effects. In addition, we excluded 
data related to industry-years with only one observation in the sample, which might confound 
industry-year and business effects.  
 The ﬁnal sample contains 6,821 observations for 2,129 business segments possessed 
by 539 corporations across 291 industry classiﬁcations. 
METHODS 
Estimation model 
We propose a three-stage hierarchical linear model, in which every subsequent stage takes the 
residuals of the previous stage as the explained variable. We set the order as follows: In the first 
stage, we partition the macro effects including year, industry and industry-year effects through 
a random intercept HLM setting:  
𝑌𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑀𝑡𝑖 + 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘       (1a) 
where 𝑌𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 represents performance, measured by return on assets (ROA), of the k
th business 
segment of corporation j in industry i in year t. 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the residual of the first stage of our 
model. We assume that 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 has a mean of zero and is distributed normally with a variance of 
τ𝑅 . 𝑀𝑡𝑖, which is the composition of macro effects, is modeled by a four-level hierarchical 
linear model whose reduced form is as follows15: 
𝑀𝑡𝑖 = 𝜇0000 +  𝛾𝑡000 + 𝛾0𝑖00 + 𝛾𝑡𝑖00        (1b) 
where 𝜇0000 represents the overall average of the business segments’ return for our sample, i.e., 
the grand mean, 𝛾𝑡000 represents the year random intercept, 𝛾0𝑖00 is the industry random 
                                                     
15 For the sake of brevity, we show only the reduced form of the first stage of the model. The second and third 
stages of the model, which are the most important stages, are presented in detailed form.    
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intercept, and 𝛾𝑡𝑖00 is the industry-year cross-classified random intercept. The year, industry, 
and industry-year random intercepts are assumed to have a mean equal to zero and to be 
distributed normally with variances equal to τ𝑡, τ𝑖, and τ𝑖𝑡, respectively. Dividing each of these 
variances by the outcome, i.e., business segment ROA variance, τ𝑌, provides us with the 
estimation of their effects.   
In the second stage, we use a three-level random intercept hierarchical linear model to 
partition the corporate and business segment effects simultaneously out of the residuals of the 
first stage model: 
𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝜋0𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘       (1c) 
𝜋0𝑖𝑗𝑘 = λ00j0 + r𝑖𝑗𝑘       (1d) 
λ00j0 = 𝑢𝑗          (1e) 
where at the first level, 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the residuals of the previous stage, i.e., the residuals of the 
business segment ROA after partitioning year, industry, and industry-year effects; 𝜋0𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the 
mean of the residuals, i.e., 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘, (across time) for business segment ijk; and 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 captures the 
time-level random error of 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘. We also assume that 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 has a mean of zero and is distributed 
normally with a variance of τ𝑆. At the second level of the second stage, the business segment 
mean of the residuals from the first stage, i.e., 𝜋0𝑖𝑗𝑘, is modeled through equation 1d, 
simultaneously, as an outcome of the random business segment intercept around the corporation 
mean, i.e., λ00j0, . At the third level of the second stage, equation 1e, 𝑢𝑗  is the between-
corporation residuals; r𝑖𝑗𝑘 and 𝑢𝑗  are also assumed to have a mean equal to zero and to be 
distributed normally with a variance of τ𝑟 and τ𝑢, respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 represents the part of the 
variance of the outcome measure, business segment ROA, that is not explained by macro 
effects, i.e., year, industry, industry-year effects, through equations 1a and 1b, or by the 
corporate and business segment effects, through equations 1c through 1e. 
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 Finally, through the third stage, we try to explain the residuals of the second stage by a 
random slope, i.e., coefficient, HLM model. We import the random slope of the strategic factors 
that may affect the resource redistribution decisions of headquarters to the model. It is worth 
remembering that in addition to the potential direct effect, our variables of interest may interact 
to induce business-variant corporate effects. For example, although the relatedness of a 
subsidiary business decreases the cost of redeploying corporate resources to and from a 
subsidiary business, it is not sufficient reason for a subsidiary business to receive a higher share 
of corporate resources. More precisely, in addition to lower redeployment costs, other 
inducements, e.g., higher market attractiveness, are needed for a subsidiary to receive an above-
average level of corporate resources (Lieberman et al., 2017; Sakhartov and Folta, 2015). 
Therefore, the interaction of relatedness and the relative attractiveness of the businesses’ 
markets may also explain a portion of business-variant corporate effects. Moreover, 
considering Shin and Stulz’s (1998) results, we expect that the interaction of the relative size 
of the subsidiaries and the relative attractiveness of their markets may explain the portion of the 
business-variant effects that cannot be captured by either of these variables alone.  The random 
slopes are defined at corporate-year level: 
 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾𝑡0𝑗0 +  𝜷𝒕𝒋𝑿𝒕𝒊𝒋𝒌 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘       (1f) 
where 𝑿𝒕𝒊𝒋𝒌 includes our proposed strategic factors (i.e., relatedness, relative market 
attractiveness and relative size) and their two-by-two interaction terms. 𝜷𝒕𝒋 is the matrix of 
estimated coefficients for our six proposed regressors, three factors and three interaction terms; 
where the coefficients are estimated for each subsample of the corporation-year. 𝛾𝑡0𝑗0 
represents the random intercept for the cross-classified categorical variable, corporation-year. 
Although we did not have a direct need to introduce the random intercept of this new cross-
classified categorical variable, our model should include it because it is impossible to introduce 
the random slope of a regressor on the level of a categorical variable into a model without also 
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introducing that categorical variable’s random intercept. 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the error term of the third stage 
of our model. We assume that 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 has a mean of zero and is distributed normally with a 
variance of τ𝜀. The higher the variance of the estimated slopes are compared to their estimated 
errors, the greater the difference is between variances τ𝑠 and τ𝜀, and the greater the estimation 
is of the business-variant corporate effects. 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
Profitability: To facilitate comparison with prior studies, we use the accounting 
value of ROA as the dependent variable. A small number of studies operationalized 
performance using value-based measures such as market-to-book value and economic profit. 
These supported the robustness of the results for the dependent variable (e.g., Hawawini et al. 
2003).  
Independent variables 
Relatedness: To report whether a business segment is related to the main activities 
of its parent company, we use a dummy variable with a value equal to one when the segment is 
in parent’s main industry group, that is if it shares the first three digits of the SIC code of  its 
parent company, and zero otherwise. Because the relatedness measure has an inherently relative 
nature, i.e., some of the subsidiaries are recognized as related and others as nonrelated to the 
corporation’s main activities, we do not need to group mean center the measure, and we use the 
absolute zero/one values for relatedness in our model. 
Reversed relative size: The reversed relative size, or smallness, of a business segment 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the relative size of the entire corporation that the focal 
business belongs to relative to that business’s size. The reversed relative size of a business 
segment to the entire corporation has a paradoxical effect on the extra contribution that a 
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subsidiary business can receive from its corporate headquarters. On the one hand, smaller 
subsidiaries may obtain their corporate parents’ support more easily, particularly if they have 
greater future prospects than their sister businesses (Shin and Stulz, 1998). On the other hand, 
smallness may mean that business segment has less power to influence corporate decisions in 
its favor (Bardolet et al. 2017). It is measured as follows: 
𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 = ln(
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑗
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘
) 
Therefore, smallness can only have a positive value. 
 Business segment relative attractiveness: Business segment relative attractiveness, or 
attract, measures the relative attractiveness of a business’s industry compared to the other 
industries in which the parent corporation is active. The allocation of non-scale-free resources 
appears to be a function of the relative attractiveness of the subsidiary rather than its absolute 
attractiveness (Levinthal and Wu 2010; Wu 2013). To construct the measure for this variable, 
we first use the empirical Bayes predictions for industry and industry-year random intercepts 
from the first stage of our model, i.e., 𝛾0𝑖00 and 𝛾𝑡𝑖00. The summation of these two provides us 
with a proxy for the profitability of industry i in a given year t relative to the grand average of 
all industries in the entire sample, where 𝛾0𝑖00 addresses the profitability of industry i over the 
entire time frame of the study, and 𝛾𝑡𝑖00 captures the variations of industry i’s profitability at 
year t beyond the average of industry i: 
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾0𝑖00 +  𝛾𝑡𝑖00 
We group mean center the value of attract for each group of observations for a similar 
corporation-year. In general, there is no statistically always true mean centering strategy, and 
researchers should determine their strategy considering the theory their studies are dealing with 
(Hofmann and Gavin, 1998; Kreft, De Leeuw, and Aiken, 1995). Because attract does not 
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inherently address a characteristic of a subsidiary business relative to its sister businesses, we 
decided to group mean center the values16. 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the variables to be used in the 
third stage of our model are presented in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1:  Descriptive analysis and pairwise correlations  
      
  Mean     S.D.      Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1.Profit  0.073  0.456 -9.776 8.477 1.00       
2.Relatedness (R)   0.469     0.499     0.000     1.000   -0.00 1.00      
3.Reverse Relative Size (S)  1.534     1.098     0.002     7.103    -0.01 -0.28 1.00     
4.Relative Attractiveness (A)  0.000      0.087    -1.424     1.211 0.22 0.02 -0.02 1.00    
5.S*A   -0.002     0.223    -5.530     3.427 0.31 0.01 -0.02 0.85 1.00   
6.S*R   0.566     0.910     0.000     6.062    -0.04 0.66 0.28 -0.00 -0.01 1.00  
7.A*R   0.001  0.053    -1.424     1.211     0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.61 0.36 -0.01 1.00 
 
 
As explained earlier, our model is composed of three stages. Each stage partitions the 
variance related to some of the categorical variables and transfers the residuals, i.e., the 
unexplained variance, to the next stage. The results of the test of our proposed three-stage 
hierarchical linear model are provided in Table 1.2. The first stage presents the macro effects 
including year, industry, and industry-year effects through a four-level hierarchical linear 
model. Year, industry, and industry-year respectively explain 0.15, 3.70, and 5.63 percent of 
the total variance of the dependent variable, i.e., business segment performance. Similar to 
Adner and Helfat (2003), we find that the industry-year effect explains more variance in 
business segment performance than does the stable industry effect. This supports our claim 
that it is worth preserving this cross-classification effect in the model. We transfer the 
                                                     
16As we discussed earlier, to capture the extra positive/negative effect of strategic decisions by corporate 
headquarters on the performance of subsidiaries, i.e., the business-variant corporate effects, we need to import the 
variables that have a relative nature into the model. We did not center mean the other regressors, relatedness and 
reversed relative size, as they inherently have a relative nature. 
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residuals of this stage to the second stage, where they will potentially be explained by other 
effects.  
Table 1.2: 3-stage HLM estimation of variance 
        
     Variance Standard 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] χ2  P-value 
          estimate error           
Stage 1. year, industry, industry-year effects       411.87 0.0000 
Outcome measure: ROA          
Variance of outcome measure: 0.2076825         
Level 4 variable variance (year) 0.0003073 0.000306  .0000436 0.002168   
Level 3 variable variance (industry) 0.0076859 0.001476  .0052755 0.011198   
Level 2 variable variance (industry-year) 0.0111357 0.001363  .0087611  0.014154   
Level 1 Residuals    0.1819776 0.003266  .1756886  0.188492   
            
year                       (Percentage of total variance):   0.15%       
industry                (Percentage of total variance):  3.70%       
industry-year       (Percentage of total variance):   5.36%       
            
Stage 2. corporate and business effects      2126.64 0.0000 
Outcome measure: Stage-1 residuals        
Variance of outcome measure: 0.1719019         
Level 3 variable variance (corporation) 0.0508935 0.00492  .0421086 0.061511   
Level 2 variable variance (business segment) 0.103904 0.005055  .0944537  0.1143   
Level 1 Residuals    0.0707793 0.001524   .067855 0.07383   
            
corporation              (Percentage of total variance): 16.01%       
business segment (Percentage of total variance): 32.68%       
            
Stage 3. business-variant corporate effects      4128.49 0.0000 
Outcome measure: Stage-2 residuals        
Variance of outcome measure: 0. 052892         
Variance related to random slope (attract) 0.3368191 0.081075  .2101388 0.539867   
Variance related to random slope (smallness) 0.0020592 0.000128  .0018238  0.002325   
Variance related to random slope (attract*smallness) 0.5804858 0.049719  .4907781 0.686591   
Level 2 variable variance (corporation-year) 5.48E-20 4.65E-20  1.04E-20 2.89E-19   
Level 1 Residuals    0.0203553 0.000437  .0195161 0.02123   
            
business-variant corporate effects (Percentage of total variance): 14.20%     
                        
 
As explained before, we use empirical Bayes predictions for industry and industry-year 
random intercepts from the test in this stage, i.e., 𝛾0𝑖00 and 𝛾𝑡𝑖00, to construct the measure of 
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industries’ attractiveness. The summation of these two provides us with a proxy of the 
profitability, i.e., attractiveness, of industry i in a given year t relative to the grand average of 
all industries in the entire sample. 
The second part of Table 1.2 presents the results of the second stage of the model and 
displays the estimations of business segment and standard corporate effects. The simultaneous 
estimation of corporate and business segment effects through the three-level hierarchical 
linear model, in this stage, prohibits the possibility of miscalculating and wrongly imputing 
one of these effects to the other. Our results show that corporation categories and business 
segment categories represent 16.01 and 32.68 percent of the variance in business segment 
performance, respectively. This estimation of business segment effects is approximately two 
times greater than corporate effects, and in line with estimations in previous studies 
(Vanneste, 2017). Standard corporate effects make explicit the extent to which the subsidiary 
businesses of a corporation, on average, perform differently from the business segments 
owned by other corporations. As such they can be considered as business-invariant corporate 
effect.  
The last part of Table 1.2 reports the results of the last stage of our model to estimate 
business-variant corporate effects, i.e. the importance of the above-/below-average 
contribution of a corporation to the performance of each of its subsidiaries depending on its 
relative characteristics. First, we entered relatedness, relative size, relative attractiveness, and 
their two by two interactions into the model. However, because relatedness and its 
interactions with relative attractiveness and relative size did not add significant explanatory 
power to the model, we eliminated them through the main stream of the paper, to increase the 
parsimony of the model 17. The third part of Table 1.2 shows that the business-variant 
corporate effects, including the effect of factors such as relative attractiveness, relative size 
                                                     
17 The comprehensive model, i.e., the model which also includes relatedness and the interactions of relatedness 
and the other two independent variables, is provided in the appendix 1, Table A1.1. 
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and the interaction of these two variables, accounts for 14.2 percent of the variance of 
business segment performance. 
Variance estimated for the random intercepts, through the first and second stages, 
directly addresses the extent to which the difference in the categories of a categorical variable 
accounts for the variance of the response variable. However, estimating the share of the 
variance accounted for by the random slopes, i.e., through the third stage, is a little different. 
For this, we should first calculate the explained variance using the introduced random slopes; 
this is the difference between the variance of the outcome measure and the residuals in this 
stage, 0.049841 and 0.020355, respectively. Thus, the explained variance is equal to 
0.029486. Comparing the explained variance in this stage and the total variance of business 
segment performance, 0.2076825, provides us with the estimation of the business-variant 
corporate effects, which is approximately 14.2 percent. 
Disregarding the newly introduced business-variant corporate effects, our results are 
in the range of those found by previous studies. As shown in Table 1.3, the effects estimated 
by the first two stages of our model are close to those found in previous studies. Small 
differences between the estimated effects in previous studies generally arise from sample 
differences (time frame, studied sectors, data cleaning procedures) and from the methods used 
(Bowman and Helfat, 2001; McGahan and Porter, 2002). However, our results also reveal the 
importance of the newly introduced business-variant corporate effects. Two patterns emerge 
from the results that are worth mentioning. First, the results of the third stage of our model 
show that the effect of the corporate headquarters (as the allocator of corporate resources) on 
the performance of subsidiaries is almost as important as its effect on the average return of 
subsidiaries as estimated in the second stage. In other words, our results find that not only do 
corporate parents contribute to the performance of their subsidiaries when, on average, their 
subsidiaries make different profits than other corporations’ subsidiaries, but they also 
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specifically contribute to the performance of their subsidiaries by inducing performance 
variance among them (as a zero sum game) based on relative characteristics that are both 
internal and external to the corporation. We entitled the former and latter effects business-
invariant corporate effects and business-variant corporate effects, respectively, and estimated 
their effects on the businesses’ performance to be of approximately the same order of 
magnitude. 
Table 1.3: Comparison of the explained variance of each factor of current study and the previous 
studies 
 
Method 
3-Stage 
HLM 
Nested 
ANOVA 
COV 
HLM 
Studya 
Current 
study 
McGahan 
and Porter 
(2002)b 
Roquebert 
et al., 
(1996) 
McGahan an 
Porter (1997) 
Hough 
(2006) 
Misangyi et 
al. (2006) 
Data Compustat Compustat Compustat Compustat Compustat Compustat 
Time frame 2001-09 1981–94 1985–91 1981–94 1995-99 1984-99 
Sector Allc All Manuf. All All All 
Year % 0.2 0.8 0.4 2.4 0.6 0.8 
Industry % 3.7 9.6 10.2 18.7 5.3 7.6 
Ind-Year % 5.4 N/Ad N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Corporatee% 16.0 12.0 17.9 4.3 20.2 7.2 
Ind-Corp Cov.% N/A N/A 0.0 -5.5 N/A N/A 
Ind-Year Cov.% N/A N/A 2.3 N/A N/A N/A 
Businessf % 32.7 37.7 37.1 31.7 40.1 36.6 
Business-variant 
corporate 
effects% 
14.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Total 
explained% 
71.2 60.1 67.9 51.6 66.2 52.2 
 
 
a. We focus here only on studies which used business unit ROA as the dependent variable 
b. Effects were added in the sequence of year, industry, corporate parent, and business unit. 
c. All except depository sector due to significant difference in ROA (See McGahan and porter, 1997) 
d.   Not applicable 
e. We named it business-invariant corporate effect. 
f. Here refers to businesses segment, as all of the studies reported in the table used Compustat. 
 
 
In addition to the estimations of the standard corporate effects, the business-invariant 
corporate effects reached more than one half of that estimated for business segment effects in 
the extant studies. This is also the case for the results of the second stage of our model (where 
the results show that the corporation category and the business segment category represent 
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16.01 and 32.68 percent of the variance of business segment performance, respectively). 
However, by adding the estimations of both models of corporate effects (16.01 percent for the 
business-invariant corporate effects and 14.2 percent for the business-variant corporate 
effects), we estimate the total corporate effect on business performance as 30.2 percent, which 
is highly comparable to the business segment effect.  
To control for the possibility that the increase in the explanatory power of our model is 
due to random improvement or computational effects, we ran a robustness test. We randomly 
changed the values for the relative size and relative attractiveness among the observations and 
reran the third stage of the model for 100 iterations. The results showed that the averages of 
the third-stage residuals variance found in the 100 regression iterations were not significantly 
different from the variance of the outcome measure in this stage. This resulted in an 
estimation of business-variant corporate effects equal to zero for the samples with randomly 
changed independent variables, thus confirming that our results are not a statistical artifact. 
DISCUSSION 
Despite initial debates, the literature interested in determining the relative importance of 
industry, corporate and business effects have converged to agree that business performance 
varies depending on which corporation it belongs to. However, in this paper, we have argued 
that prior studies have systematically underestimated the magnitude of corporate effects 
because they could not account for the uneven impact of corporate office on the performance 
of its subsidiary businesses. Our results confirm the existence of a share of a firm’s 
headquarters’ contribution to the performance of its subsidiaries which is specific to each 
subsidiary in the firm’s portfolio, i.e., the business-variant corporate effects. We captured 
these effects by the subsidiaries’ level of relatedness, relative market attractiveness and 
relative size, suggesting a significant impact of the corporate resource allocation decisions on 
business-variant corporate effects.  Business-variant corporate effects significantly, both 
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statistically and economically, contribute to increase the magnitude of overall corporate 
effects and the explanatory power of the estimation models.  
However, whether these business-variant effects are really corporate-related effects 
remains to be discussed. Given that the effect may be different for each subsidiary of a 
corporation, one could argue that it is business (and not corporation) specific and therefore 
should be considered as a business effect. However, constructs such as business’ size or 
market attractiveness are not measured in isolation but they are relative measures defined in 
relation to the corporate portfolio, thus making the so-called business-variant corporate effect 
a zero-sum effect across each corporate portfolio in each year. Then, the estimation of the 
effect is not sensitive to only business-related characteristics.  
Our results provide us with the opportunity for more exploratory discussions. 
Although we witness cross corporate-year differences, we can wonder whether a single 
corporation conserve its decision making style over different years? In other words, are the 
random slopes of relative size, relative attractiveness, and their interaction firm-specific? To 
answer this question, we use empirical Bayes predictions for the random slopes of relative 
size, relative attractiveness and their interaction in each corporation-year. On average, we 
have predictions of the random slopes for each corporation over more than four years18. We 
ran one-way ANOVA tests for the predicted slopes for each of the independent variables 
against the corporation categories. The results presented in Table 1.4 provide strong evidence 
that the random slopes of relative attractiveness and the interaction of relative size and 
relative attractiveness are corporate-specific. In other words, different corporations exhibit 
persistent differences in subsidizing (or transferring resources to) subsidiaries with higher 
relative attractiveness and a higher level for the interaction of relative attractiveness and 
                                                     
18 Our sample is composed of 2,283 corporation-year data for 539 corporations. 
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reversed relative size. The results do not support relative size as a persistent criterion on 
which a corporate headquarters bases its redistribution decisions. 
Table 1.4: One-way ANOVA test of random slopes against corporation categories 
        
number of observation: 2282    
between corporation df: 538    
within corporation df: 1744    
        
Factor random slope   F-Value P-value   
       
Relative attractiveness (attract) 1.47 0.0000  
Relative size (smallness) 0.29 1.0000  
attract*smallness 1.5 0.0000   
        
        
Moreover, we can investigate whether the average of each factor’s random coefficients 
are associated with corporate performance, thus suggesting that the uneven effect to 
businesses is corporate specific and contribute to generate enduring differences across 
corporations. To do this, we use empirical Bayes predictions of the corporation random 
intercepts, i.e., business-invariant corporate effects, as a proxy for corporate performance. 
This is a good proxy, as it addresses the extent to which the subsidiaries of a corporation 
performed on average better/worse than the overall average, while the macro effects including 
year, industry and industry-year are controlled for. We regress our measure of corporate 
performance against the average of the predicted slopes of the strategic factors through the 
different years. Table 1.5 presents the results. The first three models separately test the 
relation of corporate performance with corporate style in terms of uneven support of 
subsidiaries based on each of the introduced strategic factors. Finally, Model 4 tests this 
relation for all of the three independent variables simultaneously. The tests provide us with 
some interesting results that are worth further discussions. First, our results strongly support 
that the best (worst) performing corporations, on average, subsidize the segments that are 
active in relatively less (more) profitable industries at the cost of those segments active in 
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relatively more (less) profitable industries. This might be rooted in a reverse causality: The 
higher level of firms’ slack, gained from a better overall corporate-level performance, might 
lead to firms’ more inefficient allocation of resources (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, the 
behavioral account of intrafirm allocation anomalies suggests that firms might subsidize 
businesses which perform worse than their aspirational levels in hope to correct the 
performance of these businesses. Thus, these firms opt out of allocating more resources to 
those businesses which have better growth opportunities (Arrfelt, Wiseman, and Hult, 2013). 
Our result shows that this association is more likely to be seen in firms which have overall 
higher returns. 
Table 1.5: Is the firms’ pattern of business-variant corporate effects associated with corporate 
performance? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Business-invariant corporate random intercept 
          
relative attractiveness average slope -0.468***   -0.152*** 
 (0.0803)   (0.0483) 
relative size average slope  10.23***  10.35*** 
  (0.746)  (0.500) 
attract*smallness average slope   0.512*** 0.513*** 
   (0.0275) (0.0204) 
Constant -0.000997 0.00463 -0.00706 -0.00271 
 (0.00712) (0.00632) (0.00573) (0.00421) 
     
Observations 539 539 539 539 
R-squared 0.059 0.259 0.393 0.675 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
In addition, our results show that providing relatively smaller subsidiaries, particularly 
those that are both smaller and active in more attractive industries, with extra support is 
related to corporations’ performance. These results suggest that merely attributing the cross-
subsidization of relatively smaller subsidiaries to decision makers’ cognitive limitations 
(Bardolet et al. 2011, 2012) may provide an incomplete story. This resonates with Bardolet et 
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al. (2017) suggestion that subsidiaries’ size plays a more complex role in intrafirm 
allocations. 
Our results show that although relatedness, by itself, does not explain the variance of 
corporations’ contribution among their subsidiaries, the interactions of relatedness–relative 
attractiveness and also relatedness–relative size provide some explanations of the within 
portfolio redistribution of wealth19. Our findings comply with new suggestions in the field of 
strategy about the relatedness of subsidiary businesses. Sakhartov and Folta (2015) suggest 
that although a higher level of relatedness of a subsidiary business decreases the cost of 
redeploying corporate resources to and from that business, it does not necessarily mean more 
resources allocated. More precisely, in addition to lower redeployment costs, redeployments 
must be associated with other inducements, e.g., higher market attractiveness, for a subsidiary 
to receive an above-average level of corporate resources. Lower redeployment costs lead 
headquarters to both allocate resources to the related businesses in priority, and more easily 
withdraw resources when performing below expectations (Lieberman et al., 2017; Sakhartov, 
2017). It is worth mentioning that relatedness also underlies intra-temporal economies of 
scope or synergy effects (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014) 
traditionally captured by corporate fixed (or random) effects, and accounted for in the second 
stage of our model (in table 1.2).  
We captured the business-variant corporate effects, partly, through capturing some 
indirect effects of industry as an important criterion shaping corporate-level decisions 
(Vanneste, 2017). Recent studies, Misangyi et al., (2006) and Hough (2006) in particular, find 
that industry effects account for a very low share of business performance variance (e.g., 
7.6%, and 5.3% in the studies by Misangyi et al., 2006 and Hough, 2006, respectively). This 
is lower than initial variance decomposition studies’ estimations and goes against what the 
                                                     
19 The inclusive model is presented in table A1.1 in the appendix 1. 
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positioning school would suggest. Misangyi et al. (2006) provide a nice explanation. The 
authors show that a portion of the overall differences among the corporations arise from the 
composition difference in their portfolios and could be taken as indirect industry effect which 
shows itself in the standard corporate effect. The important indirect industry effects we 
captured in our business-variant corporate effects provide further evidence that the industry 
effects should not be as unimportant as recent studies have estimated. We suggest that 
neglecting industry transient effects due to the limitations of standard HLM also contributed 
to the underestimation of industry effects. Indeed, we found a transient industry effect of 5.36 
percent, which is higher than stable industry effects of 3.70 percent. Finally, we address the 
call by McGahan and Porter (2002), “new approaches are necessary to generate significant 
insight about the relationship between [the effects],”pp. 834. We argue that the indirect 
industry effects are not limited to choosing in which industries a business should be active. 
They are also an important source of the ongoing business-variant corporate effects because 
the industry contributes to define the relative attractiveness of a business and its level of 
relatedness with the rest of corporate portfolio. 
Finally, in this paper, our aim was to discuss the existence and importance of business-
variant corporate effects. Then, it is worth disentangling this discussion and another line of 
inquiry studying potential contingencies affecting the magnitude of corporate effects. For 
example, corporate effects may be more or less important depending on the level of 
development of the country (Makino, Isobe, and Chan 2004), the stage of the industry life 
cycle (Karniouchina et al., 2013), the sector of activity (e.g. manufacturing vs non-
manufacturing industries, McGahan and Porter, 1997). Similarly, Castellaneta and Gottschalg 
(2014) studying the determinants of the performance variance of buyout investments suggest 
that the corporation effects (in this case, the private equities effect) on buyout’s performance 
increase over time and are more important in developed countries and during economic 
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downturns. These studies concentrate on the estimation of the even effects to all subsidiaries 
to examine to which extent, and under which conditions business-invariant corporate effects 
matter. On the contrary, we showed that corporate effects matter more than prior studies have 
found, due to the existence of business-variant corporate effects, which are neglected in those 
studies. The magnitude of business-variant corporate effects also reveals the importance of 
the question of “which subsidiaries receive more?” that might have important implications for 
the performance appraisal of firms’ subsidiaries. Our results illustrated that an important share 
of a firm’s businesses’ performance differences, that might simply be attributed to the 
difference in their within business managerial factors, can be explained by the head office’s 
distribution of corporate resources. 
Our study is also subject to several limitations and caveats. First, similar to other 
recent studies in examining the importance of industry, corporate and business effects, we 
used Compustat data and SIC codes as the identifiers of the industries; these are very broad 
and do not provide a precise classification of business segments (McGahan and Porter, 1997). 
Second, to include all of the cross-classification possibilities in the model, such as industry-
year and corporation-year, we were obliged to introduce a 3-stage HLM. This prevented us 
from estimating the industry effect simultaneously with the corporate and business effects. A 
third issue is, it may be claimed, that because both business-variant corporate effects and 
business-segment effects are two business-specific effects in a portfolio, the estimation of the 
business segment effects through the second stage of the model and the estimation of the 
business-variant corporate effects in the third stage lead to a systematic overestimation of the 
former and an underestimation of the latter. We agree with this argument and, therefore, we 
claim that our results are rather conservative. Our estimations provide a minimum for the 
business-variant corporate effects and a maximum for the business-segment effects. Because 
observations are cross-nested in the corporate-year and business segment categories, they 
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should be estimated simultaneously. However, they both are categorical variables belonging 
to many categories. Then, the two effects cannot be estimated simultaneously. To be 
convinced that our results are conservative, we concentrated on smaller sub-samples to repeat 
our estimations for the business segment effect and business-variant corporate effect in the 
same stage. We persistently ended up achieving significantly lower estimations for the 
business segment effects and higher estimations for the business-variant corporate effects. 
Therefore, we make a strong claim that the total effect of corporations on the businesses’ 
performance is at least as important as the business effects. Then, although our model lacked 
the comprehensiveness of capturing different sources of the business variant corporate 
effects, we provided strong evidence for claiming that the total corporate effects on the 
heterogeneity of subsidiary business performance, is at least of the same order of magnitude 
as the business segment effects20. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we proposed that considering business-variant corporate effects on 
subsidiary businesses’ performance would significantly increase the estimation of corporate 
effects and the explanatory power of the entire model. In line with Adner and Helfat (2003), 
Bowman and Helfat (2001), and McGahan and Porter (2002), our results confirm that 
standard variance decomposition methods underestimate the impact of corporate-level 
decisions on the performance of subsidiary businesses. We find that including variables that 
may affect corporate-level resource allocation decisions dramatically improves the 
explanatory power of the models in explaining business-level performance. We showed that 
beyond the performance difference of businesses depending on their corporate affiliation, 
                                                     
20For example, in order to capture differences in headquarters’ attention depending on geographical markets of 
their businesses (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), we should include the geography of the subsidiaries into the 
model. Naturally, this would increase the comprehensiveness of the business-variant corporate effects 
estimation. However, following previous studies using Compustat business segment data, we could not account 
for the geographical business-variant corporate effects. 
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there also are within corporation performance differences depending on each business unit’s 
capacity to attract more attention from their headquarters, and then to receive more resources 
for instance. We concluded that taking into account both business-variant and business-
invariant corporate effects, the total corporate effects are at least as high in their order of 
importance as business segment effects. Finally, we showed that corporations differ in their 
patterns of resource allocation among their subsidiaries and that they conserve these patterns 
over the time.   
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Insights into Internal Capital Market Debate:  
Why Headquarters Deviate from a Winner-Picking Approach 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Internal capital market literature assumes that corporate capital allocations are 
efficient if firms invest relatively more in subsidiaries with higher growth 
opportunities (that is, pick the winners). However, empirical findings provide 
mixed evidence on the winner-picking strategy. In this paper, we revisit why firms 
might invest extra capital in subsidiaries with seemingly lower growth 
opportunities. Building on the extents of uncertainty firms confront while making 
capital allocation decisions, and interdependence among their subsidiaries, we 
disentangle between inefficient and not-necessarily-inefficient deviations. We 
explain that deviations from the winning-picking strategy may simply reflect 
different strategic intents. Moreover, we highlight the role of CEOs’ breadth of 
prior experience in subsidiaries in attenuating inefficient deviations and enhancing 
corporate value through better capital allocation practices. 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate resource allocation; internal capital market efficiency; CEO experience; 
random-coefficient hierarchical linear models 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the critical decisions in every multi-divisional firm is to allocate capital among 
subsidiary business units. The main stream research on internal capital markets assumes that an 
efficient capital allocation is the one in which corporate headquarters engage in a winner-
picking strategy (Stein, 1997) that is shifting larger portions of capital to units with more market 
growth opportunities. However, empirical evidence shows that, although headquarters have 
better access to their business units’ information than do the external intermediaries and are 
able to better evaluate business units’ prospects, firms are likely to cross-subsidize units with 
lower expected future returns at the expense of units with higher prospects (Arrfelt, Wiseman, 
and Hult, 2013; Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo, 2011; Billett and Mauer, 2003; Shin and Stulz, 
1998). In addition, although a successful capital allocation is assumed to follow the proposition 
of winner-picking strategy, there exists some evidence showing that overinvestment in units 
with lower expected future returns and underinvestment in units with higher prospects may not 
necessarily destroy the overall firm value (Billett and Mauer, 2003; Arrfelt et al., 2015).  
To shed more light on the determinants of deviation from winner picking and the 
observed mixed results on value-decreasing nature of this deviation, in this paper we argue that 
not all deviations from winner picking approach signify an inefficient and unsuccessful 
decision. We try to disentangle between deviations that are attributable to the failure of firms 
to identify and shift more capital to units with higher market opportunities and those attributable 
to pursuit of strategies other than investing more in units with higher future returns. To this aim, 
acknowledging that capital allocation is a complex decision (Bower, 1970; Sengul, Almeida 
Costa and Gimeno, 2019),  we examine deviation effects of different dimensions of complexity 
in decision environment that each may, theoretically, trigger one of these two types of deviation 
more than the other one. A more complex environment may make it harder for CEOs to find 
and implement the optimal allocations due to cognitive constraints; in line with the agency 
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theory, it also make it easier for both self-interested CEO and divisional managers to mislead 
the decision makings to their own benefit; and also makes it likely that firms pursue their unique 
strategies, by their capital allocations, than simply follow a winner-picking approach. In 
particular, we focus on return uncertainty of investment potentials, as a decision making 
complexity that motivates the former type of deviations, and segments’ interdependence, as a 
complexity that prompts the latter type of deviation through motivating firms’ investments in 
synergistic linkages among subsidiaries.  
 We also study the role of managerial dynamic capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003) in 
firms’ capital allocation decisions and these decisions’ value implications. We focus on the 
effect of the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in firm’s different business units on the two 
types of deviations. We argue that the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in firm’s different 
business units may have contrasting effects on deviations from winner-picking logic of capital 
allocation. It attenuates the deviation effect of the complexity that results in the failure of 
company in efficiently allocating capital. In the opposite, we expect the breadth of CEO’s prior 
experience in firm’s different business units to strengthen the relationship between the 
complexity and deviation when the complexity is expected to trigger an efficient deviation; 
here, drives firms’ intentions to invest in subsidiaries’ synergetic linkages.  
Finally, and in order to provide further support for the co-existence of efficient and 
inefficient deviations from winner-picking, we examine the value implications of conformity 
with winner-picking. We discern that conformity with winner-picking is associated with firms’ 
value creation not as a general rule, but if it is mindfully adopted, i.e., when adopted by firms 
with high level of dynamic managerial capability – here, firms whose CEO has a relatively high 
breadth of prior experience in firm’s different business units. 
The contributions of this paper are twofold.  First, it contributes to the debate on the 
internal capital market efficiency by showing that the extant literature overemphasizes the 
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capital allocation inefficiency by failing to consider various strategies that might be pursued by 
headquarters when allocating capital to their business units. We follow the insights from the 
Journal of Management’s special issue (Maritan and Lee, 2017), in general, and Busenbark et 
al. (2017), in particular, on the importance of recognizing the underlying purposes and 
strategies for capital allocation, when evaluating efficiency in this decision. To our knowledge, 
the present study is the first that empirically shows that not all deviations from winner picking 
is attributable to the failure in making an efficient decision. Second, it also highlights the CEO’s 
breadth of prior experience as a source of firms’ dynamic managerial capability (Adner and 
Helfat, 2003) and capital allocation competency (Arrfelt et al, 2015). It reveals the contrasting 
effect of CEO’s breadth of prior experience on the inefficient and not necessarily inefficient 
deviations and shows its role as a boundary condition, under which, a firm can enhance 
corporate value by conformity with winner-picking logic of capital allocation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, after a brief review of the debate on 
internal capital market efficiency, we present our arguments about the existence of two types 
of deviation from winner picking. In order to disentangle between these two types of deviations, 
we use different dimensions of firms’ decision-making environment complexity and 
hypothesize on their association with firms’ deviation from winner-picking logic of capital 
allocation and also on the moderating effect of breadth of CEO’s prior experience on the 
proposed associations. Next, we briefly describe our sample, empirical analyses and results. 
Then, through our further exploratory analyses we examine the value implications of firms’ 
conformity with winner-picking capital allocations and also whether our captured firms’ 
inefficient deviations from winner-picking contracts with CEO’s stock-ownership. Finally, we 
discuss important patterns emerging from the results, our contributions and limitations as well 
as further research directions. 
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Capital allocation in complex decision environments 
The theory of internal capital markets (Williamson, 1975) contends that multi-business 
firms outperform external markets in evaluating business units’ prospects and allocating capital 
to realize their opportunities due to their better access to business units’ information. The 
mainstream research on internal capital markets proposes a winner-picking logic (Stein, 1997) 
for optimality of internal capital markets. This literature assumes that internal capital allocations 
are optimal if top managers in headquarters shift the capital investments towards the units with 
higher market growth prospects. The empirical studies, however, provide ample evidence that 
multi-business firms deviate from the winner-picking logic and cross-subsidize units with lower 
prospects at the expense of units with higher expected future returns (Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Billett and Mauer, 2003; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). To explain the observed deviations, 
scholars have pointed at agency problem resulting from rent seeking behaviors of corporate 
CEOs and divisional managers (e.g. Antle and Eppen, 1985, Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Rajan, et al., 2000) as well as behavioral biases and cognitive limitations of decision makers 
(e.g., Bardolet et al., 2011; Arrfelt, et al., 2013).  
The agency account of internal capital market inefficiency perceives subsidiaries as 
rent-seekers wishing to acquire a bigger share of available resources. Subsidiaries may conceal 
their information, exaggerate their prospects, and even use their power to influence corporate 
level decisions to receive more resources. Rajan et al., (2000) suggest that CEOs intentionally 
tilt more capital budgets towards subsidiaries with less resources and market opportunities to 
decrease the diversity of expected returns between the subsidiaries and make them behave more 
cooperatively, i.e., make firm-wide optimal decisions where they have private information, and 
decision right is delegated to them. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) maintain that, on top of 
subsidiaries as rent-seeking entities, CEOs are also rent seekers who allocate capital based on 
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their own incentives which may be misaligned with the interest of owners. The behavioral 
account of internal capital market inefficiency, on the other hand, asserts that decision makers’ 
behavioral biases and cognitive limitations make capital allocation deviate from a rational 
process. Arrfelt et al. (2013) argue that corporations allocate their capital through a backward-
looking, aspiration (referent) driven, decision making process. According to them, the 
subsidiary businesses which perform relatively weaker than either their peers in the industry, 
or their sister businesses, or themselves in previous years are likely to receive relatively higher 
capital investments. They contend that actual internal capital allocation is a retrospective 
inefficient, performance-correcting, process rather than a prospective profit-maximizing one. 
As another explanation of internal capital market inefficiencies which is rooted in decision-
makers’ behavioral biases, Bardolet et al. (2012) provide evidence from both a secondary data 
analysis and an experiment showing that headquarters’ top managers tend to an “even 
distribution” of capital among subsidiaries. They show that decision-makers are likely to 
distribute the capital in a way that the segments which should, optimally, receive significantly 
less capital investments than average receive only slightly less than the ones who should 
receive, optimally, much higher capital investments than average. Their study has been 
considered as one of the major works explaining why relatively smaller subsidiaries receive 
relatively higher capital investments. 
Although the extant research considers the deviation from winner-picking approach 
equivalent to an inefficient capital allocation, it is not always found to be detrimental to firm 
value. For example, Billett and Mauer (2003) find that inefficient subsidies (i.e., capital over-
investment) provided to small business units not only do not destroy corporate value, but are 
even positively associated with multi-business firms’ excess value. Disregarding the overall 
firm-level effect, Arrfelt et al. (2015) find mixed results: over-investment in business units with 
less attractive prospects negatively contributes to their business-level return, while there is no 
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negative business-level performance effect of underinvestment in units with more attractive 
prospects21. Additionally, in a recent study Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick (2017) showed that 
the egalitarian values of liberal corporate CEOs results in even-handedly allocating capital to 
their business units. When the organizational members also have liberal orientations (similar to 
the CEO) such pattern in capital allocation is value-enhancing for the firm.  
In an effort to resolve the controversial results emerging out of this line of inquiry 
Busenbark et al. (2017) suggests that the deviation from the winner-picking logic of capital 
allocation can also be interpreted as firms pursuing a different corporate strategy. In other 
words, not every multi-business firm may necessarily follow this capital allocation logic, that 
is, decide to allocate the capital resources on the basis of the growth prospect of their 
subsidiaries. For example, multi-business firms might also decide to distribute capital based on 
the potential to achieve synergy gains among subsidiaries. Extending this reasoning, this paper 
aims at better identify deviations that are attributable to the failure of managers to identify and 
shift more capital to units with higher market opportunities and those deviations that might be 
due to situations in which managers might follow strategies other than that of simply investing 
more in units with higher future returns.  
According to Simon (1990), actors’ rational behaviors, here capital investment 
decisions, are shaped simultaneously by two set of factors which are related to the extent of 
cognitive abilities of decision-makers and the degree of complexity of the decision-making 
environment. We first posit that decision-makers are boundedly rational (Cyert and March, 
1963). As a result, they might follow some rules of thumb and biased decision making 
approaches when allocating capital (Bardolet et al., 2011; Arrfelt, et al., 2013); they also 
might not have the required knowledge about different aspects of their businesses and are 
likely to make decisions based on distorted information provided by divisional managers 
                                                     
21 In fact, if this deviation is inefficient, under-investment in the businesses with better investment prospects 
should make them underperform, at least compared to their peers who received enough capital investment. 
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(Harris and Raviv, 1996). However, we do not limit the first set of factors to decision-makers’ 
cognitive limitations, and in line with the agency theory, we also acknowledge that decision-
makers might allocate capital self-interestedly (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  
Second, firms’ resource allocation, in general, and capital allocation, in particular, is 
indeed a complex process (Bower, 1970; Sengul et al., 2019). Committing to holding an 
integrated view of capital allocation process, we select and use different dimensions of the 
complexity of decision environment that may trigger the mechanisms underlying our proposed 
two types of deviation from winner-picking. First, we look at uncertainty as a complexity 
dimension that theoretically leads to inefficient deviation by making managers less capable of 
identifying the subsidiaries with higher market prospects and tilting capital flow towards 
them. We follow Leiblein, Chen, and Posen (2017) conceptualization of uncertainty. They 
graft the insights from strategic factor market and real option theory and suggest that there are 
two uncertainties about the value of a resource: a prospective and a contemporaneous 
uncertainty. While the former pertains to how the value of resources would evolve over time, 
the latter is rooted in inefficiency of factor market and differential believes that firms have 
about the current value of a resource. Leiblein et al. maintain that firms’ feedback learning 
and information processing ability make them exercise better “contingent claims on an asset 
in a factor market” (2017: p.2590). We suggest that selecting between capital investment 
opportunities to acquire potential resources in different business units could be observed 
through a similar lens. There is contemporaneous uncertainty about the relative value of the 
potential resources to be acquired by capital investment; there is also prospective uncertainty 
about the evolution of their value over time. We use firms’ overall market volatility and 
number of business segments as proxies for prospective and contemporaneous uncertainty 
respectively, to capture inefficient deviations from winner-picking logic of capital allocation. 
When markets are volatile, headquarters may not be able to properly predict the future returns 
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of their business units and therefore are not able to shift capital to the units with higher 
prospects which is the very proposition of winner-picking strategy. Similarly, the larger the 
number of segments a multi-business firm is active in, the more calculations and information 
processing activities are required from top managers which may exceed their cognitive 
capacities. Consequently, headquarters would be more likely to utilize heuristics to find the 
solution which lead to more biases in decision making (Bettis, 2017), which results in 
deviation from rationally picking the winners. Also, the costs of auditing and collecting 
information on a large number of business segments might be too high, making a thorough 
evaluation unlikely and headquarters more vulnerable toward information asymmetry and rent 
seeking behaviors of divisional managers (Harris and Raviv, 1996). Therefore, uncertainty 
about investments’ returns might amplify the divisional managers’ self-interested behavior 
and lead to inefficient deviations from winner-picking. Additionally, uncertainty about 
investment alternatives’ return also makes it easier for a self-interested CEO to make 
decisions to her personal benefit. When there are different voices and opinions about making 
new investments in which subsidiaries would provide the firm with higher returns, the CEO 
finds it easier to make decisions self-interestedly. In sum, when markets are volatile and when 
the number of business segments is large, firms are more likely to deviate from rationally 
picking the winners. Considering the above discussion, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1a: A firms’ overall market volatility is negatively related to its conformity 
with winner-picking approach to capital allocation.  
Hypothesis 1b: The number of a firm’s business segments is negatively related to its 
conformity with winner-picking approach to capital allocation. 
 
In addition to those elements of decision environment complexity which make 
managers less capable to follow winner-picking strategy (as discussed above), there are some 
complexities that make managers less likely to follow this approach, not necessarily 
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inefficiently. As previously mentioned, multi-business firms allocate capital to their business 
units, considering different criteria and corporate strategies (Busenbark et al., 2017). One 
simplifying assumption of winner-picking strategy is that a headquarters considers each 
business unit at a time, evaluates its prospects, and allocates capital to it based on its expected 
future returns compared to its sister businesses. However, corporate headquarters also take 
into account the relationships between business units when allocating capital to them 
(Bardolet et al., 2017). The winner-picking logic of capital allocation neglects the 
subsidiaries’ interdependence which is one important aspect of multidivisional firms. 
Interdependence is the extent to which different business units might support or complement 
each other’s activities through sharing or redeploying financial, tangible, and intangible 
resources (Bower, 1970). We argue that interdependence among subsidiaries, as a capital 
allocation decision complexity dimension, makes managers less likely to follow the winner-
picking approach. Multidivisional firms are able to achieve superior performance by creating 
synergies among their different business units and allocating capital accordingly to create firm 
value (Williamson, 1975). Therefore, when allocating capital to their businesses, a 
headquarters may be less concerned about the growth prospects of each single unit 
independently, and instead, it might try to make investments in a way that enhances the 
overall firm performance. The more interdependent the business units in a multi-business firm 
are, the more potential exists for creating synergies (Rumelt, 1974). Therefore, we advance 
that when the degree of interdependence among business units within a multi-business firm is 
high, and so more opportunities for synergy exists, it is less likely that the headquarters 
follows the pure winner-picking approach and invests more in units that individually have 
more growth prospects. We expect such firm to give a more complex answer to capital 
investment challenge. We then hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 2: The degree of interdependence among a firm’s business segments is 
negatively related to its conformity with winner-picking approach to capital allocation. 
 
The role of capital allocation capabilities in complex decision environments  
In the previous section we explored the role of decision-making complexity and 
related it to different types of deviations from winner-picking approach to capital allocation. 
On the one hand, we hypothesized on the deviation arising from a firm’s uncertainty about the 
best use of capital. Such deviations are source of inefficiency in internal capital market. On 
the other hand, we introduced and hypothesized on the deviation effect of interdependence 
among business segments of a firm. Deviations then do not necessarily destroy firm value; 
rather, they may reflect value-enhancing synergetic linkages among subsidiaries.  
The co-existence of efficient and inefficient deviations from winner-picking logic of 
capital allocation warrants contrasting moderating effects of capital allocation competencies 
(Arrfelt et al, 2015) on firms’ deviations from winner-picking logic of capital allocation. 
Arrfelt et al. (2015) introduce firms’ capital allocation competency as the underinvestment of 
firms in subsidiaries with lower market prospects. We push more on the concept and, 
acknowledging the complexity of firms’ capital allocation decisions, we define firms’ capital 
allocation capabilities as those characteristics of firms’ structures, systems and decision-
makers which make firms more competent to make proper capital investment decisions. We 
expect that firm’s capital allocation capability, as an exemplary dynamic managerial 
capability (Adner and Helfat, 2003), impedes inefficient and suboptimal deviations from 
winner-picking approach, i.e., the deviations accruing from the investments’ return 
uncertainty; and, therefore, demonstrate a weakening moderating effect on this sort of 
deviation. However, we expect a strengthening moderating effect of firm’s capital allocation 
capabilities on the second type of deviations. If firm’s deviations pertain to decision-makers’ 
searching for better allocation strategies when winner-picking might prove suboptimal, we 
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expect this behavior strengthens with firms’ decision resources. In the next section, we 
develop our hypotheses on the moderating effect of breadth of CEO’s prior experience in 
various firm’s business segments, as a source of firm’s capital allocation capability, on the 
deviations proposed in previous hypotheses.  
 
Breadth of CEO’s prior experience in firm’s business segments  
We take the breadth of CEO’s prior experience, in the domain of firm’s subsidiaries, 
as an important source of firm’s dynamic managerial capability (Adner and Helfat, 2003) with 
regard to corporate capital allocation decisions. Adner and Helfat (2003) attribute a good deal 
of corporate effect on subsidiaries’ profitability to firms’ dynamic managerial capability, by 
“which managers build, integrate, and reconfigure organizational resources and competences 
…[through firms’] high level decisions” (P. 1020). They enumerate managerial human 
capital, social capital, and cognition as three factors of managerial dynamic capability that, in 
addition to their direct effect, interact, and resonate each other’s effect on the quality of firms’ 
decisions. For example, a managers’ industry-specific human capital, obtained from prior 
industry experience, contributes to her internal and external social ties that in return provides 
her with better access to new information, and ultimately higher quality of decisions. Career 
experience is an important aspect of managers’ human capital which imprints in them a 
repertoire of job relevant knowledge and skills and impact the way they process information 
(Carpenter, Sanders, and Gregersen, 2001). 
We focus on corporate CEOs since they are the most influential and powerful 
executives in any firm and usually have the discretion to determine the firms’ overall strategy 
and policy (Quigley and Hambrick, 2015) in capital allocation. CEO prior experience, in 
particular, has been known as a critical determinant of firms’ strategies and performance 
(Carpenter et al., 2001; Gunz and Jalland, 1996). When a CEO has prior experiences in 
different business units or their various domain of activity, she is better able to evaluate their 
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prospects in complex situations and therefore allocate capital to the best use of it. First, prior 
experience in firm’s business units provides the CEO with superiority in knowledge and 
information about those businesses’ markets. Therefore, she is less vulnerable toward the 
information asymmetry that exists between the headquarters and divisional managers since 
she is not solely dependent on the information provided by divisional managers to make 
investment decisions (Ang, De Jong, and Van der Poel, 2013). Additionally, the more 
experience a CEO has in different business units, the more comfortable she is in searching for 
information and process the relevant information to make decisions. Therefore, even when 
investment alternatives’ returns are highly uncertain for the majority of managers in a domain, 
a CEO with prior experience in those markets is more likely to be able to reduce the 
uncertainty compared to other CEOs who lack the experience. Considering the above 
discussion, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The negative relationship between a firm’s market volatility and its 
conformity with winner-picking approach to capital allocation weakens with the breadth of 
CEO’s prior experience in a firm’s business units. 
Hypothesis 3b: The negative relationship between a firm’s number of business 
segments and its conformity with winner-picking approach to capital allocation weakens with 
the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in a firm’s business units. 
 
On the other hand, we expect that the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in the 
domains of firm’s subsidiaries helps her better recognize potentials for synergistic rents 
among different subsidiaries to be pursued by firm’s capital investments. Therefore, 
deviations pertaining to subsidiaries interdependence should be accentuated by the breadth of 
CEO’s prior experience in subsidiaries: 
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Hypothesis 3c: The negative relationship between interdependence among a firm’s 
business segments and its conformity with winner-picking approach to capital allocation 
strengthens with the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in a firm’s business units. 
  
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
Sample selection 
Similar to previous studies, we used Compustat data. Our sample includes a 16-year 
period from 1998 to 2013 in which industries are identified based on the SIC system at the 4-
digit level. We set 1998 as our starting year considering the fact that companies follow the 
new Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS 131) since December 1997. Based 
on SFAS 131, multi-business firms categorize their business units into different operational 
business segments based on their management approaches in addition to difference in 
industries (Hough, 2006). Therefore, each firm in our sample may possess more than one 
business-segment in a single industry22.  
We mainly followed Billett and Mauer (2003) in our data screening and selection 
process. We excluded business segments with assets less than $10 million. We also excluded 
businesses active in industries with either 6000s SIC codes (depository segments) or 9000s 
(non-classifiable establishments, and government, excluding finance) because they are not 
comparable with other businesses (Misangyi et al., 2006). We excluded the observations in 
which both previous and next year related data were missing. Also, similar to previous studies, 
we excluded single-business firms because the analysis of internal capital markets, at the 
business segment level, is only applicable to multi-business firms. Further, we decided to limit 
our sample to firms active at least in two different industries in each year we had data for. This 
                                                     
22 This smaller grid for business segments than in previous standards, in which a business segment was unique 
for each pair of firm-industry, warrants for more within-segment similarity of businesses, in general, and 
investment opportunities, in particular. 
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helped us capture the potential effects of industry opportunity difference of the sister 
subsidiaries. The ﬁnal sample contains 4283 segment-level observations for 1078 business 
segments possessed by 362 firms across 205 industry (4-digit) classiﬁcations. This provides us 
with 1638 firm-level observations. They account for our main level of analysis in this study.  
The data on all variables were collected from Compustat except the required data on 
CEOs that were collected manually from proxy statements, firms’ annual reports and websites, 
BusinessWeek website, and LinkedIn profiles. 
 
Dependent variable: Our firm-year level dependent variable, Conformity with winner-
picking, is an estimated dependent variable (Añón Higón, Gómez, and Vargas, 2017; Lewis 
and Linzer, 2005; Malen and Vaaler, 2017) which we estimate in one stage ahead and at the 
segment-year level. Details of the procedure is reported in Appendix 2. Briefly, using the 
capital subsidy each business segment receives as the dependent variable, and controlling for 
other variables, we derive random coefficients for business segments’ relative overall market 
opportunities at firm-year level. The greater the positive random coefficient for a firm-year, 
the greater the conformity of capital allocations of that firm-year with the winner-picking 
approach, and vice-versa.  
 
Independent variables: 
Segments’ interdependence: We calculate firms’ segments’ interdependence by using 
segments’ resource relatedness to the rest of firm portfolio. Similar to some previous work 
(e.g., Keil, Maula, Schildt, and Zahra, 2008; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), we 
operationalize resource relatedness based on the proximity of industry SIC codes. The 
Relatedness variable can take values of 1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, or 0. Then, we take the average of 
relatedness values through a firm’s portfolio as a proxy for the overall firm’s segments’ 
interdependence in a given year. 
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Overall market volatility: We use market volatility as a proxy for prospective uncertainty and 
unpredictability of future returns on potential investments. To this aim, we follow Sakhartov 
and Folta (2015) and operationalize a segment’s market volatility by the standard deviation of 
return on assets (ROA) of the businesses active in that segment’s industry. We use a step-wised 
process to calculate market volatility at the narrowest possible SIC level (that includes at least 
five data points). Finally, we take the average of market volatility values through a firm’s 
portfolio to derive firms’ overall market volatility for the focal firm-year. 
Number of business segments: This is a count measure of the operating segment categorization 
(Hough, 2006) each firm owns. The operating segment categorization allows a firm to identify 
and differentiate between its business segments, even within a same 4-digit SIC code industry, 
based on their operational differences. Therefore, the number of a firm’s business segments is 
more insightful about capital allocation decision complexity than the number of the industries 
that firm is active in. 
Breadth of CEO’s prior experience: First, we define a CEO’s prior experience in a business 
segment as a dummy variable at segment-year level receiving 1 if the CEO had experience in 
segment’s domain before assignment to CEO position and 0 otherwise. Then, we calculate 
breadth of CEO’s prior experience in firm’s business segments, which is a firm-year level 
variable, by taking the average of the CEO’s prior experience in business segments across the 
firm’s portfolio. This variable breadth of CEO’s prior experience captures the CEO’s overall 
competence in recognizing, comparing, and selecting the best investment opportunities, 
existing in subsidiaries, and pursuing synergies among firm’s different business units. To test 
the Hypotheses 3a through 3c, we respectively interact the variable Breadth of CEO’s prior 
experience with variables firms’ overall market volatility, number of business segments, and 
segments’ interdependence. 
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Control Variables:  
Variable CEO’s tenure: We measure CEO’s tenure as the number of years that a CEO held her 
position in the focal firm. The common aspects of every CEO’s job is that they usually start 
their position with low levels of power and knowledge about their job and as time passes, they 
become more powerful and build more knowledge about different aspects of the firm 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Therefore, throughout the cycle of their tenure, not only CEOs 
become less susceptible toward political complications within the firm that might impact their 
capital investment decisions (Xuan, 2009), but also they become more familiar with business 
units and more comfortable in collecting and processing required information even in complex 
decision environments. 
Variable Segments’ opportunity diversity: Rajan et al. (2000) suggest that CEOs intentionally 
tilt more capital budgets towards the subsidiaries with less resources and market opportunities 
to decrease the diversity of expected returns between the subsidiaries and make them behave 
more cooperatively. To account for this possible mechanism, we calculate the variable 
segments’ opportunity diversity, similar to Rajan et al., as the standard deviation of asset-
weighted market opportunity of segments through a firm portfolio.  
CEO Stock ownership: One suggested explanation for the deviation of firms from efficient 
allocation of capital is the self-interested behaviors of corporate CEOs. It is expected that 
owning firm’s stock decreases the probability of CEOs pursuing self-serving behavior, and 
instead they would be more likely to act in the interest of the whole firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). We measure CEO stock ownership as the natural logarithm of the value of 
firm stock owned by the CEO measured in 1000 dollars.  
We also control for variables such as firm’s size, measured in logarithm of total asset, and cash 
munificence, i.e., asset-normalized firm’s generated cash. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In our empirical analysis, we start with testing our different hypotheses. In a post-hoc 
analysis, we explore the value implications of firms’ conformity with winner-picking 
approach to capital investment. This provides us further empirical support for our proposed 
typology on the deviations from winner-picking logic of capital allocation. 
 
Main Results: 
We use a fixed effect panel regression model including year, industry, and firm fixed effects. 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics and the pairwise correlations of variables used in our 
analysis. There is only one particular point emerging from Table 2.1 that is worth mentioning. 
CEO’s tenure has relatively important correlations with the two other CEO related variables: 
a positive correlation of 34% with CEO’s stock ownership and a negative correlation of 21% 
with breadth of CEO’s prior experience. The CEO’s stock ownership and the breadth of 
CEO’s prior experience do not have significant correlations with each other; nor has CEO’s 
tenure a significant correlation with the dependent variable, i.e., the conformity with winner-
picking capital investment approach. To ascertain that CEO’s tenure would not artificially 
affect the estimations of coefficients related to the other two variables, we will exclude CEO’s 
tenure from the model in our robustness tests and re-run the regression tests.  
Table 2.2 provides the results of our hypothesis testing. Model 1 includes control 
variables. Only the variable segments’ opportunity diversity receives a significant, indeed 
negative, coefficient. This supports Rajan et al.’s (2000) argument that headquarters might 
intentionally deviate from winner-picking approach, partly, to make segments’ managing 
directors collaborate. The results of model 1 lacks enough statistical significance to confirm 
that cash-rich firms are less likely to conform to winner-picking approach and that CEOs’ 
stock ownership is positively associated with firms’ conformity with winner-picking 
approach.  
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Table 2.2: Testing the hypotheses 
 Conformity with winner-picking 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Size -2.177 -1.198 -0.897 -0.886 -0.538 2.000 3.255 
 (3.958) (3.965) (3.974) (3.988) (3.995) (2.527) (2.562) 
Cash munificence -5.726 -7.538 -9.068 -7.466 -9.058 -16.92 -15.34 
 (20.91) (20.79) (20.83) (20.81) (20.84) (15.81) (15.79) 
Segments' opportunity diversity -6.866** -5.315* -4.960 -5.800* -5.439* -7.329*** -6.615*** 
 (3.085) (3.114) (3.120) (3.130) (3.135) (2.522) (2.552) 
CEO's tenure  0.328 -0.0704 -0.168 0.195 0.0891 1.743* 1.653 
 (1.394) (1.425) (1.425) (1.437) (1.437) (1.002) (1.017) 
CEO's stock ownership 1.011 0.906 0.949 -2.793 -2.427   
 (0.928) (0.937) (0.940) (3.572) (3.589)   
Breath of CEO's prior experience  -4.059 -25.72 -4.807 -27.39  -11.07 
  (5.324) (21.32) (5.349) (21.38)  (16.57) 
 Overall market volatility  -67.03** -101.9*** -119.4* -155.3**  -55.24** 
  (27.01) (31.84) (71.97) (73.83)  (24.02) 
Number of business segments  -1.707 -2.339 -0.370 -0.566  -1.767 
  (1.702) (1.903) (3.748) (3.782)  (1.531) 
Segments’ interdependence  -50.40*** -49.64*** -76.33*** -74.56***  -34.04*** 
  (12.91) (13.35) (24.02) (24.54)  (10.28) 
Overall market volatility * Breath   134.8**  136.8**  110.0** 
of CEO's prior experience   (68.18)  (68.24)  (49.76) 
Number of business segments * Breath   2.105  2.069  0.575 
of CEO's prior experience   (4.906)  (4.931)  (3.889) 
Segments’ interdependence * Breath   -13.92  -12.86  -10.77 
of CEO's prior experience   (20.36)  (20.47)  (15.99) 
Overall market volatility * CEO’s     9.155 9.237   
stock ownership    (11.26) (11.27)   
 Number of business segments * CEO’s    -0.293 -0.369   
stock ownership    (0.601) (0.604)   
Segments’ interdependence * CEO’s     4.883 4.669   
stock ownership    (3.702) (3.711)   
Constant 19.40 65.55* 70.74** 84.97** 88.25** -5.788 21.44 
 (33.68) (34.67) (35.06) (40.45) (40.69) (24.853) (25.89) 
Firm, industry and year fixed effects   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 1,469 1,469 
adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.22 0.222 0.219 0.221 0.157 0.169 
R-squared 0.382 0.403 0.407 0.406 0.410 0.354 0.366 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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We add independent variables to build Model 2. Variable Number of business 
segments, related to H1b, does not receive a significant coefficient. However, both other 
hypothesized effects of firms’ Overall market volatility, H1a, and Segments’ interdependence, 
H2, receive strongly significant negative coefficients (p-values equal to 0.013 and 0.000, 
respectively), conforming to hypotheses. It is worth mentioning that although only two out of 
the three hypothesized deviation effects receive statistical support, all of the three direct 
effects demonstrate relatively high importance, i.e., economic significance. One standard 
deviation increase in firms’ Overall market volatility, Number of business segments, and 
Segments’ interdependence result in a decrease of 16%, 6%, and 47% of dependent variable 
standard deviation respectively.  
We test hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c in Model 3. We find that the Breadth of CEO’s prior 
experience significantly moderates, and attenuates the negative relation between the firm’s 
overall market volatility and conformity with winner-picking approach to capital allocation, 
supporting the Hypothesis 3a (Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1: The attenuating moderating effect of the breadth of CEO’s prior experience on the 
negative relation between the firm’s overall market volatility and the conformity with winner-
picking approach to capital allocation 
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The other moderating effects of the Breadth of CEO prior experience on the variables 
Number of business segments (H3b) and Segments’ interdependence (H3c) do not receive 
statistical significance. 
 
Robustness check tests: 
We run some complementary tests to ascertain the robustness of our results.  
First, to verify the dependence of deviation effects of firms’ Overall market volatility 
on and also the independence of deviation effects of firms’ Segments’ interdependence from 
Breadth of CEO’s prior experience, we split the sample in two subsamples: firm-years with 
higher and lower than average Breadth of CEO’s prior experience. We run the test of direct 
effects for each subsample separately. While the deviation effect of Segments’ 
interdependence significantly exists in both and is statistically indifferent between the two 
subsamples, the deviation effect of firms’ Overall market volatility only exists in the 
subsample of firm-years with lower than average decision making resources. Further, as we 
explained earlier the variable CEO’s tenure might potentially distort the estimations of the 
coefficients, due to its relatively important correlation with both CEO’s breadth of prior 
experience and stock ownership. To ascertain that our results are not distorted and artificially 
strengthened, we re-run all tests while excluding CEO’s tenure from the model. The fit of our 
models increases slightly in general, however, we do not witness any significant change in our 
estimated coefficients. 
Further, as an exploratory test we are interested to see whether CEO’s stock ownership 
also has an attenuating effect on inefficient deviations in our data; similar to CEO’s breadth of 
CEO prior experience. In Model 4 we test for the moderating effect of CEO’s stock 
ownership separately and in Model 5 together with breadth of CEO prior experience. Model 4 
and Model 5 suggest that CEO self-interestedness do not have a significant moderating effect 
on deviations from winner picking.  
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Finally, data limitations on CEO’s stock ownership has contracted our data by around 
40%. Witnessing that CEO’s stock ownership does not provide any significant either direct or 
moderating effect on firms’ deviation from winner-picking capital investment approach, we 
decided to eliminate this variable from our model and re-run our regressions. Models 6 and 7 
demonstrate the replications of Models 1 and 5 (or 3), respectively, from which CEO’s stock 
ownership variable is eliminated. While the tests’ sample size, at the firm-year level, increases 
from 869 to 1469 observations, the results are qualitatively similar. 
 
Post-hoc analysis: Value implications of firm’s conformity with winner-picking 
To complement our analysis, we explore the value-implications of firms’ conformity with 
winner-picking logic of capital investment. To this end, we regress the next year value of 
firms’ market value, Tobin’s Q(t+1), in our sample on the degree of conformity to winner-
picking capital investment in previous year. We control for firms’ current year market value23, 
Tobin’s Q(t), and other firm and CEO level variables we used in the main analysis of the 
paper. We also introduce firm and year fixed effect to all of our models. Results are presented 
in Table 2.3. 
Model 1 only includes the control variables. Firms’ current year market valuation and 
firm size receive significant positive and negative coefficients, respectively. The rest of 
variables receive insignificant coefficients, although, with a sign complying with the theory. 
We introduce firms’ conformity to winner-picking in the second model that receives a 
positive, although insignificant coefficient; providing empirical evidence that winner-picking 
does not always enhance corporate value. Finally, in the third model we also capture the 
moderating effect of the Breadth of CEO’s prior experience, on the relationship between the 
                                                     
23 Since it is probable that the value of current year market value of the firm is highly dependent on its previous 
year value (much more than that to be captured the fixed effect which only captures the average value along the 
analysis timeframe), we added this.  
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firms’ conformity with winner-picking and value creation. It receives a positive significant 
coefficient. This shows that conformity with winner-picking would be particularly associated 
with firms’ value creation if CEO has had enough mastery over the domains of the 
subsidiaries and has adopted winner-picking mindfully. 
Table 2.3: Value implications of firm’s conformity to winner-picking 
  Tobin’s Q(t+1)   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
      
Tobin’s Q(t) 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.417***  
 (0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0333)  
Size -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.148***  
 (0.0533) (0.0534) (0.0533)  
Cash munificence 0.286 0.291 0.335  
 (0.325) (0.326) (0.326)  
Segments' opportunity diversity -0.0537 -0.0535 -0.0591  
 (0.0534) (0.0534) (0.0535)  
CEO's prior experience 0.0873 0.0858 0.0847  
 (0.0793) (0.0795) (0.0794)  
CEO's tenure  0.0162 0.0155 0.0143  
 (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0201)  
 Overall market volatility -0.121 -0.116 -0.137  
 (0.417) (0.417) (0.417)  
 Number of business segments -0.00341 -0.00308 -0.00329  
 (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260)  
Segments’ interdependence 0.265 0.270 0.259  
 (0.204) (0.204) (0.204)  
Conformity with winner-picking  0.000197 -0.000763  
  (0.000609) (0.000830)  
conformity with winner-picking * Breath   0.00360*  
of CEO's prior experience   (0.00212)  
Constant 1.274** 1.273** 1.272**  
 (0.568) (0.568) (0.567)  
Firm and year fixed effects YES YES YES  
Observations 1,108 1,108 1,108  
Adjusted R-squared 0.6727 0.6723 0.6731  
R-squared 0.7741 0.7742 0.775  
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
     
     
DISCUSSION 
  
Williamson (1975), comparing Multi-division (M-Form) and Unitary (U-form) types of firms, 
suggests that multi-divisional form of firm acts as “miniature” capital markets, i.e., internal 
capital markets, which makes it possible for a firm to assign cash to the uses with higher 
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yields. According to him, M-Form can compensate for external capital markets’ failure. He 
ascribes this “fundamental attribute” of M-form to potential feasibility and efficiency of the 
internal capital markets due to higher availability of information for internal auditors 
compared to the external ones (Williamson, 1975, p:148). The subsequent empirical work 
extends the logic underlying this analogy of internal capital market and assumes that an 
internal capital market, similar to an external one, is efficient only if it picks the winners, i.e., 
tilts the capital towards the businesses with higher growth opportunity, usually, the ones 
which are active in more attractive markets. Consequently, this enormous body of empirical 
work takes the observed pervasive deviations of multi-business firms from winner-picking 
approach as an evidence for inefficient internal capital market and tries to explain it by either 
agency theory or behavioral/cognitive perspectives. 
 In the present study, however, we addressed the recent theoretical argument 
(Busenbark et al., 2017; Sengul et al., 2019) about the importance of recognizing the purposes 
and strategies underlying firms’ capital allocation when analyzing internal capital markets’ 
efficiency. We argued and provided some empirical evidence that not all deviations from 
winner-picking approach is attributable to failure in making an efficient decision, and 
similarly, not all conformities with winner-picking could be expected to be value-enhancing. 
To this end, we leveraged the extent of decision-making complexity companies have to cope 
with to disentangle between the inefficient and not necessarily inefficient deviations from 
winner-picking logic of capital allocation. First, we used uncertainty about the best use of 
capital as an example of complexities that would lead to managers’ failure in recognizing 
opportunities and allocating more capital to units with more opportunities, i.e., inefficient 
deviations from winner-picking. Second, we used segments’ interdependence as an example 
of complexities that would make firms follow strategies other than growth and managers 
decide not to follow this “simply investing more in units with higher future returns” and 
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deviate from it. In particular, interdependence might provide firms with more opportunities to 
accrue synergistic rents from their capital investment decisions. Our analysis provided 
empirical supports for deviation effects of both prospective uncertainty, captured by firms’ 
overall market volatility, and firms’ segments’ interdependence. 
Then we analyzed the effect of firms’ capital allocation capabilities on deviations. 
Arguing for that each of the firms’ overall market volatility, and firms’ segments’ 
interdependence complexities trigger a different nature of deviation from winner-picking, i.e. 
an inefficient and an efficient deviation respectively, we expected firms’ decision-making 
capabilities to have opposite moderating effect on these complexities’ associated deviations. 
Our results supported that the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in firm’s different business 
domains attenuates the inefficient deviations, i.e., deviations associated with firms’ overall 
market volatility in our paper. Under market volatility, it is extremely challenging for a multi-
business firm to compare the return prospects of investment alternatives among its 
subsidiaries. Our results showed that a CEO’s breadth of prior experience in firm’s 
subsidiaries’ domains, as a source of firms’ capital allocation capability, makes her overcome 
this hardship and deviate less from winner-picking. As we expected, this is not the case 
regarding the deviations associated with subsidiaries’ interdependence which, we suppose, are 
due to a CEO’s intention to not analyze subsidiaries’ opportunities separately and try to 
achieve synergistic rents through capital investments.24 Finally, we also find that the 
conformity with winner-picking logic of internal capital market is positively associated with 
corporate value creation only in firms benefiting from dynamic managerial capabilities i.e., 
                                                     
24 The fact that we failed to find statistical significance for the opposite, strengthening, effect of firms’ capital 
allocation capability on the deviation effect of segments’ interdependence might be also suggestive in some 
extent. This might indicate that segments’ interdependence might simultaneously trigger both forms of 
deviations, i.e. an efficient deviation through providing the firm with synergy-seeking investment opportunities 
and inefficient one related to complexity and hardship of monitoring the relations and coordinating highly-
interdependent subsidiaries (Zhou, 2011). Then, the capital allocation capability helps the decision-makers 
accentuate more the efficient deviations while relax the inefficient one, resulting in an insignificant total 
moderating effect.    
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the breadth of CEO’s prior experience in this paper. This provide further empirical support 
that allocating capital conforming to winner-picking could be value-enhancing only if it is 
deployed mindfully. Our finding resonates with RBV scholarship that dynamic managerial 
capability (Adner and Helfat, 2003) may explain the corporate-effect on performance 
heterogeneity of businesses, which arises from the difference in quality of high-level 
decisions in firms’ headquarters.  
In a different note and in comparison between prospective uncertainty and 
contemporaneous uncertainty, our results supported the inefficient deviation effect of 
prospective uncertainty, captured by firms’ overall market volatility, which would be 
corrected by firms’ decision-making resources. However, this was not the case for 
contemporaneous uncertainty, which we captured by firms’ number of business segments. 
Our failure to find statistical support for the latter uncertainty might be due to imperfectness 
of the variable we used.  
Finally, our results show that what we categorized as inefficient deviations from 
winner-picking ensue more from decision-makers’ cognitive limitations to find the best 
investment opportunities under uncertainty than from CEO’s use of uncertainties self-
interestedly. Indeed, we do not aim to conclude that our results corroborate for higher 
explanatory power of behavioral/cognitive factors compared to agency reasons for capital 
missallocations. This is first because the corrective effect of the breadth of CEOs’ prior 
experience might also be rooted in its functionality in countervailing divisional managers’ 
rent-seeking behavior. Second, it is also possible that the uncertainty, as the complexity we 
used to trigger inefficient deviations, might per se trigger cognitive reasons more than agency 
ones.  
Our analysis is subject to some caveats. First, as we mentioned, firms’ number of 
business segments is not a perfect variable to capture the decision complexity dimension 
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rooted in contemporaneous uncertainty about the valuation of rival capital investment 
opportunities; and might have prevented us from finding statistical support for this 
uncertainty’s effect. Moreover, and from a methodological standpoint, the adjustment of 
capital intensity by the norms of a business segment’s industry, i.e., to derive Industry-
Adjusted, AI, capital intensity in the Appendix 2, might affect our results. In general, industry-
adjustment of capital intensity has its own pros and cons. As a positive point, it partitions the 
residuals that are industry-year-specific while are not related to market opportunity. For 
example, an industry might become extremely capital intensive, due to emergence of a new 
technology for instance, and not adjusting for this temporal effect would distort the 
estimations. On the other hand, this industry-year-level adjustment washes out a great deal of 
residuals pertaining to the industries’ overall growth opportunity, especially if responded by 
the majority of businesses in a same industry. We decided to follow the methods excessively 
used in previous research to make it easier to compare our results with those of previous 
work.  
It should be noted that, the present study intended to provide further support for the 
recent argument that not all deviations from winner picking are symptoms of inefficiency in 
capital allocation. To do this, we studied different dimensions of firms’ decision-making 
complexity that would trigger either of the two inefficient and not necessarily inefficient 
deviations, and examined the effect of firms’ capital allocation capabilities on those 
deviations. Our aim was not providing structural analysis about which segments are likely to 
receive over- or under-investment in the presence of each dimension of complexity we 
analyzed. This interesting question calls for further studies in the future. Further, our work 
focused on segments’ interdependence as a complexity dimension that provides firms with an 
opportunity to pursue synergies in their capital investments, as a strategy that might make 
firms deviate from winner-picking. The study of deviation effects of other corporate-level 
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strategies and competitive objectives such as risk mitigation (Busenbark et al., 2017) and 
avoiding competition escalation from the rivals (Sengul and Gimeno, 2013) also opens some 
avenues for further empirical work in this area. Similarly, it would also be some opportunities 
in examining the corrective effects of firms’ decision-making resources other than the breadth 
of CEO’s prior experience in subsidiaries businesses.  
 
CONCLUSION 
By the present work, we took the first step to swing the pendulum of the analogy of internal 
capital market a little back, and claim that, in contrast to external capital markets, the 
deviation of internal capital markets from winner-picking approach to capital investment is 
not equivalent to its inefficiency.  
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Extending the Theory of Resource Redeployment to Financial Resources: 
Evidence from Corporate Internal Capital Markets 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to reconcile the theories of internal capital market and resource 
redeployment (RR theory). Using a simulation model followed by empirical 
investigations of the model’s propositions, we develop and test a theory that 
clarifies how capital allocation decisions provide trace evidence of non-financial 
resource redeployments. By this, we set the stage for empirical investigations and 
validation of RR theory which has been mainly developed through formal models 
and simulations. In turn, studying intrafirm capital allocations through the lens of 
RR theory helps us further develop and offer novel predictions for the theory. Our 
research also illuminates how prior studies, claiming that firms extensively 
misallocate capital, may have reached their conclusion because they did not 
consider the value derivable from investing in resource redeployability.  
 
Keywords:  
Resource redeployment theory; inter-temporal economies of scope; resource divisibility; 
internal capital market efficiency debate; computational simulation  
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INTRODUCTION 
Resource redeployment across businesses is one of the fundamental roles of corporate 
headquarters. Significant theoretical advances in recent years have illuminated the conditions 
under which there exists considerable potential for corporate value creation through  
withdrawing resources from one subsidiary business and redeploying them to other businesses 
(e.g., Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Levinthal and Wu, 2010; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014, 2015; 
Lieberman, Lee, and Folta, 2017). However, empirical investigation into this emerging theory 
of resource redeployment (RR theory from now on) is scarce. It has been argued that the main 
reason behind this oversight is the challenge that exists in observing the internal redeployment 
of non-financial resources (Sakhartov and Folta, 2015). RR theory’s lack of empirical work is 
in stark contrast to the immense theoretical and empirical body of research on internal capital 
markets (e.g., Arrfelt, Wiseman, and Hult, 2013; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Stein 
1997) which tracks capital flows between a firm’s businesses. In this paper, we contend that 
capital flows might also be used to diagnose evidence around the redeployment of non-
financial resources, because capital is eventually converted to resources of the non-financial 
kind. In reconciling the theory of internal capital markets with the theory of resource 
redeployment we also challenge the established conclusion stipulating that firms frequently 
misallocate capital.   
Internal capital markets literature stipulates that firms’ capital allocation is suboptimal; 
firms ought to invest in subsidiaries with higher growth opportunities, however they are 
observed not to do so. In turn, we argue that firms consider more than just its subsidiary’s 
growth opportunities in allocation capital. A corporate headquarters investing capital in one of 
its subsidiaries to acquire non-financial resources (e.g. plants or technology), also purchases 
the option to redeploy those same non-financial resources in subsequent periods. Therefore, 
the direction of current capital flow among subsidiary businesses will not be a mere function 
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of their current relative market growth opportunities. Rather, this flow of capital is also a 
function of the flexibility, i.e., feasibility and adjustment costs, of potential resource 
redeployments among subsidiaries in subsequent periods. In other words, headquarters also 
consider the potential subsequent resource redeployments when allocating capital to develop 
resources.  
We draw on RR theory which contends that different characteristics of a firm’s 
resource influence the resource’s optimal redeployment. In particular, the feasibility and 
adjustment cost of redeployments are driven by two characteristics of a potential latent 
resource: fungibility (Levinthal and Wu, 2010; Penrose, 1959) and divisibility (Helfat and 
Eisenhardt, 2004; Penrose, 1959).25 On the one hand, a subsidiary’s resource fungibility refers 
to its value if employed elsewhere; it contributes to the lower adjustment cost of withdrawing 
the resources from that business and redeploying them to another firm’s business in the future 
(e.g. when a more opportune use of those resources is available). Similar to other works in the 
field, we proxy for a subsidiary’s resource fungibility as the subsidiary’s resource relatedness 
with other firm’s businesses. On the other hand, a subsidiary’s resource divisibility results in 
higher ability to smoothly scale it up or down (depending on whether the market demand 
grows or declines respectively). We study whether investing capital in these two elements of 
resource redeployability (i.e., resource relatedness and divisibility) contributes to firms’ 
creation of inter-temporal economies (i.e., aptitude to flexibly adjust their subsidiaries’ 
resource bases to external opportunities). More importantly, we explore whether either of 
these elements becomes the main source of value creation under different contingencies such 
as firms’ market volatility and cash-limitedness. 
The complex non-linear system of effects and interactions between the factors, and the 
path-dependence of firms’ capital allocation and resource redeployment decisions, make our 
                                                     
25 Latent resources refer to the resources that a subsidiary would develop by means of the allocated capital. 
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analysis not amenable to analytical solutions. Therefore, we develop a computational 
simulation model that complements the classic, winner-picking (Stein, 1997) logic of 
intrafirm capital allocation (i.e., investing in subsidiaries with higher growth opportunity). In 
addition to the value firms may gain from allocating capital to subsidiaries with higher growth 
opportunities, our model also accounts for the potential value firms might create through 
investing in resource redeployment flexibility. Through computational experimentation of our 
model, we study the effect of firm’s market volatility and cash-limitedness, as two important 
contingencies, on the extent the firm would optimally leverage the elements of subsidiaries’ 
resource redeployability when deciding about capital allocation. The results of the simulation 
suggest that for extremely low levels of market volatility, a firm is better-off if it distributes 
capital among its subsidiaries only according to subsidiaries’ relative growth opportunity. 
However, for a range of moderate to relatively high levels of market volatility, the firm can 
create value by leveraging both elements of resource redeployability as market volatility 
increases. It also turns out that the firm’s cash-limitedness imposes converse effects on the 
importance of the two elements of resource redeployability in firms’ capital investment 
decisions. While cash-limitedness pushes firms to invest more in subsidiaries’ resource 
divisibility, it alleviates inter-temporal economies rooted in resource relatedness. We provide 
empirical support for our propositions and theory using data from Compustat.  
This study contributes to two different literatures. First, it contributes to RR theory by 
extending its boundaries to embrace capital allocation. We argue and show that observing 
internal capital allocation enables an empirical test of RR theory. Moreover, by offering new 
predictions, we also contribute to further development of this theory. Second, the paper 
contributes to internal capital market literature (Stein, 1997; Williamson, 1975). Relying on 
the premises of RR theory, our work complements the theory of capital investment optimality 
that have been merely accounting for subsidiaries’ relative market growth opportunities. This 
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illuminates how prior work claiming that firms broadly misallocate capital may have reached 
this conclusion because they did not consider the potential value derivable from investing in 
resource redeployability. Our study confirms that internal capital markets may be more 
efficient than external capital markets; they can create value not only because of information 
premium of headquarters over external markets on subsidiary businesses, but also because 
internal capital markets consider the firm-specificity of capital investment.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
The theory of resource redeployment argues that a multi-business firm may create value by 
redeploying its resources when it realizes intra- and/or inter-temporal economies of scope 
(Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014). On the one hand, the intra-temporal 
economies arise from resource sharing, or in other words, which is the simultaneous and 
synergistic use of resources by different subsidiaries of a firm. Resource sharing leads to cost-
reduction for the units of a multi-business firm relative to their single-business firm rivals. 
This value-creation mechanism applies to resources that do not have capacity limitation, i.e., 
scale-free resources, or those whose capacity is not fully utilized by either use. On the other 
hand, the inter-temporal economies are rooted in the flexibility and ease, i.e., low sunk cost 
and adjustment cost, of withdrawing the resource from current endeavor and allocating it to 
another. This value-creation mechanism is particularly salient when the firm’s markets are 
volatile and returns are uncertain (Sakhartov, 2017; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014).  
A value-maximizing firm faces a wide range of redeployment potentials for its 
resources that selecting the optimal redeployment strategy is challenging. In addition to 
targeting intra-temporal and/or inter-temporal economies, the firm should decide whether to 
redeploy its resources internally or externally. It may redeploy its resources internally through 
strategies such as diversification, reorganization (i.e., creation, deletion or recombination) of 
business units (Karim, 2009), redeployment of human capital (Wang, He, and Mahoney, 
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2009) and executives (Karim and Williams, 2012); or externally through strategies such as 
divestitures and alliances.  
RR theory introduces two pillars for optimal redeployments. First, resource 
characteristics essentially determine the optimal redeployment strategy over a resource 
(Anand et al., 2016). Scale-free nature (Levinthal and Wu, 2010), fungibility (Anand and 
Singh, 1997), and divisibility (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Penrose, 1959) are among the 
most important characteristics of resources in this regard. Scale-freeness makes it possible to 
redeploy a resource to other endeavors, parallel to the current use, without any opportunity 
cost. Fungibility refers to the value of a resource if employed elsewhere; the higher the 
resource’s fungibility, the better the chances for its potential redeployments. Finally, a 
resource may have an indivisible scale that makes its optimal scale up (and scale down) non-
continuous. For instance, in contrast to capital which is perfectly divisible, a special purpose 
milling machine with a 1000 piece per hour milling capacity is indivisible; and a firm which 
produces 1500 pieces per hour needs two of these machines, rather than one and half. 
Redeployment of the underutilized capacity of an indivisible non-scale-free resource may also 
result in intra-temporal economies (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004).  
Second, decisions seeking scope economies are path-dependent and firm-specific. The 
optimality of current decisions is dependent on previous decisions and varies across firms 
(Folta, Helfat and Karim, 2016; Sakhartov, 2017). One important facet of path dependency in 
corporate decisions is the resource relatedness (Rumelt, 1974) between a firm’s current 
businesses and a new business into which the firm diversifies. According to the theory, 
particularly, resource relatedness among a firm’s subsidiary businesses, is positively 
associated with the value to be created from both intra- and inter-temporal economies of 
scope mechanisms (Sakhartov, 2017; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014). Resource relatedness leads 
to intra-temporal economies of scope by increasing the chance and decreasing the cost of 
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sharing scale-free resources (Maritan and Brush, 2003) and also by facilitating more efficient 
utilization of under-utilized non-scale-free resources (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Resource 
relatedness also creates value through inter-temporal economies (Sakhartov and Folta, 2014; 
2015) by cutting future redeployment costs and facilitating potential reversal, i.e., non-
redeployment (Sakhartov, 2017). This redeployment flexibility makes the firm decide to 
redeploy resources among the businesses and achieve higher margins even if the expected 
margin in the new use of the resource is only slightly higher than the margins of its current 
use (Lieberman et al., 2017; Sakhartov, 2017). 
We argue that RR theory does apply to multi-business firms’ capital allocation 
decisions. Standard RR theory has been developed limited to non-financial resources. It takes 
capital as a pure fungible resource whose allocation is not subject to any sunk or adjustment 
cost. Capital is also a perfectly divisible resource that can be allocated at the exact amount 
needed without any underutilization. Therefore, the mainstream has excluded capital 
allocation from the boundary of RR theory (Folta, Helfat, and Karim, 2016). We argue, 
however, that by investing capital in one of its subsidiaries to acquire a non-financial 
resource, a corporate headquarters also purchases the option to redeploy that resource to other 
subsidiaries in the future when needed. Therefore, managers with high capital allocation 
competences (Arrfelt et al., 2015) would not limit their decision criteria solely to the currently 
anticipated returns and prospects of the potential resources to be developed/acquired by the 
competing capital investment opportunities. Rather, the headquarters’ managers also take the 
potential ex-post resource redeployments into account in their capital allocation decisions.  
We mainly focus on two different sources of redeployment flexibility: the latent 
resources’ relatedness and divisibility. We explore the value effect of investment in resource 
relatedness and divisibility; both provide a firm with flexibility and the opportunity to 
continuously adjust its resource deployments to external opportunities in next periods. The 
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more a subsidiary’s developed resource is related to the other sister businesses, the more 
flexibility the headquarters would have to withdraw that resource and redeploy it to the best 
use (when the composition of market opportunities changes between the subsidiary 
businesses; and the current investment proves suboptimal). In addition, the more divisible a 
subsidiary’s resource is, the more feasible it would be for the headquarters to ration the 
resource in that subsidiary (i.e. following a decline of market demand) and redeploy the 
unutilized units of that resource in other subsidiaries with growing demands.  
We raise the question whether and when investing capital in these two elements of 
resource redeployability (i.e., resource relatedness and divisibility) contributes to firms’ 
creation of inter-temporal economies of scope. More precisely, we explore the effect of 
important contingencies, such as firms’ market volatility and cash-limitedness, on the extent a 
firm would optimally leverage these two elements of resource redeployability in its capital 
investment decisions.  
On the one hand, RR theory suggests that inter-temporal economies of scope are 
particularly momentous in uncertain markets where the entry and exit may happen more 
frequently (Sakhartov and Folta, 2014). Therefore, we expect that a performance maximizer 
firm happen to assign higher weights to both of our studied latent resources’ elements of 
redepolyability (compared to external growth opportunities) in its capital investment decisions 
when the firm is active in relatively more volatile markets.  
On the other hand, we expect that the firm’s cash-limitedness plays a more complex 
role.  
Firm’s cash-limitedness, as a general rule, might weaken the value implications of investing 
in redeployability; a shallow pocket, in general, underinvests in its potential growth 
opportunities, and would have a relatively higher level of demand it cannot respond to. Thus, 
a cash limited firm would be less likely to have its resources underutilized. Knowing that 
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underutilization of resources is one of the reasons behind their withdrawal and redeployments, 
we might expect that firm’s cash-limitedness makes the firm less willing to invest in latent 
resources’ relatedness or divisibility. However, as a specific effect, cash-limitedness might 
have a positive effect on the value to-be-created from investing in resource divisibility. This 
new effect arises from particular hazard of shallow-pockets’ overcommit to indivisible 
resources. Investing in indivisible resources, in general, is harmful since it makes firms less 
flexible in adjusting their resource deployments to external opportunities. However, this effect 
is less hazardous for cash-rich firms which are capable of continuously investing in new 
resources and can plan their new resource developments in a way to correspond to new 
market landscapes and opportunities. Conversely, redeployments are critically more important 
for cash limited firms since these firms have fewer means to acquire new resources when 
needs arise in face of external opportunities. In other words, cash-limited firms depend more 
heavily on the latent resources’ divisibility in order to more gradually withdraw those 
resources from the current use and allocate them to a better one. We will study which 
mechanism underlies the stronger effect of firms’ cash-limitedness on the extent latent 
resource’ divisibility should be leveraged in firms’ capital allocation decisions. We will also 
explore whether our studied contingencies, market volatility and cash-limitedness, interact 
with each other to affect the value implications of investing in redeployability elements. 
SIMULATION MODEL 
In this section, we study how firms’ consideration of latent resources’ redeployability, in 
addition to their subsidiaries’ market growth opportunity, might help firms create further 
value by their intrafirm capital allocations. It is worth mentioning that the complex non-linear 
system of effects and interactions between the factors and also the path-dependence of capital 
allocation and resource redeployment decisions makes the capital investment optimization 
problem not amenable to analytical solutions. Therefore, we decided to develop a 
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computational model and study the intrafirm capital allocation through simulation of the 
system of the effects.  
We computationally experiment how the optimal weights assigned to latent resources’ 
relatedness and divisibility, in a firm’s capital investment due diligence, would adapt with the 
variation of firm’s market volatility and cash-limitedness. To do so, we analyze the evolution 
of our model’s outcome, i.e., firm’s average value growth, consequent to the gradual 
alteration of the parameters of the model.  
 
General specifications of the model: 
We simulate a firm’s capital allocation to its subsidiaries and potential resource 
redeployments among them for 10 periods of time. The periods are comparable to years in 
related empirical work. Initially, a firm is randomly given a number of business segments, 
drawn from a negative binomial probability distribution with a minimum of 4 subsidiaries. 
Each firm’s subsidiary businesses is randomly assigned to one of 360 industries. We model 
the industries as a set of points uniformly located around a circle, where the angular distance 
of each two industries defines their resource relatedness: 
relatedness𝑖𝑘 =    𝑒
− 𝛼𝜃𝑖𝑘                                      (1) 
where, 𝜃𝑖𝑘 is the angular distance in degrees between the two industries i and k serve, and 𝛼  
is a parameter to set the relatedness in a suitable range. We set 𝛼 as 0.01, in our model, which 
offers a granular range for relatedness.  
 Firm’s business segments are fixed in quantity and never change their industry 
during the periods of our simulation. We also use constant probability distributions to assign 
each industry an “indivisible investment threshold” which is the cost of one uniform 
production line and is an integer number between 1 through 5. Similarly, each subsidiary of 
the firm is then assigned a number of production lines between 5 through 10 in the first 
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period26. The reverse of this “indivisible investment threshold” of each industry defines the 
resource divisibility of a subsidiary assigned to that industry that varies between 0.2 and 1. 
Every period includes random modifications in industries’ (by implication, business 
segments’) growth opportunity, actual demand and profitability. As it is elaborated in the 
Appendix 3, the mean and standard deviation of the normal distributions from which these 
variables are generated are calibrated with our empirical data; and, the industry’s random 
growth opportunity, in each period, affects the mean of normal distributions from which the 
industry’s demand and profitability random values are generated27. In each period, the firm 
optimally invests the summation of the generated cash by its subsidiaries, back into the 
subsidiaries in the form of new production lines. These investment decisions are made based 
on the marginal value of the investment of one unit of cash in subsidiaries which have un-
responded demand. To derive the marginal value of capital investment in each subsidiary, the 
firm calculates capital investment score, CIS, for that subsidiary and corrects the CIS with a 
correction factor if the new production line would not be completely utilized:28  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 score𝑖𝑡 =   
Q𝑖𝑡
Q?̂?
  +  𝛾1 
R𝑖
?̂?
   +   𝛾2  
D𝑖
?̂?
                                                       (2) 
where, 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the growth opportunity of the industry in which the business i is active, and is 
captured by that industry’s overall Tobin’s q; R𝑖 is the average relatedness of business i with 
its sister businesses, i.e., other businesses existing in firm’s portfolio; 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are 
coefficients that capture the difference in weighting the elements of redeployability in 
decision making criteria (i.e., relatedness and divisibility, respectively) and receive values 
from 0 through 1 for 𝛾1, and 0 through 0.2 for 𝛾2 (both in steps of 0.05). The overall Tobin’s q 
                                                     
26 Changing 𝛼 in equation 1 or the range of the integers for the initial number of production lines or indivisible 
investment thresholds does not qualitatively change our results. 
27 Therefore, industries with relatively higher growth opportunity, in general, receive higher actual demand 
growth and profit margin. 
28 The correction factor would be equal to the un-responded demand divided by the indivisible investment 
threshold. 
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of an industry stands for the overall growth opportunity in that industry, and usually has been 
operationalized with the average or median of single business firms’ Tobin’s q in that industry 
in empirical work. 𝑄𝑖𝑡,  R𝑖, and D𝑖  and are normalized with (i.e. divided by) their average 
values, the ?̂? , 𝑅 ̂, and ?̂?, respectively. Setting  𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 demonstrates the scenario in 
which a firm follows the standard internal capital market theory’s, i.e., winner-picking, logic 
of capital allocation. 
In addition, each period also includes the redeployment of potential unutilized 
production lines of each subsidiary in sister businesses which still have un-responded demand, 
even after the capital investment phase, and also provide the highest redeployment value 
added to the firm for each unit of redeployed production line. Unutilized production lines 
emerge in subsidiaries following their potential demand fall. The value added of each 
potential redeployment is a function of the value that the receiving subsidiary offers and of the 
redeployment cost (which is a negative function of the resource relatedness between the 
transferring and receiving subsidiaries). Redeployment cost pertaining to the redeployment of 
a production line, which is originally developed in subsidiary i, in subsidiary k is calculated as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 cost𝑖𝑘 =   (1 - relatedness𝑖𝑘)  . 1/ 𝐷𝑖                                (3) 
where, the reverse of subsidiary i’s divisibility, 𝐷𝑖, stands for its indivisible investment 
threshold (i.e., the cost of one production line). Equation 3 suggests that a production line 
which is originally developed for a specific subsidiary would be able to demonstrate only a 
fraction of its nominal functionality if being used for another purpose (the fraction is equal to 
the resource relatedness between the original and new subsidiaries). Finally, we calculate the 
model’s outcome, i.e., Average value growth, as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡=10/ 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡=0)
1/10 – 1  (4) 
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where, 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 = ∑ ( 𝐴𝑖.  Q𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 /  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1   (5) 
𝑁 is the number of firm’s subsidiary businesses. Equation 5 denotes that subsidiaries 
contribute to the value of their parent firm only by the utilized share of their production 
capacity. Therefore, the value-maximizing firm tries to, optimally, both allocate capital to 
develop new production lines, and also redeploy them in future if needed. Further details 
about the model’s specification and also its calibration with our empirical data is provided in 
Appendix 3. 
 
The effect of resource divisibility on investment affordability 
In the first stage of our experiment, we set 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 at zero, to derive the standard winner-
picking pattern of capital allocation. We run 1000 repetition of the model (each for 10 
periods); in result, we obtain a sample of 45,023 capital investment in the subsidiary-year 
level. During the simulation, we control for firms’ size, number of subsidiaries, cash 
munificence (i.e., firms’ aggregated generated cash divided by its size), the growth 
opportunity for the subsidiaries and their sister businesses, and subsidiaries’ average resource 
relatedness with their sister businesses. We find that subsidiaries’ divisibility is positively 
related to their size-adjusted capital investment, i.e., capital intensity. While the average 
capital intensity in this sample is 8.6 percent, as Figure 3.1a demonstrates, the coefficient of 
the studied relationship is equal to 9.8 percent. It means that, on average, the capital intensity 
in the most divisible subsidiaries (subsidiaries with divisibility equal to 1, i.e., the ones with 
an indivisible investment threshold equal to 1) is 7.8 percent higher than in the most 
indivisible subsidiaries (subsidiaries with divisibility equal to 0.2, i.e., the ones with an 
indivisible investment threshold equal to 5).  This finding of subsidiaries’ resource-
divisibility-related investment subsidization is particularly important when we remember that, 
in this stage, firm is not intentionally investing more in subsidiaries with higher divisible 
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resources (i.e., we have set 𝛾2 at zero). Rather, this investment subsidization is rooted in better 
affordability of investments in resources with lower indivisible investment thresholds. The 
negative moderating effect of firm’s cash munificence on the effect of subsidiaries' divisibility 
on allocated capital, demonstrated in Figure 3.1a, confirms this finding.  
 
Figure 3.1:  Higher capital investment in subsidiaries with lower indivisible investment 
thresholds (The role of investment affordability) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1a: The negative moderating effect of cash munificence on relatively higher investments in 
subsidiaries with more divisible resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1b: Demonstration of internal opportunity cost which is rooted in subsidiaries’ investment 
thresholds 
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Proposition 1: Intrafirm capital allocations are subject to a constraint of less affordability of 
fulfilling greater opportunities existing in subsidiaries with higher indivisible investment 
thresholds. Therefore, firms might allocate capital to businesses that do not represent the 
portfolio’s best opportunity if those businesses have low indivisible investment thresholds 
relative to other businesses in the portfolio. Cash-limited firms are expected to display this 
pattern more prevalently in their allocations. 
Proposition 1 highlights the effect of investment affordability, arising from the threshold 
effects (Baldwin and Clark, 1992), on firms’ capital allocation decision. Threshold effects 
reflect the concept that return to investments are not a linear function of investments. More 
precisely, a subsidiary’s return improves after each indivisible investment threshold is 
reached, i.e. as an investment quantum (for example the cost of a new production line in our 
model). Further, the capital investments needed for developing resources with higher 
indivisible investment thresholds are less likely to be affordable. Therefore, a subsidiary’s 
resources’ indivisible investment thresholds may increase the parent firm’s internal 
opportunity cost of capital investment in that subsidiary. Assume that a firm has 1,000 Dollars 
of capital and intends to choose between investment opportunities in two of its subsidiaries. 
The expected rate of return on capital investment in subsidiary A, (Figure 3.1b left), and 
subsidiary B, (Figure 3.1b right), is 20% and 15% respectively. Now, assume that the 
indivisible investment thresholds which trigger those rates of return are $2,000 and $500 in 
subsidiaries A and B, respectively. Because the headquarters does not afford subsidiary A’s 
indivisible investment threshold, it has to invest all of its available capital in the second 
subsidiary as a second-best decision. Otherwise, it faces an internal opportunity cost (shown 
in the right-hand graph) that takes account of the fact that investing $1000 in subsidiary A 
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does not provide the firm with any return. Logically, this affordability-based pattern of 
investments would be more pronounced by cash-limited firms.  
Resource redeployability and capital allocation- the effect of firm’s market volatility: 
The resource redeployment theory lens for capital investment, represented in our paper, 
suggests that investing capital to develop more redeployable resources in businesses provides 
multi-business firms with an option (Folta and O'Brien, 2004; O'Brien and Folta, 2009) to 
deploy their resources to the best use in later periods. This option arises from both higher 
feasibility of more gradual withdrawal and continuous adjustment of divisible resources, and 
also the lower redeployment cost of resources between subsidiaries which have more related 
resource bases. Further, the value of this option, i.e., inter-temporal economies of scope, 
increases with the firm’s market volatility which increases the likelihood of resource 
withdrawals and redeployments. We computationally experiment whether and under which 
conditions firms’ simultaneous consideration of latent resources’ redeployability, in addition 
to their subsidiaries’ market growth opportunity, might result in value creation through 
intrafirm capital allocations. 
In the first step, we compute the model’s outcome variable (i.e., firm’s average value 
growth) using different weight values of resource relatedness (i.e., the  𝛾1 coefficient from the 
capital investment score equation) and explore how the optimal  𝛾1 depends on the firm’s 
market volatility. We dial market volatility, captured by the standard deviation of the normal 
distributions of both industries’ Tobin’s q and actual demand growth, from minus 50 percent 
to plus 150 percent of the related values drawn from our sample. While we adjust the weight 
firms give to latent resources’ relatedness, 𝛾1, from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.05, we fix  𝛾2 (the 
score firms give to latent resource’s divisibility) at 0 in this stage of our simulation. Figure 
3.2a compares the change of the outcome variable as a function of  𝛾1 under different schemes 
of market volatility.  
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Figure 3.2: Simulation results. Firms’ average value growth (over 10-period) as a function of 
γ1 (the coefficient of resource relatedness in Capital Investment Score) and γ2 (the coefficient 
of resource divisibility in Capital Investment Score). The mean of profitability (i.e., generated 
cash) normal distribution = The mean of actual demand growth normal distribution = 12% 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2a: The relation between the coefficient of resource relatedness in Capital Investment 
Score, 𝛾1, and firms’ average value growth when firms do not consider resource divisibility, 𝛾2=0, 
under different volatility schemes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2b: Simultaneous experiment of the effect of both elements of redeployability on firms’ value 
growth under moderate market volatility (volatility is equal to its average value drawn from our 
sample, i.e. volatility = V)  
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Figure 3.2c: Simultaneous experiment of the effect of both elements of redeployability on firms’ value 
growth when volatility is 50% higher than the average value drawn from our sample (i.e., volatility = 
1.5V)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2d: Simultaneous experiment of the effect of both elements of redeployability on firms’ value 
growth when volatility is 100% higher than the average value drawn from our sample (i.e., volatility = 
2V) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2e: Simultaneous experiment of the effect of both elements of redeployability on firms’ value 
growth when volatility is 150% higher than the average value drawn from our sample (i.e., volatility = 
2.5V) 
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Each graph in figure 3.2a is a line or a second order curve that best fits29 the outcome 
variable medians of 1000 repetition of the model under each setting of the parameters. Two 
important patterns emerge from the figure. First, the increase of market volatility leads to, 
overall, lower creation of firm value which is rooted in the frequent change of the 
composition of market growth opportunities and need for redeployments that accrue 
considerable redeployment costs. Second, the graphs support the existence of an inverted U-
shape relation between  𝛾1 and firms’ created value when market volatility is sufficiently high. 
This effect fades for very high levels of market volatility (when volatility is far greater than 
the range demonstrated in Figure 3.2a) and changes to a consistently negative relation 
between  𝛾1  and firms’ value creation for low levels of market volatility. Extremely high 
market volatility makes the firm’s value growth random with respect to the weights given to 
resource relatedness. On the other hand, when market volatility is very low, the firm’s future 
outlook, especially the relative market opportunity of its business segments, will be very 
similar to its current situation. Therefore, it would make sense that capital allocation will be 
optimal if firms only consider subsidiaries’ relative market growth opportunities, i.e., when 
 𝛾1  is equal to zero. Conversely to these two extremes, a range of moderate to relatively high 
market volatility demands the simultaneous consideration of both segments’ overall market 
growth opportunity and latent resources’ relatedness. Whereas the former optimizes the 
decisions for the scenario in which the future is the continuation of the current situation, the 
latter provides the firm with flexibility for less costly management of future withdrawals and 
redeployments.  
Next, we complement the simulation model by also including the latent resource’s 
divisibility and computing the capital investment score using its complete form as illustrated 
in Equation 2. That is, in addition to 𝛾1, similar to the previous experiment, here we also 
                                                     
29 Either one which provides a higher adjusted R-squared 
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adjust the weight firms give to latent resources’ divisibility, 𝛾2, from 0 to 0.2 in steps of 0.05. 
We study the model under a wide range of market volatility schemes; we dial the market 
volatility value starting from the overall volatility computed in our sample (Volatility = V) to 
150 percent higher (Volatility = 2.5V). For each setting of parameters (e.g.  𝛾1,  𝛾2, and 
volatility), we run the model for 1000 repetitions to obtain a set of 1000 value growth 
computations. We then use the median of the 1000 obtained growth values to plot firm’s 
value growth as a function of  𝛾1 and  𝛾2 (under a given volatility value). Each surface in 
figure 3.2b through 3.2e is the best fitted surface for different volatility schemes30. Comparing 
the results of both stages of our experiments, we conclude:  
 
Proposition 2: For very low levels of market volatility a firm is better-off if it purely follows 
the suggestions of internal capital market theory, i.e., allocates capital to the subsidiaries 
with the highest growth opportunity. However, for a range of moderate to relatively high 
levels of market volatility, a firm can create value by simultaneously leveraging the market 
growth opportunity and both elements of resource redeployability (resource relatedness and 
divisibility) of its subsidiary businesses. Further, within this range of market volatility, the 
weights assigned to subsidiaries’ elements of resource redeployability increases with market 
volatility.  
Resource redeployability and capital allocation- the effect of firm’s cash-limitedness: 
In the final stage of our experimentation, we explore how firm’s cash-limitedness affects its 
optimal investment in elements of resource redeployability when making capital allocation 
decisions. We expect that, as a general effect, the firm’s cash-limitedness shrinks the potential 
inter-temporal economies derived from investing in elements of redeployability; a shallow-
                                                     
30 We regress the outcome variable, in the sample of the outcome variable medians (under each vale of 
volatility), on all possible combinations of 𝛾1, 𝛾2,  𝛾1-squared, and 𝛾2-squared. We use the regressors and their 
significant coefficients in the combination that provides the highest adjusted R-squared to construct the surface 
which provides the best fit.    
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pocket, in general, would have a relatively higher level of demand that it cannot respond to. 
Therefore, a cash-limited firm would be less likely to have its resources unutilized when the 
demand declines. However, as a specific effect, investing in resource divisibility might be 
specifically beneficial for cash-limited firms, so that cash-limitedness might have a positive 
effect on the inter-temporal economies rooted in investing in resource divisibility31. This new 
effect arises from the particular hazard for shallow-pockets to overcommit to indivisible 
resources.  
Investing in indivisible resources, in general, is harmful since it makes firms less 
flexible in adjusting their resource deployments to external opportunities. However, this effect 
is less hazardous for cash-rich firms which continuously invest in new resources and can plan 
their new resource developments in a way to correspond to new market landscapes and 
opportunities. Conversely, redeployments are critically more important for cash limited firms 
since these firms have fewer means to acquire new resources when needs arise in face of 
external opportunities. In this stage, we experiment whether and how cash-limitedness affects 
the potential value of investing in latent resources’ divisibility differently from how it affects 
the value of investing in the resource’s relatedness. Moreover, by this stage of our experiment, 
we would be able to derive further insights on whether the firm’s market volatility and cash 
limitedness interact with each other to affect the value implications of investing in 
redeployability elements. 
We repeat the previous experiments related to extreme market volatility values (i.e., 
volatility equal to V and 2.5 V) while limiting firms’ cash resources. To impose the cash-
limitedness, we divide the mean of the profitability normal distribution by two; whereas, we 
get the random numbers for industries’ demand from a similar normal distribution as in the 
previous section. This puts the firms, in general, in situations that they lack enough cash 
                                                     
31 This effect is different from the extra investment in divisible resources which is rooted in higher affordability 
of investment in divisible resources (i.e., proposed in Proposition 1). 
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resources to respond to their growth opportunities.  Figures 3.3a and 3.3b demonstrate the 
results.  
Figure 3.3: Simulation results for cash-limited firms. Firms’ average value growth (over 10-
period) as a function of γ1 (the coefficient of resource relatedness in Capital Investment Score) 
and γ2 (the coefficient of resource divisibility in Capital Investment Score). The mean of 
profitability (i.e., generated cash) normal distribution = 6%. The mean of actual demand growth 
normal distribution = 12% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3a: Simultaneous experiment of the effect of both elements of redeployability on firms’ value 
growth under moderate market volatility (volatility is equal to its average value drawn from our 
sample, i.e. volatility = V) for a cash-limited firm (Generated cash is 50% less than the average in the 
sample, i.e., cash = 0.5C)  
 
 
Figure 3.3b: Simultaneous experiment of the effect of both elements of redeployability on firms’ value 
growth when volatility is 150% higher than the average value drawn from our sample (i.e., volatility = 
2.5V) for a cash-limited firm (Generated cash is 50% less than the average in the sample, i.e., cash = 
0.5C)  
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Table 3.1 compares these new pieces of experiment vis-a-vis the ones when firms 
were under the same volatility scheme but were not cash limited. An important pattern 
emerges from this stage of our analysis. As expected, higher market volatility uniformly 
strengthens the value implications of investing in both elements of latent resources’ 
redeployability. However, cash-limitedness makes a clear-cut win between the latent 
resources’ relatedness and the resource’s divisibility as the main source of redeployment 
flexibility.  
Table 3.1: The effects of firms’ cash-richness and market volatility on optimal weighting of 
latent resources’ relatedness and divisibility (setting  𝛾1 and 𝛾2) in Capital Investment Score. 
  cash-richness 
  Average shallow pockets 
volatility 
2.5 V 
 𝛾1: inverted U 
 
 𝛾2: weak linear 
positive effect 
 
 𝛾1: insignificant 
  
 𝛾2: strong concave 
positive effect 
V 
 𝛾1: insignificant 
 
 
 𝛾2: linear negative 
effect 
 
 𝛾1: uniform 
negative effect 
 
 𝛾2: weak concave 
positive effect 
 
 
It turns out that for a relatively cash-rich firm, inter-temporal economies arise mainly 
from firm’s investment in resource relatedness (captured by 𝛾1); and cash-limitedness 
weakens the foreseeable benefits of investing in resource relatedness as expected. More 
interestingly, the results reveal that the introduced specific effect of cash-limitedness, i.e. the 
one specific to latent resources’ divisibility, more strongly affects the value implications of 
investing in divisibility than the general effect:  Shallow pockets might create value by 
strategically investing relatively more in divisible resources. In other words, cash-limited 
114 
 
firms depend more heavily on the latent resources’ divisibility (captured by 𝛾2) to leverage 
inter-temporal economies. We propose: 
 
Proposition 3: Cash-rich and cash-limited firms differ in their main source of resource 
redeployment flexibility: While both reployability elements are important for both types of 
firms, cash-rich firms achieve inter-temporal economies by, mainly, investing in resource 
relatedness; however, cash-limited firms leverage mainly the latent resource’s divisibility, in 
their capital investment decisions, in order to reach resource redeployment flexibility and 
gain inter-temporal economies.   
In the next sections we provide some empirical evidence from intrafirm capital allocation for 
our propositions. 
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
Sample selection    
Similar to previous studies, we use Compustat database. Our sample set includes a 16-year 
period from 1998 to 2013 in which Industries are identified based on the SIC system at the 4-
digit level. We only use data since 1998 because from December 1997companies have 
followed the new Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS 131). Based on SFAS 
131, corporations categorize their business units into different business segments based on 
their management approaches and the way the managers organize different segments of their 
organizations (Hough, 2006). We followed earlier studies addressing the internal capital 
market efficiency debate in the data screening process (e.g., Bardolet et al., 2011; Arrfelt et 
al., 2013). We excluded business segments with assets under $10 million; those with missing 
capital expenditure or capital expenditure greater than their size, i.e., capital intensity greater 
than one; those for which data is lacking for both preceding and subsequent periods; 
businesses active in industries with either 6000s (depository segments) or 9000s (non-
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classifiable establishments) SIC codes because they are not comparable with other businesses 
(Misangyi et al., 2006); single-business firms and firms with missing or non-positive assets or 
market value; and lastly firms with missing capital expenditure. The ﬁnal sample contains 
4283 observations for 1078 business segments possessed by 362 firms, across 205 industry 
classiﬁcations.  
 
Dependent variable  
Subsidy intensity: We follow Rajan et al. (2000) to derive our dependent variable. First, we 
calculate the capital investment intensity (Bardolet et al., 2011) by dividing the capital 
invested in the focal subsidiary business32 by its identified asset at the beginning of the fiscal 
year.  
          𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑡 
𝐴 𝑖𝑡
                                                            (6) 
Then, we adjust capital intensity in two stages. First, we adjust a segments’ capital intensity 
by the median of capital intensity of single business firms in the narrowest industry category 
for which we have at least five observations (Equation 7). Second, we adjust the result of the 
first stage by the asset-weighted average of all business segments in the portfolio (Equation 
8).  The industry-adjusted capital intensity, i.e., IA capital intensity, shows the 
positive/negative deviation of capital investment intensity in a firm’s subsidiary, i, relative to 
the norms of its industry.  
           𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡   −     
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
    (7) 
where,   
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
   stands for the median of capital intensity of the single business 
firms in the focal subsidiary’s industry.  
                                                     
32 Here, we use the terms “subsidiary businesses” and “business segments” interchangeably; that refer to firms’ 
business segments we derived from Compustat. 
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The asset-weighted average of the result of the first stage in a multi-business firm 
portfolio (the last term in Equation 8) reveals the extent that the firm, overall, invests 
more/less than comparable single business firms do. Finally, the subsidy intensity reveals the 
capital investment preferences in firm j’s portfolio, i.e., the capital flow among sister 
businesses.  
  𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  −   ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑡(
𝑁𝑗𝑡
𝑘=1 𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘𝑡) (8) 
where, 𝑤𝑘𝑡  refers to the segment k’s share of the total asset of firm j at time t. 
 
Independent variables 
Relative size: We take a business segment’s relative size compared to its parent firm as a 
proxy for its resource indivisible investment thresholds. This is to say, in general, a 
headquarters is more likely to be capable to afford capital investments to develop the 
resources needed by its relatively smaller segments. We measure a segment’s relative size as 
the natural logarithm of the result of entire parent firm’s size divided by the focal business 
segment’s size; in order to both have a more normally distributed variable and also work with 
positive values. Therefore, relative size receives a higher value for the smaller segments of a 
firm.   
Relative relatedness: We follow extant work that has operationalized SIC proximity in 
different ways to capture relatedness (e.g., Keil, Maula, Schildt and Zahra, 2008; Villalonga 
and McGahan, 2005). Relatedness receives values equal to 1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25 or 0 if of all four, 
only the first three, first two, only the first one or none of SIC code digits of the subsidiary 
business and the parent firm are identical. Then, the portfolio group mean-centered measure 
of relatedness provides us with relative relatedness.  
Volatile-portfolio: is a firm-year-level dummy variable that takes 1 if the focal firm’s overall 
market volatility of the businesses in its portfolio is more than half of the firm-years in the 
sample and 0 otherwise. Following Sakhartov and Folta (2015), we take the standard 
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deviation of the ROA of the businesses in the industry as the proxy for the industry volatility. 
Then the average volatility of a firm’s industries provides the overall portfolio volatility of 
that firm-year.   
Shallow-pocket: is a firm-year dummy variable that takes 1 if the focal firm has practiced less 
overall industry-adjusted capital intensity than half of the firm-years in the sample, and 0 
otherwise.33  
 
Control Variables 
We control for relative market opportunity by using the median of Tobin’s q of single 
business firms in each industry as the proxy for the market opportunity of the businesses 
active in that industry; and adjusting it with an asset-weighted average of its value through the 
parent firm’s portfolio.  
  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒′𝑠 𝑞 
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑡
 −   ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑡(
𝑁𝑗𝑡
𝑘=1 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒′𝑠 𝑞 
𝑆𝑆
𝑘𝑡
)     (9) 
We also control for variables such as asset-normalized subsidiary’s generated cash (Cash 
intensity) and sisters’ generated cash (Sisters’ cash intensity), number of parent’s subsidiary 
businesses (Number of segments). 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In our empirical analysis, we investigate if multi-business firms’ capital investment data 
provide a preliminary support for our developed theory. Then, through a post-hoc analysis, we 
explore the association between firms’ capital investment practices and value 
creation/destruction.; by which, we, particularly, aim to discriminate between mechanisms 
underlying capital subsidization of smaller segments. 
 
                                                     
33 The robustness check of repeating our analysis while operationalizing this variable based on generated cash 
divided by the total asset of the firms, provides us with qualitatively similar results. We preferred capital 
investment-based to cash-based operationalization of this variable, because the relation between generated cash 
and investment may not be uniform and comparable through different industries. 
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Main results 
We use a fixed effect regression model including year, industry and firm fixed effects with 
lagged independent and control variables. This one-year lag helps to reduce potential 
endogeneity problems.  Table 3.2 presents the pairwise correlations for the variables used in 
our empirical analysis. The relatively high correlation between a firm’s number of business 
segments and the relative size of segments is natural. The higher the number of segments, the 
smaller they are on average relative to their corporate parent’s overall size. The only 
important high correlation emerging in Table 3.2 is the positive correlation between the asset-
divided cash generated by the subsidiary businesses and their other sister businesses which is 
0.23.   
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (Business-level); n= 4283 
 
  Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1- Subsidy intensity 0.00 0.06 -0.52 0.71 1       
2- Relative size 1.66 1.05 0.00 6.13 0.09 1      
3-Relative relatedness 0.00 0.34 -0.86 0.75 -0.06 -0.42 1     
4-Relative market opportunity 0.01 0.45 -7.62 4.32 0.06 0.04 -0.06 1    
5- Cash intensity 0.16 0.18 -0.93 1.00 -0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.05 1   
6- Sisters' cash intensity 0.16 0.15 -0.84 0.95 0 0.04 -0.04 0 0.23 1  
7- Number of segments 2.94 1.13 2.00 8.00 0.04 0.23 0 -0.01 0.02 0.03 1 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 provides the results of our regression models. Model 1 only includes the 
control variables. Similar to the majority of the empirical studies addressing internal capital 
market efficiency debate (e.g., Arrfelt, et al., 2013; Bardolet et al., 2011; Billett and Mauer, 
2003; Rajan, et al., 2000; Shin and Stulz, 1998), our results show that relative market 
opportunity does not significantly explain capital flow among the subsidiary businesses of a 
multi-business firm.   
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Table 3.3: Fixed effect regression models (Empirical investigations of our propositions) 
VARIABLES DV: Capital subsidy intensity (t+1) 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash intensity 0.0165** 0.0143* 0.0145* 0.0141* 0.0142* 0.0143* 
 (0.00764) (0.00763) (0.00764) (0.00763) (0.00764) -0.00764 
Sisters' cash intensity -0.00605 -0.00576 -0.00601 -0.00392 -0.00418 -0.00437 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Number of segments 0.00195 0.00122 0.00137 0.000819 0.000963 0.000990 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00189) 
Relative market opportunity 0.00177 0.00142 0.00119 0.00111 0.000898 0.000925 
 (0.00309) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) 
Relative size  0.00594*** 0.00462** 0.00325* 0.00215 0.00233 
  (0.00148) (0.00193) (0.00186) (0.00221) (0.00224) 
Relative relatedness  0.00479 -0.00315 0.00416 -0.00354 -0.00360 
  (0.00480) (0.00625) (0.00480) (0.00624) (0.00625) 
Volatile-portfolios   -0.00110  -0.00115 -0.00116 
   (0.00300)  (0.00300) (0.00300) 
Relative relatedness * volatile-portfolios   0.0148**  0.0144*  
   (0.00747)  (0.00747)  
relative size * volatile-portfolios  0.00265  0.00226  0.00229 
   (0.00265)  (0.00265) (0.00266) 
shallow-pockets   -0.00440 -0.00433 -0.00378 
    (0.00463) (0.00464) (0.00478) 
relative size * shallow-pockets    0.00521** 0.00513** 0.00480** 
    (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00227) 
Relative relatedness * volatile-portfolios * shallow-
pockets     
 0.0122 
(0.00870) 
Relative relatedness * volatile-portfolios * deep-pockets    
 
0.0168*   
 
   
 (0.00901) 
 
       
Constant 0.0409 0.0329 0.0279 0.0328 0.0280 0.0275 
 (0.0866) (0.0864) (0.0865) (0.0864) (0.0865) (0.0865) 
       
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 3,106 3,101 3,101 3,101 3,101 3,101 
R-squared 0.304 0.311 0.312 0.313 0.314 0.314 
 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
     
Model 2 includes the independent variables. Relative relatedness receives a positive 
non-significant coefficient; this shows that there is not sufficient statistical evidence that 
multi-business firms are likely to, consistently, tilt the capital flow towards the more related 
120 
 
subsidiary businesses. However, the results of the Models 3 and 5, which test this effect for 
the firm-years with higher than average market volatility, provide preliminary statistical 
evidence for Proposition 2; the moderation effect, Relative relatedness * volatile-portfolios, 
receives significant, positive coefficients in both models. However the moderation effect of 
Relative size * volatile-portfolios receives insignificant positive coefficient, supporting that 
firms’ market volatility has a greater effect on the leverage of resource relatedness, as a 
source of resource redeployment flexibility, than resource divisibility. Further, while the 
direct effect of the relative size receives significant positive coefficients in Models 2 through 
4, its coefficients lose statistical significance when we test a more inclusive model. However, 
the moderating effect of shallow-pockets on relative size receives strong statistical support in 
Models 4 through 6, providing preliminary support for propositions 1 (i.e., extra investment in 
divisible resources due to better affordability) and 3 (the contingent effect of firms’ cash-
limitedness on leveraging the resource divisibility as a stronger source of resource 
redeployability).  
We, particularly, develop Model 6 to test whether cash-rich and cash-limited firms 
differ in leveraging resource relatedness as the main source of resource redeployability; as 
stated in Propositions 3. To do this, we separate the moderation effects of Relative relatedness 
* volatile-portfolios for shallow-pockets and deep-pockets.  We observe that this moderation 
effect is particularly significant for the firms with relatively higher cash resources.  Our 
regression models provide the preliminary empirical evidence for our developed RR theory of 
intrafirm capital investment. To check for the robustness of our results, we operationalized the 
cash-richness of the firms based on their generated cash divided by their total asset. The 
repetition of our regression tests provided us with qualitatively similar results.   
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Post-hoc analysis: Further analysis of subsidization of smaller segments  
In this section of our empirical analysis, we take a closer look at firms’, relatively, higher 
capital investment in smaller segments. We differentiate between the previous work’s 
explanation that attributes this subsidization to managerial cognitive limitations (e.g., Bardolet 
et al., 2011), and our proposed mechanisms which are rooted in potential higher divisibility of 
investing in smaller subsidiaries. Bardolet et al. (2011) imputes the subsidization of relatively 
smaller segments to the cognitive limitations of corporate managers and takes it as evidence 
for naïve diversification. Therefore, according to their view, this subsidization is expected to 
result in value destruction at the firm level. However, we suggested that extra investment in 
smaller subsidiaries might be also rooted in smaller subsidiaries’ higher affordability of 
investment opportunities due to their potential lower indivisible investment thresholds and the 
potential redeployment flexibility that higher divisibility might offer. The results of our 
experiments showed that firms’ cash-limitedness positively moderates these mechanisms. 
Therefore, we expect that the subsidizations of smaller subsidiaries by shallow pockets, in 
particular, to be associated with shallow-pockets’ value creation. We examine the value 
implications of cross-subsidization of smaller segments to discriminate between the overall 
value-destroying capital subsidization of smaller segments and the specific shallow-pockets’ 
value-enhancing capital subsidization of smaller segments.  
To this end, we regress the next year Tobin’s q of the firms, as a measure of firm 
created value, on the extent of accordance of firms’ capital allocation practices to either of the 
terms at the right hand-side of Equation 2. We follow Rajan et al., (2000) to construct the 
measure of firms’ capital allocation accordance to market growth, i.e., Market-based value-
added, and develop the other two dependent variables in a similar vein34.  We control for the 
                                                     
34 The measure takes the multiplication of the amount of capital subsidized (transferred) to (from) a subsidiary 
business, i.e., positive (negative) capital subsidy intensity, and its relative (positive or negative) market 
opportunity as the value-added by capital allocation related to that segment. According to the logic underlying 
this measure, corresponding to each subsidiary business, an absolute amount equal to the multiplication of 
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firms’ current year Tobin’s q, average relatedness of their subsidiary businesses, the logarithm 
of size (total asset), the logarithm of generated cash and the number of business units. Our test 
includes a fixed effect panel regression model including year and firm fixed effects.  
Some insightful patterns emerge from our results. First, we find that, in general, 
neither significant value creation nor value destruction results from shifting capital towards 
either the more related subsidiary businesses or the ones which are active in markets with 
higher growth opportunity. However, we find that firms that are mainly active in relatively 
high volatile markets may create value by tilting the capital flow towards their relatively more 
related businesses. Second, while overall committing to invest in relatively smaller 
subsidiaries receives an almost significant negative coefficient (P-Value equal to 10.9%), 
specific behavior of either shallow-pockets or firms with relatively volatile markets to invest 
in relatively smaller subsidiaries receives positive, albeit, insignificant effect. 
 
DISCUSSION  
In this study, we reconcile the theories of internal capital market and resource redeployment. 
We extend the boundaries of RR theory, which merely explains the redeployment of non-
financial resources, to embrace the corporate capital allocation process. By doing so, we set 
the stage for empirical investigations of RR theory and also contribute to a better 
understanding of the corporate capital allocation process. In turn, studying intrafirm capital 
allocations through the lens of RR theory helps us further develop and offer novel predictions 
for the theory.  
                                                     
capital subsidy intensity and relative market opportunity would be created (destroyed) if the signs of these two 
match (mismatch). The aggregation of this measure at a firm’s portfolio-level provides that firm’s expected 
value creation/destruction by capital allocation. We develop relatedness-based value-added and size-based 
value-added in the same manner. 
However, we do not take the absolute values of these value-added measures as equivalent to created/destroyed 
value. Instead, we introduce these variables to our regression models and let the regression tests identify their 
value creation/destruction implications. Therefore, the fact that our different value-added measures, i.e., market-
based, relatedness-based and size-based, do not have similar dimensions is not problematic for our tests.  
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From a theoretical perspective, while we acknowledge that capital is perfectly 
fungible and divisible, we show that the fungibility and divisibility of latent resources (which 
are competing choices for headquarters’ capital investment decisions) significantly affect 
capital allocation decisions. The fungibility and divisibility of a latent resource provide the 
headquarters with resource redeployability. Redeployability is the flexibility and ease to 
gradually withdraw the resource from the use it is developed for and redeploy it in another use 
in future. We find that leveraging this characteristic, in capital allocation decisions, results in 
inter-temporal economies particularly for firms which are active in highly volatile markets. 
Further, we find that cash-rich and cash-limited firms differ in their main source of 
redeployment flexibility. While both reployability elements are important for both types of 
firms, cash-rich firms achieve inter-temporal economies by investing, mainly, in resource 
fungibility; however, cash-limited firms mainly leverage latent resource’s divisibility, in their 
capital investment decisions, in order to reach resource redeployment flexibility and gain 
inter-temporal economies. This is due to the fact that cash-limited firms have fewer means to 
acquire new resources when needs arise in face of external opportunities. Therefore 
overcommitting to indivisible resources results in cash-limited firms’ rigidity and is extremely 
hazardous. Also, the divisibility of a resource might affect firms’ capital allocation decisions 
through another mechanism, i.e., the affordability-based subsidization. A headquarters might 
not afford to develop a resource with high indivisible investment threshold; alternately, it only 
invests its available capital in a less opportune resource that has instead a lower indivisible 
investment threshold. Similar as in the first mechanism (i.e., leveraging resource divisibility 
in capital allocation decisions to gain resource redeployability), the affordability-based 
subsidization of more divisible resources would be also more pronounced for cash-limited 
firms. 
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 Our results confirm the propositions of Busenbark et al. (2017) that the controversial 
results of the studies addressing internal capital market debate are partially due to the 
complexity of capital allocation decisions unaccounted for by the extant research. By applying 
the RR theory-based lens to the corporate capital allocation process, we take the first steps to 
unravel this complexity. As such, our work contributes to internal capital market literature in 
two main ways as we reveal the effects of two critical contingencies on both capital allocation 
practices and their value implications.  
First, although a general tendency to tilt the capital flow towards more related 
subsidiary businesses would not guarantee any contribution to corporate value, firms whose 
portfolios include businesses serving relatively more volatile industries may create value by 
subsidizing more related subsidiary businesses.  Interestingly, our results in Table 3.3 show 
that multi-business firms’ managers have already put this piece of knowledge into practice.  
Second, our results confirm the existence of two distinct and different mechanisms 
that explain the tendency of headquarters to tilt capital flow towards relatively smaller 
subsidiaries. The first mechanism is the overall firm’s tendency to subsidize smaller business 
units. This overall tendency is the consequence of a headquarters’ behavior in the even 
allocation of capital among its subsidiaries. This overall tendency is rooted in headquarters’ 
cognitive limitations (Bardolet et al. 2011) and destroys value at the firm level. The second 
mechanism is practiced especially by cash-limited firms, (shallow pockets). Here, the 
subsidization of relatively smaller business units is rooted in the potential limitations of 
shallow-pockets to afford fulfilling the growth opportunities of their relatively larger 
subsidiaries, even if these subsidiaries have more attractive growth opportunities, or in 
shallow-pockets’ quest for resource redeployability. Our results confirm that this second 
mechanism would have positive effect on firm value, if any. Our results related to the 
affordability mechanism comply with those found by Shin and Stulz (1998). They find 
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empirical support that capital investment in the subsidiaries with the highest market 
opportunities is independent of the subsidiaries’ generated cash flow when they are also the 
smallest business segments of the portfolio. Conversely, capital investment in the subsidiaries 
with the highest market opportunities is dependent on their generated cash if they are the 
largest segments of their corporate parents’ portfolio. 
Despite its contributions, our study is subject to several limitations. First, similar to 
other recent studies addressing the internal capital market efficiency debate, we used 
Compustat data and SIC codes as the identifiers of the industries; these are very broad 
(McGahan and Porter, 1997) and do not provide a precise measure of market opportunities a 
business segment perceives. Second, our relatedness measure is not sufficiently precise. 
However, since our sample includes a wide range of industries, it is hard to replace our 
measure with more precise ones such as those developed on technological relatedness 
(Silverman, 1999).   
 
CONCLUSION 
Headquarters’ managers do not limit their capital allocation decision criteria merely to the, 
anticipated, very first returns on their investments. Rather, they also take potential ex-post 
resource redeployments into account in such decisions. Extending the resource redeployment 
theory and applying it to corporate capital allocation, we show that what previous research has 
documented as pervasive inefficient capital cross-subsidization of multi-business firms, partly 
results from the fact that those studies have not considered firms’ quest for resource 
redeployment flexibility in their capital allocation decisions. We also showed that both 
subsidiaries’ resources’ divisibility and relatedness may contribute to firms’ redeployment 
flexibility and ultimate inter-temporal economies. However, the impact of these two elements 
of resource redeployability is different for a firm depending on the specific conditions it faces.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
This dissertation was intended to answer the question of “how firms’ strategies affect the 
performance of subsidiary businesses”. I split this broader question into more focused 
questions starting with “how importantly firms’ strategies affect the performance of 
subsidiary businesses” and “what are the mechanisms underlying this firms’ contribution to 
subsidiaries’ performance.” Answering these questions motivated other ones such as “which 
subsidiaries receive more of headquarters’ contribution”, and “whether firms are as inefficient 
in their capital allocation practices as the extant internal capital market literature suggests”. I 
designed each chapter of my dissertation to provide an answer to one or two of these more 
concentrated questions. In the present conclusion section, first I review the answers my thesis 
provides to these research questions as different facets of its main and broader one. Then, I 
enumerate the main contributions this dissertation makes, and explain some of limitations and 
caveats in my studies. Finally, I introduce some research avenues my dissertation motivates 
for future work.  
 
Answers to the research questions 
The first chapter of my dissertation was designed to answer the question of how importantly 
firms’ strategies affect the performance of subsidiary businesses. In this chapter, we argued 
that, due to methodological limitations, prior studies failed to account for the business-variant 
corporate effects – the uneven impacts of a corporate office on the performance of its 
subsidiary businesses. This methodological failure resulted in a systematic underestimation of 
corporate effects. Our results in this chapter confirmed the significance and importance of the 
business-variant corporate effects contributing to the magnitude increase in overall corporate 
effects. We showed that the total corporate effect is at least as important as the business 
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effect. This finding corroborates the importance of the effects of firms’ strategies on the 
performance of subsidiary businesses.  
The second chapter provided an answer to the question related to the efficiency of 
firms’ capital allocation. This intrafirm capital allocation represents an exemplary mechanism 
underlying a firm’s uneven contribution to the performance of its subsidiaries. The extant 
work, almost unanimously, took the firms’ deviations from the winner-picking logic of capital 
allocation (that is investing relatively more in subsidiaries with higher growth opportunities) 
as evidence of inefficiency. Deviations from winner-picking have been attributed to agency 
problems resulting from rent seeking behaviors of corporate CEOs and divisional, behavioral 
biases and cognitive limitations of decision makers, as well as intrafirm politics. We provided 
a different answer by empirically showing that these deviations might simply reflect firms’ 
different corporate characteristics generating different strategic intents. We showed that these 
deviations might be, in part, attributable to firms’ quest of leveraging synergistic rents which 
is not rooted in inefficiencies.  
The third chapter of my dissertation strives to provide answers to questions about how firms 
make capital allocation decisions and which subsidiaries are potent to receive higher shares of 
firms’ capital investments. This chapter draws from the theory developed in regard to firms’ 
resource redeployments and shows that while the extant work excludes firms’ allocation of 
financial resources from the boundaries of this theory, due to the perfect fungibility and 
divisibility of financial resources such as capital, this theory demonstrates great potential to 
explain firms’ capital allocations. Our simulation analysis and the subsequent empirical work 
showed that a headquarters takes its subsidiaries’ overall redeployability of resources as a 
substitute for their overall market growth opportunity in its capital investment due diligence. 
Our analysis in this chapter suggested that for very low levels of market volatility a firm is 
better-off if it purely follows the suggestions of internal capital market theory: investing more 
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of firms’ capital in subsidiaries with higher growth opportunity, i.e., the winner picking 
approach. However, for a range of moderate to relatively high levels of market volatility, a 
firm can create value by simultaneously considering the overall market growth opportunity 
and overall redeployability of its business segments (which provides the firm with flexibility 
in potential future redeployments). Further, within this range of market volatility, the weights 
assigned to segments’ redeployability increases with market volatility. We also showed that 
cash-rich and cash-limited firms differ in their main source of redeployment flexibility. While 
both reployability elements, i.e., resource relatedness and divisibility, are important for both 
types of firms, cash-rich firms achieve inter-temporal economies by investing, mainly, in 
resource relatedness; however, cash-limited firms would be, relatively, more willing to invest 
in subsidiaries with lower indivisible investment thresholds.  
 
Main contributions  
Contributions to the debate on the sources of performance heterogeneity 
My dissertation, particularly by the first chapter, sheds more light on the counterintuitive 
results of previous studies about the extent of the effect of firms’ headquarters on the 
performance of businesses. Different theoretical strands such as dominant general 
management logic (Prahalad, Bettis, 1986), parenting theory (Goold, Campbell, and 
Alexander, 1994), portfolio management (Haspeslagh, 1982) have emphasized the role of 
corporate headquarters in creating value. However, the empirical variance decomposition 
studies (e.g., Guo, 2017; Hough, 2006; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991) have 
estimated relatively low corporate effects on the performance of businesses. My dissertation 
explains that the statistical approach has been used to estimate the relative importance of 
industry, firm, and business effects on persistent performance differences among businesses is 
potent to systematically underestimate the corporate effects. This underestimation is rooted in 
failing to account for the “business-variant corporate effects” that are the uneven impact of a 
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corporate office on the performance of its subsidiary businesses. By developing a three-stage 
hierarchical linear model, we could manage to capture the non-previously-explored business-
variant corporate effects. Our results showed that our proposed business-variant corporate 
effects are as important as the previously studied standard corporate effects, which we 
connote as “business-invariant corporate effects”. We showed that the total corporate effects 
are at least as important as the business effects that has been estimated to be far higher than 
the other effects by the extant work.  
 
Contributions to the intrafirm capital allocation studies 
Firms’ capital allocation is one of the most important decisions a headquarters makes. Since 
empirical studies in financial economics literature provided evidence that diversified firms are 
traded at a discount compared to comparable portfolio of single business firms in the market 
(e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994), a stream of empirical studies was initiated to address the sources 
of the observed diversification discount; out of which, a line of inquiry argued for corporate 
capital allocation process inefficiency as a potential source of diversification discount (Berger 
and Ofek, 1995; Rajan et al., 2000; Shin and Stulz, 1998). Even though the early evidence on 
the existence of diversification discount has been challenged and imputed to some 
methodological problems (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Levinthal and 
Wu, 2010; Villalonga, 2004)35, the empirical debate on the corporations’ internal capital market 
efficiency, per se, has continued and also expanded to strategy management literature (e.g., 
Arrfelt, et al., 2013; Bardolet, et al., 2011). The mainstream research on internal capital markets 
proposes a winner-picking logic (Stein, 1997) to obtain the optimality of internal capital 
                                                     
35 Campa and Kedia (2002), Gomes and Livdan (2004) and Villalonga (2004) attribute the evidence on the 
existence of diversification discount to the endogenous self-selection of the firms into the act of diversification. 
According to them, the firms which undergo diversification would be likely to perform worse than the others 
even if they would not diversify. On the other hand, Levinthal and Wu (2010), taking an opportunity cost lens, 
suggest that firms try to dedicate their resources to the best use of them; so, in response to the changes in the 
markets they are active in, ”demand maturity” for example, the firms may reallocate their “resources away from 
established markets and, at the sacriﬁce of proﬁt margins but not total proﬁts” (p., 785). 
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markets. This literature assumes that internal capital allocations are optimal if top managers in 
headquarters shift the capital investments towards the units with higher market growth 
prospects. The empirical studies, however, provide ample evidence that multi-business firms 
deviate from the winner-picking logic and cross-subsidize units with lower prospects at the 
expense of units with higher expected future returns (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Billett and Mauer, 
2003; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). Deviations from winner-picking have been attributed to 
agency problems resulting from rent seeking behaviors of corporate CEOs and divisional 
managers (e.g. Antle and Eppen, 1985, Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Rajan, et al., 2000), 
behavioral biases and cognitive limitations of decision makers (e.g., Bardolet et al., 2011; 
Arrfelt, et al., 2013), as well as intrafirm politics (e.g., Cremers, Huang, and Sautner 2013; 
Duchin and Sosyura, 2013; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2015; Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Sautner 2013). Deviation from winner-picking approach, however, was not always found to be 
detrimental to firm value (Arrfelt et al., 2015; Billett and Mauer, 2003; Gupta et al., 2017).  
The second and third chapters of my dissertation contributed to fill this gap. These 
chapters illuminated how prior work claiming that firms misallocate capital might have reached 
their conclusion because they did not consider firm-specific aspects in capital allocation 
optimality. The deviations from the winning-picking strategy might simply reflect firms’ 
strategic intents other than growth which is the strategic intent which fits the winner-picking 
logic of capital allocation. On the one hand, the second chapter contributed by providing 
empirical evidence for the existence of and disentangling between inefficient and not-
necessarily-inefficient deviations. It also highlighted the role of firms’ managerial capability 
(Adner and Helfat, 2003), captured by the CEOs’ breadth of prior experience in subsidiaries, in 
attenuating inefficient deviations and enhancing corporate value through better capital 
allocation practices. The third chapter, on the other hand, revealed how subsidiaries’ resources’ 
relatedness (which provides the firm with flexibility in potential future redeployments), and 
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divisibility (that makes the gradual investments and resource withdrawals more feasible) play 
a substitute role of subsidiaries’ growth opportunities in headquarters’ capital investment 
decisions. Further, results in this chapter showed that two important factors affect the weight of 
subsidiaries’ resources’ relatedness and divisibility, in comparison to their growth opportunity, 
in headquarters’ due diligence. On the one hand, the overall volatility of markets in which a 
firm is active increases the weight of subsidiaries’ both elements of redeployability; and on the 
other hand, the cash-limit of the firms increases the weight of subsidiaries’ divisibility. Finally, 
my studies confirmed that internal capital markets might be more efficient than external capital 
markets and create value not only because of information premium of headquarters over 
external markets on subsidiary businesses36, but also because internal capital markets consider 
the firm-specificity of capital investment.   
 
Contributions to the theory of resource redeployment theory 
Seeking to maximize profit, firms intend to optimally allocate non-scale free resources and 
capabilities across their business units. Since allocating a non-scale free resource to one 
subsidiary might be at the expense of other subsidiaries, allocation of non-scale free resources 
is subject to opportunity cost (Levinthal and Wu, 2010; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). A recent 
stream of research, interested in diversification practices, has brought the consideration of 
resources’ opportunity cost into account to resolve the inconsistencies found in the results of 
the studies estimating the relation between diversification and firms’ performance (Levinthal 
and Wu, 2010; Wu, 2013). Consequently, the research in the realm of the theory of resource 
redeployment (RR theory hereafter) has provided a substantial theoretical contribution to 
explain how “the opportunity cost of the continued use of resources in an underperforming 
business” (Sakhartov, 2017; p.4) and the cost of redeployment of the resources in a new 
                                                     
36 Which is the underlying logic of value-creation by the multi-business firms in the theory of internal capital 
markets (Stein, 1997; Williamson, 1975) 
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business opportunity, together, shape the firms’ diversification decisions (Lieberman, Lee and 
Folta, 2017; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014, 2015). We know much less about how the 
opportunity cost of investing resources in existing subsidiary businesses affects the flow of 
resource redeployment among a firm’s existing subsidiaries; that is to explain the likelihood 
of a subsidiary business to be allocated more or less resources from its headquarters. In 
addition, empirical investigation into this emerging RR theory is scarce. It has been argued 
that the main reason behind this oversight is the challenge of observing redeployment of non-
financial resources (Sakhartov and Folta, 2015).  
The third chapter of my thesis contributes to resolve this shortcoming by pushing the 
boundaries of the theory beyond redeployment of non-financial resources to also incorporate 
the allocation of financial resources, particularly capital. The extant work in RR theory 
excludes firms’ capital allocation from the boundaries of this theory due to the perfect 
fungibility and divisibility of capital. If a resource is perfectly fungible and divisible, a firm 
has a perfect flexibility to rationalize it according to the optimal capacity in the current use 
and redeploy the unutilized capacity to a new use either internally or externally. We argue 
however that the potential resource to be developed by the invested capital would not be 
necessarily perfectly fungible or divisible. Further, when investing capital in one of its 
subsidiaries to acquire non-financial resources such as plants or technology, a corporate 
headquarters also purchases the option to redeploy those same resources in subsequent 
periods. Therefore, the direction of current capital flow among subsidiary businesses will not 
merely be a function of their current relative market growth opportunities, but also other 
factors explained by RR theory. This chapter contributes to RR theory by extending its 
boundaries to embrace capital allocation. We show that observing internal capital allocation 
enables an empirical test and investigation of RR theory. More importantly, studying intrafirm 
capital allocations through the lens of RR theory helps us further develop and offer novel 
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predictions for this theory. We find that cash-rich and cash-limited firms differ in their main 
source of redeployment flexibility. While both reployability elements are important for both 
types of firms, cash-rich firms achieve inter-temporal economies by investing, mainly, in 
resource relatedness; however, cash-limited firms mainly leverage latent resource’s 
divisibility, in their capital investment decisions, in order to reach resource redeployment 
flexibility and gain inter-temporal economies. This is due to the fact that cash-limited firms 
have fewer means to acquire new resources when needs arise in face of external opportunities. 
Therefore overcommitting to indivisible resources results in cash-limited firms’ rigidity and is 
extremely hazardous to them. 
 
Methodological contributions 
The studies included in the present dissertation use a broad range of methodologies 
including Hierarchical Linear Models, Panel Data Analysis, and Simulations to contribute to 
management theory as well as to offer important managerial implications with respect to 
corporate-level decisions. Among these methods, the 3-stage, random coefficient, hierarchical 
model developed in the first chapter offered a creative solution for the methodological 
limitations underlying the systematic underestimation of corporate effects in the previous work 
that is worth further consideration.  
The use of hierarchical linear models (HLM) since 2006 (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 
2006) helped scholars to resolve the collinearity problem between corporate and industry effects 
and between corporate and business effects. This was due to HLM’s capacity (unlike standard 
fixed/random effect models) to integrate residuals in each level to be estimated separately 
(Hofmann, 1997, 1998). In addition, using HLM techniques eliminated the need to regress 
business performance against dummy variables, thus providing a higher statistical power than 
nested ANOVA models (see Goldstein, 2011, p. 922). However, the standard HLM proves 
unable to account for our introduced business-variant corporate effects, as it cannot evaluate 
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more than one cross-nested effect simultaneously. Prior studies, using HLM, were limited to 
modeling only the most important cross-classification where lower-level categories of 
businesses are cross-nested in two higher-level categories, i.e., corporations and industries, 
simultaneously (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 2006). However, examining business-variant 
corporate effects necessitated multiple simultaneous cross-nested categorical variables. First, 
similar to previous studies, we had to model business segments as a categorical variable cross-
nested in corporate parents and industries. In addition, to capture the uneven impact of corporate 
decisions on business performance, we needed to consider that yearly business performance is 
cross-nested within both the corporate parent and year categories. We could capture the 
variance related to the business-variant corporate effects only when we introduced the variables 
that potentially affect the corporate resource allocation decisions into the model at a corporate 
parent-year level. Finally, business performance was affected by both stable and transient 
industry effects, which would generate another cross-classification problem (Adner and Helfat, 
2003; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Given the time length of the observations, not considering 
the variance between industries’ performance over time might undermine the overall industry 
effects. To account for transient industry effects, one would need to introduce a categorical 
variable (industry-year) that is simultaneously cross-nested within year and industry categories.  
In other words, all three cross-classifications, i.e., industry-year, industry-corporation, 
and corporation-year, are highly important in our model. This is why we decided to propose a 
model that was a mixture of the nested ANOVA and HLM models to estimate different effects, 
in particular, the newly introduced business-variant corporate effects. We devised a three-stage 
hierarchical linear model, where every subsequent stage takes the residuals of the previous 
stage: In the first stage, we partitioned the macro effects including year, industry and industry-
year effects through a random intercept HLM setting. In the second stage, we developed a three-
level random intercept hierarchical linear model to partition the standard corporate, i.e., 
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business-invariant corporate, and business segment effects simultaneously out of the residuals 
of the first stage model. And finally, through the third stage, we explained the residuals of the 
second stage by a random slope, i.e., coefficient, HLM model. In this stage, we estimated the 
random slope of the strategic factors that may affect the resource redistribution decisions of 
headquarters to the model. These factors helped us partition the business-variant corporate 
effects. 
Limitations 
The studies included in this dissertation are subject to several limitations. First, similar 
to other recent studies addressing either the relative importance of different effects on 
business performance or the internal capital market efficiency debate, I used Compustat data 
and SIC codes as the identifiers of the industries. These codes are very broad (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997) and do not provide a precise measure of market opportunities a business 
segment perceives. Second, I followed extant work that has operationalized SIC proximity in 
different ways to capture relatedness (e.g., Keil, Maula, Schildt and Zahra, 2008; Villalonga 
and McGahan, 2005). This provided me with a less precise relatedness measure than those 
developed on technological relatedness (Silverman, 1999), for example. However, since my 
sample includes a wide range of industries, it is hard to replace my measure of relatedness 
with more precise ones.   
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, to include all of the cross-
classification possibilities in our model in the first chapter, my coauthor and I were obliged to 
introduce a 3-stage HLM. This prevented us from estimating the industry effect 
simultaneously with the corporate and business effects. However, we believe, the fact that we 
have partitioned the effects from the most macro ones towards the lower-level effects has 
protected our methods from potential estimation biases rooted in sequential estimations. 
Finally, and from a methodological standpoint, the adjustment of capital intensity by the 
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norms of a business segment’s industry, in both second and third chapters, might affect the 
results. In general, industry-adjustment of capital intensity has its own pros and cons. As a 
positive point, it partitions the residuals that are industry-year-specific while are not related to 
market opportunity. For example, an industry might become extremely capital intensive, due 
to emergence of a new technology for instance, therefore, not adjusting for this temporal 
effect would distort the estimations. On the other hand, this industry-year-level adjustment 
washes out a great deal of residuals pertaining to the industries’ overall growth opportunity, 
especially if responded by the majority of businesses in a same industry. My coauthors and I 
decided to follow the methods excessively used in previous research to make it easier to 
compare our results with those of previous work.  
 
Motivating new research 
I aimed to answer core questions in Strategy through my thesis work. More precisely, my 
thesis incorporated rigorous mathematical and empirical analysis to offer solutions to long 
standing debates in corporate strategy. It aimed to unbundle the black box of corporate effect 
(the effect of corporate headquarters on subsidiary businesses’ performance). Overall, through 
my dissertation, I contributed to the debated magnitude, efficiency, and mechanism of the 
effect of a multi-business firms’ headquarters on the performance of its subsidiaries. My 
dissertation, however, opens new directions for future research in different ways. First, by 
extending the boundaries of the theory of resource redeployment (RR theory) to include 
intrafirm capital allocations, my study sets the stage for further empirical investigations of RR 
theory. It also facilitates looking at the role of firms’ and managers’ specific characteristics 
that may influence the resource allocation and redeployment within the boundaries of multi-
business firms. Further, my work focused on segments’ interdependence, as a decision 
complexity dimension that provides firms with an opportunity to pursue synergies in their 
capital investments. Pursuing synergies, in turn, might make firms deviate from winner-
137 
 
picking logic of capital allocation. My dissertation motivates the study of deviation effects of 
other corporate-level strategies and competitive objectives such as risk mitigation (Busenbark 
et al., 2017) and avoiding competition escalation from the rivals (Sengul and Gimeno, 2013) 
for further empirical work in this area. Similarly, my work signals for opportunities in 
examining the corrective effects of firms’ decision-making resources and capabilities on 
firms’ inefficient capital allocations. While my research has mostly highlighted the breadth of 
CEO’s prior experience in subsidiaries businesses as one source of firms’ decision-making 
capability, there remains many other such sources to explore. For example, I expect that firms 
with more developed decision support systems (Sharda, Barr, and MCDonnell, 1988) would 
be also less likely to deviate inefficiently from winner-picking capital allocation.   
Last but not least, as I mentioned in the introduction and also is reflected in Figure 0.1, 
a firm’s uneven contribution to the performance of its businesses is not, merely, rooted in 
corporate-level decisions such as capital allocation in which the headquarters directly selects 
between its subsidiaries, as the locus of capital investments. Rather, any corporate-level 
initiatives may result in a re-distribution of resources among subsidiaries at the benefit of some 
subsidiaries and at the expense of others. For example, acquisition of a knowledge firm by the 
headquarters might provide one of the existing subsidiaries with valuable resources (the 
knowledge existing in the newly acquired unit) while another subsidiary might not benefit from 
the acquisition (if the newly acquired knowledge is irrelevant to this second subsidiary). Thus, 
the study of business-variant corporate effects of specific corporate-level initiatives would be a 
potentially promising extension of my work. For example, studying which subsidiaries are 
likely to benefit headquarters’ acquisition decisions more than their sister businesses might 
provide us with new knowledge and help us fill the existing gaps in the area of this corporate-
level strategy.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1.Table A.1: 3-stage HLM estimation of variance including random slopes for 
relatedness and its interactions 
         
     Variance Standard 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] χ2  P-value 
          estimate error           
Stage 1. year, industry, industry-year effects       411.87 0.0000 
Outcome measure: ROA          
Variance of outcome measure: 0.2076825         
Level 4 variable variance (year) 0.0003073 0.000306  .0000436 0.002168   
Level 3 variable variance (industry) 0.0076859 0.001476  .0052755 0.011198   
Level 2 variable variance (industry-year) 0.0111357 0.001363  .0087611  0.014154   
Level 1 Residuals    0.1819776 0.003266  .1756886  0.188492   
            
year                       (Percentage of total variance):   0.15%       
industry                (Percentage of total variance):  3.70%       
industry-year       (Percentage of total variance):   5.36%       
            
Stage 2. corporate and business effects      2126.64 0.0000 
Outcome measure: Stage-1 residuals        
Variance of outcome measure: 0.1719019         
Level 3 variable variance (corporation) 0.0508935 0.00492  .0421086 0.061511   
Level 2 variable variance (business segment) 0.103904 0.005055  .0944537  0.1143   
Level 1 Residuals    0.0707793 0.001524   .067855 0.07383   
            
corporation              (Percentage of total variance): 16.01%       
business segment (Percentage of total variance): 32.68%       
            
Stage 3. business-variant corporate effects      4177.37 0.0000 
Outcome measure: Stage-2 residuals        
Variance of outcome measure: 0. 052892         
Variance related to random slope (attract) 0.2412113 0.0787476  .1272061 0.457391   
Variance related to random slope (smallness) 0.0018875 0.000143  0.0016279  0.002189   
Variance related to random slope (relatedness) 7.43E-26 1.77E-22       0   .   
Variance related to random slope (attract*smallness) 0.5877234 0.050353  .496874 0.695184   
Variance related to random slope 
(attract*relatedness) 0.460295 0.129818  .2648314 0.800024   
Variance related to random slope (relatedness 
*smallness) 0.0006705 0.000254  .0003194 0.001408   
Level 2 variable variance (corporation-year) 6.95E-25 7.19E-25  9.16E-26 5.28E-24   
Level 1 Residuals    0.0197304 0.000432  .0189017 0.020595   
            
business-variant corporate effects (Percentage of total variance): 14.498%     
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Appendix 2. Deriving firms’ conformity with (deviations from) winner-picking approach 
 
Here we derive the extent of firms’ conformity with (or deviations from) winner-picking 
approach to capital investment, i.e., the dependent variable of our hypothesis testing models 
as an estimated dependent variable, EDV, to be used in our main analysis. To this end, we 
estimate the Relative market opportunity variable random coefficients at the firm-year level in 
a mixed effect hierarchical linear model. Considering the hierarchical structure of our data in 
this stage, we use the empirical Bayes predictions (Skrondal, Rabe-Hesketh, 2009) of the 
relative market opportunity variable random coefficients. We rescale the estimated random 
coefficients by multiplying them in 10,000 to derive the value of the variable accounting for 
firms’ Conformity with winner-picking.37  
 
Dependent variable: the variable Subsidy intensity captures the capital flow for each segment 
in a firm’s portfolio in each year. Positive amounts of subsidy intensity for a business segment 
reveals the extent to which the focal segment has been subsidized by the capital that would be 
invested in other sister businesses if the internal capital market was not existing. We follow 
Rajan et al. (2000) to calculate subsidy intensity. We derive subsidy intensity by adjusting 
capital intensity, i.e., asset-based normalized form of capital expenditure, in a two stage 
process. We first derive industry-adjusted capital intensity for each segment, and then adjust 
the industry-adjusted value by the average at the segment’s corporate parent’s portfolio in a 
following way: 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑡(
𝑁𝑗𝑡
𝑘=1 𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘𝑡) (A2.1) 
                                                     
37 Since the estimated random coefficients are from the order of magnitude between 0.00001 and 0.001, using the 
raw values of them (without any rescaling) as DV in the main analysis, makes all of the estimated coefficients 
and standard deviations in an order of magnitude of 0.00001; which makes the table of regression results 
unreadable. Indeed, our rescaling does not affect the t-statistics estimations (significance/insignificance). 
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where, 𝑤𝑘𝑡 refers to the segment k’s share of the total asset of firm j at time t and 
𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 refers to industry-adjusted capital intensity which is calculated as 
follows: 
 𝐼𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  −   
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
    (A2.2) 
where,  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
  stands for the median capital intensity of the single business 
firms in the focal subsidiary’s industry at the narrowest industry category that we have data at 
least for 5 single-business firms.  
 
Independent variable:  
The variable Relative market opportunity: following previous research (e.g., Arrfelt et al., 
2013; Rajan et al., 2000) we use Tobin’s q of the single business firms in each industry as a 
reference for the market opportunity of firms’ business segments which are active in that 
industry. More precisely, we take the median of Tobin’s q of the single business firms at the 
narrowest industry category that we have at least five observations as proxy for business 
segments’ overal market opportunity and adjust it with an asset-weighted average of its value 
through the parent firm’s portfolio:  
 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑞 
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑡
−  ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑡(
𝑁𝑗𝑡
𝑘=1 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑞 
𝑆𝑆
𝑘𝑡
)  (A2.3)   
where, i is a business segment of firm j, and 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑞 𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑡
 stands for the median of Tobin’s q 
of the single business firms at business segment i’s industry and 𝑤𝑘𝑡 refers to the segment k’s 
share of the total asset and 𝑁𝑗𝑡  refers to the number of the business segments of firm j at time 
t. 
 
Control Variables:  
We control for the variable Relative size (measured as the natural logarithm of the total asset 
of the entire firm that the focal business segment belongs to divided by the identified asset of 
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that business segment), the variable Cash intensity (computed as asset-normalized segment’s 
generated cash, i.e., segment’s generated cash divided by its identified asset), Sisters’ cash 
intensity (which is sisters’ asset-normalized generated cash) and CEO’s prior experience in 
business segment which is a dummy variable receiving 1 if the CEO had experience in the 
segment’s domain before assignment to CEO position and 0 otherwise. 38 
 
Statistical model and Results: 
We use a mixed-effect panel data hierarchical linear model (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; 
Hofmann, 1997; Misangyi et al. 2006). The fixed part of the model includes the independent 
and control variables as well as firm, industry, and year fixed effects. The variable part of the 
model includes firm-year random intercepts and random coefficients of the variables Cash 
intensity and Relative market opportunity at the firm-year level. Our preliminary analysis 
revealed that there is a significant variation between firms in how the difference in their 
segments’ cash generation affects the capital flow within their portfolios. This is why we 
decided to control for the cash intensity random coefficient at the firm-year level in addition 
to estimate relative market opportunity, whose random coefficients are needed for 
constructing firms’ conformity to winner-picking variable. The statistical model can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 +  𝜈𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡  𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 + 
+ (𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑡 )  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (A2.4)   
 
where i is a business segment belonging to firm j, 𝛼0 is model’s constant, 𝜆𝑖 are the industry 
fixed effects, 𝛾𝑡 are year fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of control variables, 𝜑𝑗  are the firm 
                                                     
38 It is worth mentioning that since we are eager to capture the firms’ difference in their conformity with (or 
deviation from) winner-picking, we do not control for any firm-level variable in this stage. Later, in our main 
analysis we try to explain firms’ difference in capital allocation patterns. 
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random intercepts, 𝛼𝑗𝑡 are firm-year random intercepts, 𝛽0 is the estimated coefficient for the 
independent variable as a pooled variable, 𝛽2𝑗𝑡 are the estimated 
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 random coefficients to be used to construct the dependent 
variable in our main analysis of the paper, and finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are the error terms. 
 Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the variables used 
in this model. There is a relatively important positive 23% correlation between business 
segments and their sister segments cash intensity. This correlation between the returns of 
different subsidiaries of a single firm may be rooted in the firm’s effect on performance 
(McGahan and Porter, 1997; Misangyi et al. 2006), or be related to similarity between overall 
profitability of the industries each firm is active in.  
 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (Business-level); n= 4283 
           
 Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1- Subsidy intensity 0.004 0.063 -0.519 0.709 1      
2- Relative market opportunity 0.012 0.447 -7.617 4.321 0.06 1     
3- Breath of CEO's prior experience 0.266 0.442 0 1 -0.04 -0.03 1    
4- Relative size 1.662 1.049 0 6.133 0.09 0.04 -0.14 1   
5- Cash intensity 0.157 0.179 -0.932 0.997 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.09 1  
6- Sisters' cash intensity 0.156 0.145 -0.838 0.946 0 0 0 0.04 0.23 1 
 
 
 
Table A.3 provides the results of our mixed effect models. Model 1 includes control 
variables which is the whole model introduced in Equation A2.4 except for the terms related 
to the variable Relative market opportunity. Only two variables in the fixed part of the model 
receive significant coefficients: CEOs’ prior experience receives a significant negative 
coefficient conforming to Xuan’s (2009) suggestion that CEO’s are likely to tilt the capital 
investments towards the subsidiaries they do not have prior experience in, as a “bridge-
building tool” to elicit those divisions’ directors’ cooperation. Further, segments’ relative size 
receives a significant positive coefficient meaning that relatively smaller businesses are 
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subsidized which is in accordance to the results of previous studies (e.g., Bardolet et al., 2011; 
Billett and Mauer, 2003). 
Table A.3: Random coefficient hierarchical linear model for estimating firms’ conformity to 
winner-picking; n= 4283 
 subsidy intensity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Relative market opportunity   .00673 (.00236) .00815 (.00282) 
CEO prior experience -.00628 (.00239) -.00618 (.00238) -.00618 (.00237) 
Relative size .00434 (.00102) .00427 (.00102) .0041788 (.00102) 
Cash intensity -.00894 (.00648) -.00862 (.00647) -.00794 (.00646) 
Sisters' cash intensity .00328 (.00733) .00436 (.00733) .00458 (.00730) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES 
Variance components   
Level 1, eit .0029488 (.0000783) .002944 (.0000781) .0029156 (.0000798) 
Level 2, corporate-year intercept 2.65e-18 (2.85e-18) 5.72e-18 (7.20e-18) 1.58e-18 (2.04e-18) 
Cash intensity slope .0047905 (.0007842) .0047849 (.0008087) .0045799 (.0007547) 
Relative market opportunity slope     .0002365 (.0002277) 
Level 3, corporate intercept 7.47e-06 .000027 5.69e-06 (2.68e-05) 2.88e-06 (.0000252) 
Observations 3906 3,906 3,906 
Log likelihood 5683.6638 5687.7116 5688.5979 
 
 
Model 2 includes the variable Relative market opportunity fixed effect in addition to 
the variables included in Model 1. Relative market opportunity receives a significant positive 
estimated coefficient. This result shows that, in general, multi-business firms in our sample 
have a tendency to comply with the winner-picking approach to capital allocation. Finally, we 
complete our model in Model 3 by introducing relative market opportunity random 
coefficients at firm-year level. The results show that dependent variable’s variance explained 
by relative market opportunity random variables is not statistically significant. A likelihood 
ratio test which is not reported in the table A2 indicates that the overall model fit 
improvement related to introduction of relative market opportunity random variables is 
significant only at an 18% p-value. However, the variance explained by relative market 
opportunity random coefficients are economically important. The improvement in model fit 
related to the introduction of the relative market opportunity random coefficients, in Model 3 
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compared to Model 2, is more than 20% of the improvement in fit due to adding relative 
market opportunity variable to the fixed part of the model in Model 2, compared to model 1. 
Therefore, we decide to use the estimated random variables as a proxy for the extent of firms’ 
conformity to winner-picking approach to capital investment.  
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APPENDIX3. More details about the simulation model 
 
In this Appendix, I provide more details about the specification of the simulation model, in 
chapter three, and its calibration with the empirical data. 
Model initialization 
At the beginning of simulation (t=0), each industry receives a random Tobin’s q from a 
normal distribution with its average and standard deviation at 1.69 and 0.45 respectively, 
which are the calibrated values with four central years (2004 through 2007) of the sample 
used for our empirical analyses. Similarly, each industry receives a random actual demand 
growth and ROA from two normal distribution. We define the average in ROA normal 
distribution and actual demand by taking into account the industries’ Tobin’s q. To account 
for industry effect on industries’ ROA and actual demand, we define the mean in ROA and 
demand normal distributions as follow: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 =    ROA𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    +   𝛽1 (𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑞𝑖𝑡 −  𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑞𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  )                (A3.1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 =    Demand𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   +   𝛽2 (𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑞𝑖𝑡 −  𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑞𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  )   (A3.2) 
where, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 capture the effect of industry i’s Tobin’s q  on its profitability and demand 
growth, respectively. 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is adjusted by its average value in our sample (which is 
1.69) . To estimate the 𝛽1, we regress the business segments’ ROA on their industries’ overall 
Tobin’s q while controlling for business segment fixed effects. From the similar period of 
2004 through 2007 of our sample we find values of 0.0133 and 0.124 for 𝛽1  and average 
ROA, i.e., ROA𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , respectively. This is to say, an industry with an overall Tobin’s q equal to 
1.69 receives its random ROA at the first period from a normal distribution averaging 12.4 
percent. However, a segment that serves an industry with higher (lower) Tobin’s q, receives 
its ROA from a normal distribution whose average is modified (e.g., the distribution average 
would be 13.7 percent if a segment’s industry Tobin’s q is 2.69). Through a relatively similar 
procedure, we find 𝛽2 and average demand equal to 0.07 and 0.0127 respectively. We decided 
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to fix both of the mean values of ROA’s and demand’s normal distribution means at 12 
percent for the experiments reflected in Figures 1 and 2. Later, to impose a cash-limitedness 
to firms, for the experiment related to Figure 3, we divide the mean of the profitability normal 
distribution by two.  We set the standard deviation in normal distribution of ROA at one-third 
for simplicity (not generating negative cash). This does not affect models’ predictions 
qualitatively. It only makes the model less complicated. On the other hand we set the standard 
deviation of actual market growth at 12 percent to represent a moderate volatility. We would 
adjust the standard deviations of both actual demand growth and Tobin’s q according to the 
extent of volatility we would like to impose to the model.  
Details of calculations in each period: 
Each period comprises the following steps: 
1- Industries receive their Tobin’s q value from a normal probability distribution around 
the previous period Tobin’s q with a standard deviation equal to Tobin’s q volatility. 
Tobin’s q volatility is the square root of the portion of variance of current year 
industries’ Tobin’s q which is not explained by industries’ preceding year Tobin’s q 
value. We find Tobin’s q volatility equal to 0.36 from the four central years of our 
sample. 
2- Industries (and similarly the business segments) receive their ROA from a normal 
probability distribution around the last period ROA which is modified by the current 
year growth of industry Tobin’s q (similar to equation 5 in chapter 3) and standard 
deviation equal to ROA volatility.  
3- Optimal capital investment and resource redeployment decisions are made based on 
the marginal value of the investment of one unit of cash (in case of capital allocation) 
and one unit of unutilized production line (in case of resource redeployment) in 
subsidiaries which have unresponded demand.   
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